2,789 research outputs found
Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance
Countries appear to differ considerably in the basic orientations of their corporate governance structures. We postulate the trade-off between objectivity and proximity as fundamental to the corporate governance debate. We stress the value of objectivity that comes with distance (e.g. the market oriented U.S. system), and the value of better information that comes with proximity (e.g. the more intrusive Continental European model). Our key result is that the optimal distance between management and monitor (board or shareholders) has a bang-bang solution: either one should capitalize on the better information that comes with proximity or one should seek to benefit optimally from the objectivity that comes with distance. We argue that this result points at an important link between the optimal corporate governance arrangement and industry structure. In this context, we also discuss the ways in which investors have "contracted around" the flaws in their own corporate governance systems, pointing at the adaptability of different arrangements.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39651/3/wp266.pd
Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance
Countries appear to differ considerably in the basic orientations of their corporate governance structures. We postulate the trade-off between objectivity and proximity as fundamental to the corporate governance debate. We stress the value of objectivity that comes with distance (e.g. the market oriented U.S. system), and the value of better information that comes with proximity (e.g. the more intrusive Continental European model). Our key result is that the optimal distance between management and monitor (board or shareholders) has a bang-bang solution: either one should capitalize on the better information that comes with proximity or one should seek to benefit optimally from the objectivity that comes with distance. We argue that this result points at an important link between the optimal corporate governance arrangement and industry structure. In this context, we also discuss the ways in which investors have "contracted around" the flaws in their own corporate governance systems, pointing at the adaptability of different arrangements.corporate governance, comperitive systems, corporate finance, economic reform, convergence
Development and validation of ELISAs for monitoring bacterial and parasitic infections in laboratory rodents and rabbits
According to the FELASA recommendations for the health monitoring of rodent and rabbit breeding and experimental colonies (Kraft et al. 1994; Rehbinder et al. 1996) bacterial and parasitic infections are monitored by culture and microscopy respectively whereas viral infections are monitored by serology. The recommendation on the breeding colonies states that serological methods exist for the detection of antibodies to various bacterial pathogens e.g. Bacillus piliformis (now Clostridium piliforme), mycoplasmas and Leptospira spp. and suggests the possible use of serology for these infections as well as for Treponema cuniculi, Encephalitozoon cuniculi and Toxoplasma gondii.Since 1985 we have explored the utility of serology, notably the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), for the monitoring of animal colonies. Serology avoids the killing of animals and large numbers of animals can be more easily tested than by culture and results can be obtained within hours. Here we give a brief overview of our work and some experiences. Details can be found in a series of papers published between 1993 and 1999 in Laboratory Animals (LA) and the Journal of Experimental Animal Science (JEAnS) (Table 1). We started with non-X (hemin) and non-V (NADP) factor requiring Pasteurellaceae as such bacteria frequently occurred in all animal species. Later we extended our studies to growth factor requiring members of the family (Haemophilus sp) and bacterial species belonging to other families. The development and validation of the assays were done similarly for bacterial species or groups studied (Figure 1)
A Pasteurella pneumotropica Strain of Mouse Origin Colonizes Rats but is Out Competed by a P. pneumotropica Strain of Rat Origin
Mouse and rat Pasteurellaceae have been found to differ in phenotypic characteristics but both animal species may be infected by each other’s bacterial strains. We explored the possibility that a mouse Pasteurella strain colonizing rats would be out competed by a subsequent infection of a rat Pasteurella strain. Rats were dosed intranasally and orally with the mouse P. pneumotropica biotype Jawetz strain NCTC 8141T and exposed to pen-mates infected with the rat P. pneumotropica biotype Heyl strain SSI P331 by co-housing. Rats were tested by PCR using primer sets developed for the specific detection of each biotype respectively. The co-housing and exposure of rats initially infected by the mouse P. pneumotropica with pen-mates harbouring the rat P. pneumotropica led to disappearance of the mouse bacterium from the rats. Our results question the suitability of Pasteurellaceae from contemporary laboratory animals to elucidate associations between bacterial properties and host species.
