Valuation of Closely-Held Firms: Another Look

For the most part, closely-held firms must be valued using proxies for market data which are not available. Valuation approaches described in the literature are used by practitioners with exceptions demanded by circumstances. Results of the survey confirm statements of others that substantial discounts for non-marketability and minority interest are usually appropriate

Corporate Governance, Illiquidity, and Valuation Issues in Privately-Owned Corporations

Investors in private corporations face unique problems relating to corporate control, illiquidity and valuation of securities. In this research, we survey a large sample of US corporations. Our sample includes both private and public firms. Major findings of our research are as follows: Private firms use written shareholder agreements for safeguarding ownership interests and dividend payments. Family owned firms dominate the ownership structure of private firms. Insiders of private firms own a much larger proportion of common stock than insiders in public firms, and the CEOs of private firms often happen to be the largest stockholders

Use of Debt Covenants in Small Firms

This paper examines the structure of debt covenants in small firms, with emphasis on privately owned firms. It is based on a survey of a large sample of firms drawn from the S&P Register of Corporations. The findings show that debt covenants imposed on small firms differ according to the firm type (privately owned or publicly owned), debt level, the borrowing cost, and the source of financing (bank or other sources). The evidence is generally consistent with the arguments relating to stockholder-bondholder agency cost conflicts and the Costly Contracting Hypothesis of Smith and Warner (1979)

Sources of Capital and Debt Structure in Small Firms

In this paper we examine the relationship between ownership differences and small firms’ financial policies using a survey of U.S. companies. The study finds that financial policies differ according to the type of ownership (private versus public) and by the ownership differences (family-owned, closely-held, or widely-held) within the private firms. The differences are in the ownership concentration, relative importance of various sources of capital, debt characteristics (sources of debt financing, debt maturity, and debt cost). A multiple regression equation estimated in the paper provides evidence relating to cross-sectional variations in debt ratios of small firms. The paper offers information asymmetry, illiquidity, and agency cost explanations for the observed differences in ownership and financial policies of small firms

Guide To Financial Analysis

New Yorkxii, 335 p.; 23 c

Guide to financial analysis

Grolier Business Library No. 6xi, 377 p.; 25 cm

Guide to financial analysis/ Bowlin

xiii, 417 hal.; 23,5 c

Guide to financial analysis/ Bowlin

xiii, 417 hal.; 23,5 c