Viral shedding of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses by American robins

American robins (Turdus migratorius) are commonly associated with farmsteads in the United States and have shown previous evidence of exposure to an H5 avian influenza A virus (IAV) near a poultry production facility affected by a highly pathogenic (HP) H5 virus in Iowa, USA during 2015. We experimentally infected American robins with three clade 2.3.4.4 HP H5 viruses (H5N2 and H5N8). A total of 22/24 American robins shed virus, and all three strains were represented. The highest virus titres shed were 104.3, 104.3 and 104.8 PFU/ml, associated respectively with viruses isolated from poultry, a captive gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus), and a Northern pintail (Anas acuta). Of those birds that shed, viral shedding was initiated 1 or 2 days post‐infection (DPI) and shedding ceased in all birds by 7 DPI. This study adds an additional synanthropic wildlife species to a growing list of animals that can successfully replicate and shed IAVs

Viral shedding of clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses by American robins

American robins (Turdus migratorius) are commonly associated with farmsteads in the United States and have shown previous evidence of exposure to an H5 avian influenza A virus (IAV) near a poultry production facility affected by a highly pathogenic (HP) H5 virus in Iowa, USA during 2015. We experimentally infected American robins with three clade 2.3.4.4 HP H5 viruses (H5N2 and H5N8). A total of 22/24 American robins shed virus, and all three strains were represented. The highest virus titres shed were 104.3, 104.3 and 104.8 PFU/ml, associated respectively with viruses isolated from poultry, a captive gyrfalcon (Falco rusticolus), and a Northern pintail (Anas acuta). Of those birds that shed, viral shedding was initiated 1 or 2 days post‐infection (DPI) and shedding ceased in all birds by 7 DPI. This study adds an additional synanthropic wildlife species to a growing list of animals that can successfully replicate and shed IAVs

Cottontail rabbits shed clade 2.3.4.4 H5 highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses

During 2014-2015, clade 2.3.4.4 H5Nx highly pathogenic (HP) avian influenza A viruses (IAV) were first detected in North America and subsequently caused one of the largest agricultural emergencies in U.S. history. Recent evidence has suggested that cottontail rabbits can shed multiple IAV subtypes. We experimentally infected cottontail rabbits with three HP H5Nx IAVs. All rabbits tested shed virus on at least one day by at least one route. Cottontail rabbits appear to be an exception to the limited capacity for replication that has been previously reported for certain other mammalian species inoculated with clade 2.3.4.4 HP H5Nx avian influenza A viruses

H7N9 influenza A virus transmission in a multispecies barnyard model

Influenza A viruses are a diverse group of pathogens that have been responsible for millions of human and avian deaths throughout history. Here, we illustrate the transmission potential of H7N9 influenza A virus between Coturnix quail (Coturnix sp.), domestic ducks (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus), chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus), and house sparrows (Passer domesticus) co-housed in an artificial barnyard setting. In each of four replicates, individuals from a single species were infected with the virus. Quail shed virus orally and were a source of infection for both chickens and ducks. Infected chickens transmitted the virus to quail but not to ducks or house sparrows. Infected ducks transmitted to chickens, resulting in seroconversion without viral shedding. House sparrows did not shed virus sufficiently to transmit to other species. These results demonstrate that onward transmission varies by index species, and that gallinaceous birds are more likely to maintain H7N9 than ducks or passerines

Susceptibility of Wild Canids to SARS-CoV-2

We assessed 2 wild canid species, red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) and coyotes (Canis latrans), for susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2. After experimental inoculation, red foxes became infected and shed infectious virus. Conversely, experimentally challenged coyotes did not become infected; therefore, coyotes are unlikely to be competent hosts for SARS-CoV-2. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, multiple instances of natural infections with SARS-CoV-2 have been reported in pet dogs, likely after exposure to an infected human (1–3). Domestic dogs appear to be minimally susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, as indicated by experimental inoculations resulting in reverse transcription PCR–positive samples and low titer antibody responses but no clinical disease nor shedding of infectious virus (4,5). The ability of SARS-CoV-2 to infect domestic dogs, in addition to several other species of carnivores, suggests that additional members of the canid family might be susceptible to infection. Wild canids, such as red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) and coyotes (Canis latrans), are of particular interest given how widely distributed these animals are, their frequent proximity to humans, and that they prey, scavenge upon, or otherwise interact with species demonstrated to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, including felids, skunks, rodents, and white-tailed deer (6,7). Foxes (species not specified) have been included in modeling efforts and serosurveillance studies aiming to predict animal hosts of SARS-CoV-2, but their ability to serve as hosts for SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear

