Embodied perceptual moderation: How interoceptive and proprioceptive engagement affect perceptual performance

According to the framework of embodied cognition, perception is actively constructed across exteroceptive, interoceptive, and proprioceptive modalities. Exteroception relies on the senses to detect external stimuli originating outside the body, which generally remain stable and out of the person’s control. Interoception and proprioception gather information from internal organs and body status, respectively. This information is more variable because it can be influenced by active engagement. However, active engagement’s effect on interoceptive and proprioceptive processes regarding perception remains nebulous. By resorting to the principles of predictive coding, we hypothesize that the active engagement of interoceptive and proprioceptive modalities will provide a perceptual advantage as the result of physiological recruitment which drives attention (higher precision) to the objective reality. In a three-factor repeated-measures design, 39 participants will perform a visual rotation detection task at the end of each 20-minute, randomized condition: a) Diaphragmatic Breathing, for active interoceptive engagement, b) Isometric Handgrip Task, for active proprioceptive engagement, and c) Arithmetic Task, as the control condition. Low-frequency/High-frequency heart rate variability will be measured throughout to account for emotional affect. Behaviorally, performance will be measured with signal detection accuracy (d’), and reaction times modeled via drift-diffusion modeling with confidence rating as parameters. Attention to the presented stimuli will be measured with the EEG-elicited P300 component amplitude. We hypothesize that Diaphragmatic Breathing will lead to more accurate perceptual performance (higher accuracy, faster response times, larger P300 amplitude), followed by the Isometric Handgrip Task, and the control task. This hypothesis is based on previous work supporting that interoception maintains an optimal range of physiological states to promote advantageous behavior and cognition. If the hypothesis is supported, it will suggest that actively engaged physiological processes act as an “anchor” to the environment, providing new grounds for supplemental interventions to assist with perceptual disturbances, such as hallucinatory phenomena. If the hypothesis is not supported, it will suggest that perception and physiology are not as co-dependent, supporting the need for further research on the efficacy of body-oriented interventions

Cardiac responses to auditory deviants track variations of hierarchical perceptual processing during sleep

editorial reviewedObjectives: Embodied cognition proposes that visceral inputs play a fundamental role in perceptual processing. The evidence showing that variations in arousal can be tracked by modulations of cardiac responses to violations of hierarchical auditory expectations have come so far from pathological low arousal states (Raimondo et al., 2017). We study this question during sleep by investigating cardiac responses to auditory deviants in a local-global paradigm - a modified version of the classic oddball. Methods: We re-analyzed a dataset of 23 healthy adults who heard the local-global paradigm while having a morning nap (Strauss et al., 2015). We tested cardiac modulations after auditory deviants by comparing the time difference between the R-peak of the heartbeat before and after the onset of auditory deviants according to previous methodology (Raimondo et al., 2017). Results: We found differences in cardiac responses before and after the onset of deviants depending on the hierarchical level of prediction and arousal state (3-way repeated measures ANOVA, triple interaction: F(3,196)=3.92, p=0.010). We replicated previous findings that no cardiac modulations are observed after auditory deviants in wakeful subjects (Student’s t-test for local: t(21)=-0.19, p=0.848, global: t(21)=1.93, p=0.134; corrected for multiple comparisons) (Raimondo et al., 2017). No modulations of cardiac responses were also observed in deep NREM sleep (local: t(5)=0.59, p=0.578, global: t(5)=-1.18, p=0.578; corrected for multiple comparisons). However, an acceleration of the heartbeat was found in light NREM and REM sleep after local deviants (light NREM: t(15)=-3.67, p=0.004, REM: t(8)=-2.51, p=0.036; corrected for multiple comparisons), but not after global deviants (NREM: t(15)=1.26, p=0.735, REM: t(8)=1.26, p=0.488; corrected for multiple comparisons). Conclusions: Cardiac modulations to violations of auditory expectations during sleep are consistent with observations at the cerebral level that show a preservation of low-level hierarchical predictions but an absence of high-level hierarchical expectations in the light NREM sleep and REM sleep stages (Strauss et al., 2015). Our results thus confirm that cardiac modulations can track the variations of hierarchical perceptual processing during sleep. Codes and dataframes for statistical analyses can be accessed here: https://gitlab.uliege.be/Matthieu.Koroma/sleep_localglobal Dr. Mélanie Strauss and Dr. Athena Demertzi are co-last authors

Whole-brain deactivations precede uninduced mind-blanking reports

tMind-blanking (MB) is termed as the experience of inability to report mental contents. In contrast to other mental states, such as mind-wandering or sensory perceptions, the neural correlates of MB started getting elucidated only recently. A notable particularity that pertains to MB studies is the way MB is instructed for reports, like by deliberately asking participants to “empty their minds”. Such instructions were shown to induce fMRI activations in frontal brain regions, typically associated with metacognition and self-evaluative processes, suggesting that MB may be a result of intentional mental content suppression. Here, we aim at examining this hypothesis by determining the neural correlates of MB without induction. Using fMRI combined with experience-sampling, univariate analysis of MB reports revealed deactivations in occipital, frontal, somatosensory, and thalamic areas, but no activations in prefrontal regions. In fact, a Bayesian region-of-interest analysis on areas previously shown to be implicated in MB provided evidence for frontal deactivations during MB reports in comparison to other mental states. Further contrast analysis between reports of MB and content-oriented mental states also revealed deactivations in the L angular gyrus. We propose that these effects characterize a cortical profile of MB, where key cortical nodes are unable to communicate and formulate reportable content. Collectively, our results show that study instructions for MB may lead to cortical differences which provide different insights as to the underlying mechanisms leading to the phenomenology of MB.Significance StatementAn emergent research paradigm in the study of mental states has focused on periods of complete thought absence, where people report an inability to report mental content, termed mind blanking. The neural correlates supporting mind blanking are still debated and might vary depending on thought-report instructions. By reanalyzing an fMRI dataset utilizing an unguided, free-thinking paradigm, the present study provides critical insights into the neuronal events that preceded mind-blanking reports. Our findings demonstrate that spontaneous mind-blanking occurrences are associated with large-scale cortical deactivations in frontal, occipital, parietal and thalamical sites, with the frontal evaluative sites and the angular gyrus especially differentiating mind-blanking from other mental states associated with the presence of content

