Disruptions in large value payment systems: an experimental approach

This experimental study investigates the behaviour of banks in a large value payment system. More specifically,we look at 1) the reactions of banks to disruptions in the payment system, 2) the way in which the history of disruptions affects the behaviour of banks (path dependency) and 3) the effect of more concentration in the payment system (heterogeneous market versus a homogeneous market). The game used in this experiment is a stylized version of a model of Bech and Garrett (2006) in which each bank can choose between paying in the morning (efficient) or in the afternoon (inefficient). The results show that there is significant path dependency in terms of disruption history. Also the chance of disruption influences the behaviour of the participants. Once the system is moving towards the inefficient equilibrium, it does not easily move back to the efficient one. Furthermore, there is a clear leadership effect in the heterogeneous market

The Behavioral Impact of Emotions in a Power-to-Take Game: An Experimental Study

The power-to-take game is a simple two player game where players are randomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder. Both players in each pair have earned an income in an individual real effort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the earned income of the responder that is left after the second stage will be transferred to the take authority (the so-called take rate). In the second stage, the responder can punish the take authority by destroying (part of) his or her earned income. In this experimental study, we are primarily interested in how emotions influence responder behavior. Our findings are the following. (1) A higher take rate significantly increases the intensity of irritation, contempt, and envy, and significantly decreases the intensity of joy and happiness. Since negative emotions are experienced as painful, there is direct hedonic impact. (2) Irritation and contempt drive punishment behavior. (3) There are discontinuous "jumps" in the behavior of responders. They either choose no punishment (destroy nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroy everything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the probability of punishment but not on the intensity of experienced emotion. This last result is explained in terms of norm-related regulation of emotions.Emotions, punishment, expectations, social norms, experiment

Exploring Group Behavior in a Power-to-Take Video Experiment

This paper experimentally explores group decision-making in a two-player power-to-take game. Discussions preceding group decisions are video taped and analyzed. Each subject first earns an income in an individual effort task preceding the game. The game consists of two stages. First, one group can claim any part of the income of the other group (take rate). Then, the latter group can respond by destroying own income. The results show that (1) although group behavior is in line with individual behavior, group behavior depends crucially on the decision rules that subject use to arrive at their group decision; (2) groups ignore the decision rule of their ‘opponents’ and typically view other groups as if they were single agents; (3) perceptions of fairness are prone to the so-called self-serving bias. (4) expectations are often not consistent with actual outcomes.groups, decision rule, fairness, experiment, video

Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction

We investigate experimentally whether emotions affect bidding behavior in a firstprice auction. To induce emotions, we confront subjects after a first auction series with apositive or negative random economic shock. We then explore the relation between emotions andbidding behavior in a second auction series. Our main results are: (i) the economic shock has asubstantial impact on the experienced emotions of bidders; (ii) the emotional statesystematically influences bidding behavior. In particular, negative emotions induce morecompetitive bidding. Our findings show that for a good understanding of bidder behavior theemotions have to be taken into account

Emotional Hazard and Real Effort in a Power-to-Take Game

This paper experimentally investigates whether agents behavedifferently if their own earnings are atstake (effort experiment) or a budget that is provided to them likea sort of manna from heaven(no-effort experiment) . We use the so-called power-to-take game,employed by Bosman & VanWinden (1999) to study the impact of emotions on economic behavior.Players are randomly dividedinto pairs consisting of a take authority and responder. Both playersin each pair have an endowment. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the takeauthority decides how much of theendowment of the responder that is left after the second stage willbe transferred to the take authority(the so-called take rate). In the second stage, the responder canpunish the take authority by destroying (part of) his or her endowment.Our main findings are the following:responders destroy moreoften and a greater amount on aggregate in the no-effort experiment;responders more often choosean intermediate amount of destruction in the no-effort experiment;the behavior of take authorities does not depend on effort;responders expect lower take rates in the no-effort experiment;in addition to the take rate, responders' expectations of the take ratehave a significant effect on theprobability of punishment in both the effort and no-effortexperiment. We explain these results withthe help of emotion theory