Experimental Infection of Brazilian Free-Tailed Bats (\u3ci\u3eTadarida brasiliensis\u3c/i\u3e) with Two Strains of SARS-CoV-2

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is presumed to have originated from wildlife and shares homology with other bat coronaviruses. Determining the susceptibility of North American bat species to SARS-CoV-2 is of utmost importance for making decisions regarding wildlife management, public health, and conservation. In this study, Brazilian free-tailed bats (Tadarida brasiliensis) were experimentally infected with two strains of SARS-CoV-2 (parental WA01 and Delta variant), evaluated for clinical disease, sampled for viral shedding and antibody production, and analyzed for pathology. None of the bats (n = 18) developed clinical disease associated with infection, shed infectious virus, or developed histopathological lesions associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. All bats had low levels of viral RNA in oral swabs, six bats had low levels of viral RNA present in the lungs during acute infection, and one of the four bats that were maintained until 28 days post-infection developed a neutralizing antibody response. These findings suggest that Brazilian free-tailed bats are permissive to infection by SARS-CoV-2, but they are unlikely to contribute to environmental maintenance or transmission

Feral Swine as Indirect Indicators of Environmental Anthrax Contamination and Potential Mechanical Vectors of Infectious Spores

U.S. government wor

A novel vaccine candidate against rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus 2 (RHDV2) confers protection in domestic rabbits

OBJECTIVE To evaluate efficacy of a novel vaccine against rabbit hemorrhagic disease virus 2 (RHDV2) in domestic rabbits. ANIMALS 40 New Zealand White rabbits obtained from a commercial breeder. PROCEDURES Rabbits were vaccinated and held at the production facility for the duration of the vaccination phase and transferred to Colorado State University for challenge with RHDV2. Rabbits were challenged with oral suspensions containing infectious virus and monitored for clinical disease for up to 10 days. Rabbits that died or were euthanized following infection were necropsied, and livers were evaluated for viral RNA via RT-PCR. RESULTS None of the vaccinated animals (0/9) exhibited clinical disease or mortality following infection with RHDV2 while 9/13 (69%) of the control animals succumbed to lethal disease following infection. CLINICAL RELEVANCE The novel vaccine described herein provided complete protection against lethal infection following RHDV2 challenge. Outside of emergency use, there are currently no licensed vaccines against RHDV2 on the market in the United States; as such, this vaccine candidate would provide an option for control of this disease now that RHDV2 has become established in North America

Potential Use for Serosurveillance of Feral Swine to Map Risk for Anthrax Exposure, Texas, USA

Anthrax is a disease of concern in many mammals, including humans. Management primarily consists of prevention through vaccination and tracking clinical-level observations because environmental isolation is laborious and bacterial distribution across large geographic areas diffi cult to confi rm. Feral swine (Sus scrofa) are an invasive species with an extensive range in the southern United States that rarely succumbs to anthrax. We present evidence that feral swine might serve as biosentinels based on comparative seroprevalence in swine from historically defi ned anthrax-endemic and non–anthraxendemic regions of Texas. Overall seropositivity was 43.7% (n = 478), and logistic regression revealed county endemicity status, age-class, sex, latitude, and longitude were informative for predicting antibody status. However, of these covariates, only latitude was statistically signifi cant (β = –0.153, p = 0.047). These results suggests anthrax exposure in swine, when paired with continuous location data, could serve as a proxy for bacterial presence in specifi c areas

Quantifying proximity, confinement, and interventions in disease outbreaks: a decision support framework for air-transported pathogens

Includes bibliographical references (pages H-I).The inability to communicate how infectious diseases are transmitted in human environments has triggered avoidance of interactions during the COVID-19 pandemic. We define a metric, Effective ReBreathed Volume (ERBV), that encapsulates how infectious pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2, transport in air. ERBV separates environmental transport from other factors in the chain of infection, allowing quantitative comparisons among situations. Particle size affects transport, removal onto surfaces, and elimination by mitigation measures, so ERBV is presented for a range of exhaled particle diameters: 1, 10, and 100 μm. Pathogen transport depends on both proximity and confinement. If interpersonal distancing of 2 m is maintained, then confinement, not proximity, dominates rebreathing after 10–15 min in enclosed spaces for all but 100 μm particles. We analyze strategies to reduce this confinement effect. Ventilation and filtration reduce person-to-person transport of 1 μm particles (ERBV1) by 13–85% in residential and office situations. Deposition to surfaces competes with intentional removal for 10 and 100 μm particles, so the same interventions reduce ERBV10 by only 3–50%, and ERBV100 is unaffected. Prior knowledge of size-dependent ERBV would help identify transmission modes and effective interventions. This framework supports mitigation decisions in emerging situations, even before other infectious parameters are known