Age-dependent attentional style and pupil-linked arousal regulate the reportability of spontaneous mental states

The reportability of spontaneous thinking relies significantly on attention and arousal. As these cognitive faculties change with age, we aimed at testing how spontaneous mental state reportability is influenced accordingly. Using experience sampling, 20 senior (65-75yrs) and 20 young participants (20-30yrs) were prompted to report mind-wandering (MW), mind-blanking (MB), or sensory-related (S) mental states at random times. Attention was assessed with the Attentional Style Questionnaire, and arousal with continuous monitoring of pupil diameter. First, we found more MW occurrences than MB or S across all participants. For young responders, we replicated that MW was more prevalent in easily-distracted participants. In seniors, though, MW was more prevalent in participants with a higher focused attentional style. In senior participants who reported being more easily distracted, MW was associated with lower arousal (pupil constriction) and MB with higher arousal (pupil dilation), reversing the pattern found for young adults and focused seniors. We propose that these effects may result from intentional MW, during which senior participants allocate attentional resources to mentally engage inwards, as opposed to younger participants who get more easily distracted by their own mental activity leading to unintentional MW. Together, our results highlight age-dependent mechanisms by which attentional style and pupil-linked arousal regulate the reportability of spontaneous mental states across age

Age-dependent attentional style and arousal regulate reportability of spontaneous mental states

editorial reviewedThe reportability of spontaneous thoughts relies significantly on attention and arousal. As these cognitive faculties change with age, we aimed at testing how spontaneous mental state reportability is influenced accordingly. Using experience sampling, 20 senior (65-75yrs) and 20 young participants (20-30yrs) were prompted to report mind-wandering (MW), mind-blanking (MB), or sensory-related (S) mental states at random times. Attention was assessed behaviorally with the Attentional Style Questionnaire, and arousal physiologically with continuous monitoring of pupil diameter. First, we found more MW occurrences compared to MB or S across all participants. For young responders, we replicated that MW was more prevalent in easily distracted participants. MW was also linked to higher arousal (pupil dilation) and MB was linked to lower arousal (pupil constriction) independently of attentional style. In seniors though, MW was more prevalent in participants reporting higher focused style. As participants were more easily distracted, MW was associated with lower arousal (pupil constriction) instead and MB with higher arousal (pupil dilation). We postulate that these effects in seniors may be a result of intentional MW, during which they allocate attentional resources inwards in order to stay on task, as opposed to younger participants who get more easily distracted by intrusive thoughts leading to unintentional MW. Together, our results highlight opposite mechanisms by which attentional style regulates the reportability of spontaneous mental states across age. They also point towards the role of attentional style in mediating the impact of arousal on spontaneous thinking in the senior population

Age-dependent attentional style and arousal regulate reportability of spontaneous mental states

editorial reviewedThe reportability of spontaneous thoughts relies significantly on attention and arousal. As these cognitive faculties change with age, we aimed at testing how spontaneous mental state reportability is influenced accordingly. Using experience sampling, 20 senior (65-75yrs) and 20 young participants (20-30yrs) were prompted to report mind-wandering (MW), mind-blanking (MB), or sensory-related (S) mental states at random times. Attention was assessed with the Attentional Style Questionnaire, and arousal with continuous monitoring of pupil diameter. First, we found more MW occurrences than MB or S across all participants. For young responders, we replicated that MW was more prevalent in easily distracted participants. MW was also linked to higher arousal (pupil dilation) and MB was linked to lower arousal (pupil constriction) independently of attentional style. In seniors though, MW was more prevalent in participants with higher focused style. As participants were more easily distracted, MW was associated with lower arousal and MB with higher arousal. We postulate that these effects in seniors may result from intentional MW, during which they allocate attentional resources inwards, as opposed to younger participants who get more easily distracted by intrusive thoughts leading to unintentional MW. Together, our results highlight opposite mechanisms by which attentional style regulates the reportability of spontaneous mental states across age. They also point towards the role of attentional style in mediating the impact of arousal on spontaneous thinking in the senior population

Missing our own thoughts: Insights from Mind-Blanking

Meta-awareness, the awareness of the contents of our mental life, provides us with a monitoring mechanism to access, identify and monitor our stream of consciousness. Whether our minds drift through environmental stimuli, pay attention to a task or just wander, we are mostly aware of our thoughts. Occasionally however, this immediate awareness fails us. Self-catch and experience sampling methods have shown that people report an inability to access brief parts of their mental life, and through a reflective process of no mental experience, no thoughts. This peculiar phenomenological state is termed Mind-Blanking. In this presentation, we will be discussing behavioral, neuroimaging and computational advances in cases of “absence” reports to examine what may precede monitoring and access errors. In the first part, we will discuss findings on the role of specific brain connectivity patterns preceding blanking reports, paving the way for decoding access errors from neural activity. Interestingly, specific bodily contributions might guide these patterns, in line with recent embodied theories of meta-cognition. After that, we will examine how Bayesian models might be used to test potential mechanisms for absence reports. Examples from metacognition and confidence research provide us with evidence of perception-awareness decoupling metacognitive components that fail during access to consciousness. Finally, we will discuss cognitive and metacognitive components that might help us understand individual variation in how blanks occur, based on previous work on mind wandering