Guinea Pig and Rat as Carriers of Host-unique and Shared Haemophilus Phenotypes
Infections by V- factor dependent Pasteurellaceae (commonly called Haemophilus spp) frequently occur in colonies of guinea pig and rat. We evaluated possible differences between 185 Haemophilus strains from guinea pig (n=97) and rat (n=88) by API NH biotyping and by cell wall lipid profiling (FAME-analysis). By combining results of both methods we found 28 Haemophilus API-FAME types. Seven API-FAME types were shared and comprised 66% and 76% of the guinea pig and rat Haemophilus strains respectively. The remaining 21 Haemophilus phenotypes were unique to either guinea pig (12 types) or rat (9 types).
Civics Beyond Critics: Character Education in a Liberal Democracy
It is quite common to make the argument that a stable liberal democracy requires high levels of compliance with the law. Scholars disagree, however, how such reliable and widespread compliance can be achieved. Roughly, liberals have traditionally emphasized the importance of arriving at compliance by way of autonomous and critical reasoning, whereas others (communitarians and republicans chiefly) argue that autonomous motives are notoriously weak and can, therefore, not by themselves bring about a high enough rate of compliance. The exclusionary importance accorded to autonomy by (many) liberals bars the state from cultivating the habits, sentiments and civic virtue upon which a polity’s stability depends. By contrast, many republicans follow Rousseau when he states that it is necessary for the law to reach the citizens’ hearts: “So long as the legislative force does not reach that deep, the laws will invariably be evaded” (Rousseau 1997: 179). We ought to, in other words, acknowledge the importance of nonautonomous motives for compliance stemming from character, sentiments, habits, beliefs and identities
Monitoring of Rat Colonies for Antibodies to CAR Bacillus
The cilia associated respiratory (CAR) bacillus is a respiratory pathogenic bacterium of rats and other species of animal. We determined by enzymelinked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) antibudies t0 CAR bacillus antigen in sera from 20 colonies of rats. Six out of 10 Mycoplasma pulmoms ELISA positive experimental colonies contained CAR bacillus seropositive rats, comprising 26 out of 45 (58 %) samples. CAR bacillus infection was not diagnosed by ELISA in 183 samples from 10 M. pulmonis free SPF-rat breeding colonies
Market liquidity, investor participation and managerial autonomy: why do firms go private?
We analyze a publicly-traded firm's decision to stay public or go private when managerial autonomy from shareholder intervention affects the supply of productive inputs by management. We show that both the advantage and the disadvantage of public ownership relative to private ownership lie in the liquidity of public ownership. While the liquidity of public ownership lets shareholders trade easily and supply capital at a lower cost, the liquidity-engendered trading also results in stochastic shocks to a firm's shareholder base. This exposes management to uncertainty regarding the identity of future shareholders and their extent of intervention in management decisions and in turn curtails managerial incentives. By contrast, because of its illiquidity, private ownership provides a stable shareholder base and improves these inputprovision incentives but results in a higher cost of capital. Thus, capital market liquidity, while being a principal advantage of public ownership, also has a surprising 'dark side' that discourages public ownership. Our model takes seriously a key difference between private and public equity markets in that, unlike the private market, the firm's shareholder base, namely the extent of investor participation, is stochastic in the public market. This allows us to extract predictions about the effects of investor participation on the stock price level and volatility and on the public firm's incentives to go private, thereby providing a link between investor participation and firm participation in public markets. Lesser investor participation induces lower and more volatile stock prices, encouraging public firms to go private, whereas greater investor participation encourages younger firms to go public. Moreover, IPO underpricing is optimal because it is shown to lead to a higher and less volatile post-IPO stock price, greater autonomy for the manager and a higher supply of privately-costly managerial inputs
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