Microwave absorption on a thin film

With the use of a simple model, it is shown that a thin film of contaminant on a microwave window may absorb up to 50% of the incident power, even if the film thickness is only a small fraction of its resistive skin depth. This unexpectedly large amount of absorption is conjectured to have played a significant role in window failure. The temperature rise in a thin film is estimated. © 2003 American Institute of Physics.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/71216/2/APPLAB-82-9-1353-1.pd

Heating of Contaminants on Diamond Windows

This paper examines the RF heating of the contaminants on a diamond window. Both heating of an isolated internal graphite impurity, and of a thin film on the window surface, are discussed. Comparison with recent experiments is given. It is found that heating of isolated internal graphite impurities is unlikely to account for diamond window failure. Upon averaging over the entire window, the thin surface film in general absorbs approximately a fraction of one percent of the total incident power. Intense local heating on the surface contaminant is possible, however. © 2003 American Institute of PhysicsPeer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/87504/2/234_1.pd

The Ohmic heating of particulates in a lossless medium

This paper provides a general theory on the Ohmic dissipation of electromagnetic energy by a spherical particulate that is embedded in a lossless medium. The particulate may possess an arbitrary electrical conductivity, and both the medium and the particulate may assume general values of permittivity and permeability. Under the assumption that the wavelength of the electromagnetic field in the medium is large compared with the particulate size, we provide an accurate account of the degree of Ohmic heating by the radio frequency (rf) electric field and by the rf magnetic field of the electromagnetic field. It is found that, in general, heating by the rf magnetic field is dominant whenever δ<aδ<a, where δδ is the resistive skin depth and aa is the radius of the particulate. Analytic scaling laws in the various regimes are derived, from the static case to very high frequency, and for ratios of δ/aδ∕a ranging from zero to infinity. The calculation is extended to a transient electromagnetic pulse. Also constructed is the loss tangent of the medium, resulting from a distribution of particulates.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/87599/2/114915_1.pd

Heating of a particulate by radio-frequency electric and magnetic fields

With the use of a highly symmetrical model, the heating of a spherical particulate by a predominantly radio-frequency electric field and by a predominantly rf magnetic field is solved exactly using the Maxwell equations. It is found that, in general, heating by the rf magnetic field is dominant whenever δ<aδ<a, where δδ is the resistive skin depth and aa is the radius of the particulate, which may either be nonmagnetic or magnetic. The known analytic scaling laws in the various regimes are recovered, from the static case to very high frequency, subject to λ≫aλ≫a, where λλ is the free space wavelength of the rf field. The analysis may form a theoretical basis in the heating phenomenology of particulates.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/70327/2/APPLAB-85-15-3319-1.pd

Emotion at Stake - The Role of Stake Size and Emotions in a Power-to-take Game Experiment in China with a Comparison to Europe

This paper experimentally investigates how monetary incentives and emotions influence behaviour in a two-player power-to-take game. In this game, one player can claim any part of the other's endowment (take rate), and the second player can respond by destroying his or her own endowment. We focus on how stake size (endowment) and emotions influence responses in China. Our main findings are the following. First, average (median) take and destruction rates are not influenced by a large or small stake size. Second, emotions related to anger and joy mediate the impact of the take rate on destruction. Third, monetary incentives matter for the reaction function of the responder regarding the take rate: when stakes are low there is more destruction for low and intermediate take rates (smaller than 80%), while, when stakes are high, there is more destruction for high take rates (larger than 80%). This result is explained in terms of the amount of behavioural control that the responder has over his or her actions via emotion regulation. Finally, comparing our data with existing data for countries in Europe, it turns out that average (median) take and destruction rates are similar, while a similar set of emotions mediates destruction in both regions