152 research outputs found

    ETS Alignment: a price collar proposal for carbon market integration

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    The global carbon market landscape is fragmented and increasingly complex. The conclusions reached at COP26 in Glasgow on the Article 6 rulebook are expected to achieve further mitigation using market mechanisms, facilitate the coordination of international efforts and increase carbon market integration. Three sets of conditions are necessary for smoothing the linking of emissions trading systems (ETSs). Before negotiations, mutual trust is crucial to respond to unexpected developments in partners’ economic, social and political circumstances. During the linking negotiations, a degree of alignment of core design features of ETSs is necessary to harmonise the systems. After the completion of negotiations, built-in reviews and broad-based consultations, as well as mechanisms for revision, dispute resolution and potential future delinking, are fundamental to ensure that linking works over time. The degree of alignment necessary for linking is a critical issue. Some ETS features (e.g., the price control mechanisms) require compatibility, whereas other key design elements (e.g., the stringency of the cap) may not require strict compatibility if they lead to comparable outcomes. Other ETS design features (e.g., the allocation phases and compliance periods) would benefit from coordination but do not need to be aligned. When ETSs are linked, the efficiency gains from allowance trade are enhanced compared to autarky (pre-link levels), as domestic and foreign allowance prices fully or partially (in case of linking with quotas) converge to an intermediate level. The price risk of linking could be constrained by enforcing a price collar (i.e., a price floor and a price ceiling) for the linked system. The price collar could be specified by the intersection between the two respective intervals representing acceptable post-link allowance prices. Options for enforcing the price ceiling include releasing allowances from a joint cost-containment reserve. To enforce the floor, allowances can be allocated in auctions with a reserve price equal to the floor. Alternatively, a ‘top-up’ carbon tax could be applied to allowances that are auctioned at a price below the floor. The price collar could help jurisdictions to mitigate systemic shocks that may affect allowance prices like recession, unanticipated growth, technological leaps that lower the abatement cost of emissions, as well as changes in companion climate policies. Reducing price risk and uncertainty would be beneficial for regulators, regulated entities and investors. However, reaching an agreement on the parameters and rules of a price collar in the linked system can be difficult. Early and open dialogue between the ETSs is strongly recommended to overcome these challenges

    Analgesic effectiveness and tolerability of oral oxycodone/naloxone and pregabalin in patients with lung cancer and neuropathic pain. An observational analysis

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    INTRODUCTION: Cancer-related pain has a severe negative impact on quality of life. Combination analgesic therapy with oxycodone and pregabalin is effective for treating neuropathic cancer pain. We investigated the efficacy and tolerability of a dose-escalation combination therapy with prolonged-release oxycodone/naloxone (OXN-PR) and pregabalin in patients with non-small-cell lung cancer and severe neuropathic pain. METHODS: This was a 4-week, open-label, observational study. Patients were treated with OXN-PR and pregabalin. Average pain intensity ([API] measured on a 0-10 numerical rating scale) and neuropathic pain (Douleur Neuropathique 4) were assessed at study entry and at follow-up visits. The primary endpoint was response to treatment, defined as a reduction of API at T28 ≥30% from baseline. Secondary endpoints included other efficacy measures, as well as patient satisfaction and quality of life (Brief Pain Inventory Short Form), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, and Symptom Distress Scale; bowel function was also assessed. RESULTS: A total of 56 patients were enrolled. API at baseline was 8.0±0.9, and decreased after 4 weeks by 48% (4.2±1.9; P<0.0001 vs baseline); 46 (82.1%) patients responded to treatment. Significant improvements were also reported in number/severity of breakthrough cancer pain episodes (P=0.001), Brief Pain Inventory Short Form (P=0.0002), Symptom Distress Scale (P<0.0001), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale depression (P=0.0006) and anxiety (P<0.0001) subscales, and bowel function (P=0.0003). At study end, 37 (66.0%) patients were satisfied/very satisfied with the new analgesic treatment. Combination therapy had a good safety profile. CONCLUSION: OXN-PR and pregabalin were safe and highly effective in a real-world setting of severe neuropathic cancer pain, with a high rate of satisfaction, without interference on bowel function

    Quantitative two-dimensional shadowgraphic set-up for high-sensitivity measurement of low-density laser-plasmas

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    We present a quantitative shadowgraphic method which can measure the density of a laser-generated plasma in air with sensitivity and resolution comparable or better than traditional interferometric techniques. Simultaneous comparison of both shadowgraphy and interferometry has been carried out allowing the experimental evaluation of the reliability of the shadowgraphic method

    ETS alignment : a price collar proposal for carbon market integration

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    This report was prepared to inform the Carbon Market Policy Dialogue (CMPD) between the European Commission, as the regulator of the EU Emissions Trading System, and the regulatory authorities for the emissions trading systems (ETSs) of California, Quebec, China, New Zealand and Switzerland. Building on the earlier findings of the LIFE DICET project, this fifth and final report identifies specific ETS design elements requiring specific degrees of alignment/harmonisation and discusses how this can be achieved in linking negotiations. Moreover, with a view to finding ways to facilitate the establishment of direct linkages between ETSs, a proposal regarding the management of allowance prices in the form of a “price collar for the linked system” is presented

    Linking emissions trading systems with different measures for carbon leakage prevention

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    Different measures for carbon leakage prevention across Emissions Trading Systems (ETSs) may distort economic competition between firms. The same is true of competition between jurisdictions if decisions on the location of production plants are concerned. Free allocation of emission allowances responds to a logic of carbon costs compensation. Border carbon adjustments aim at levelling the playing field between domestic firms and their foreign competitors. Direct support to low-carbon innovation aims at enhancing the competitiveness of domestic firms. Any instrument for carbon leakage prevention could produce, depending on its own specific design, competitive distortions that are illegitimate under WTO law or other applicable trade regime. By inducing convergence of allowance prices, ETS linking reduces any internal competitive distortion due to differences in carbon prices. However, given pre-link differences in anti-leakage measures, price convergence can highlight or even exacerbate potential competitive distortions. In a linking context, output-based allocation may amplify or attenuate competitive distortions by interacting with post-link changes in allowance prices. Differences in anti-leakage measures do not preclude linking in a technical sense. However, with time, some harmonization may prove necessary for the political sustainability of the linkage. The actual significance of any competitive distortion always depends on the extent to which firms compete in a market

    Linking emissions trading systems with different offset provisions

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    There is a very large cost-effectiveness potential for the implementation of offsets under Emissions Trading Schemes (ETSs). The scientific literature highlights that heterogeneity in offset provisions between prospective partners in an ETS linkage should be addressed for the sake of linking, but is not regarded as a priority.Co-benefits of offset projects are typically insufficiently incentivised, while adverse impacts have been reported on the local communities. In general, the experience with the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can greatly inform offset provisions design. Experts at the Carbon Market Policy Dialogue share insights on the most successful offset provisions. The Paris Agreement and its Article 6 can foster ETS linking, but requires additional coordination by prospective partners on key aspects

    'Carbon' boards and transition risk : explicit and implicit exposure implications for total stock returns and dividends payouts

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    Published online: 23 July 2024Transition risk disclosure facilitates investors' understanding of the potential company-level risks associated with a low-carbon transition. Among the others, stricter regulations could undermine companies' financial performances, affecting operations costs and revenues and their impact being proportional to the business carbon intensity. Transition risk disclosure takes two forms. One is a textual description of transition risk in compulsory and voluntary non-financial disclosure. The other is the disclosure of carbon emissions and intensity, which is implicitly associated with transition risk exposure. We empirically assess the impact of the two transition risk measures on shareholder returns to test the “carbon premium” hypothesis. We consider shareholder return as the sum of capital gain and dividend paid and analyse the impact of transition risk on both. Evidence supports the “carbon premium” hypothesis but suggests such a premium is transferred to shareholders primarily via dividend payouts. One possible explanation consistent with this evidence is that boards in highly polluting companies use dividends to compensate investors for the relatively lower capital gain, dissuading them from divesting due to low returns, stigmatisation effects and regulatory risks
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