Brexit could mean greater freedom, but also international domination over the UK

For some, Brexit was about giving the UK the freedom to make its own decisions without having to respect, be accountable to, or abide by EU law. Matteo Bonotti uses the republican concept of freedom as non-domination in order to explain why Leavers’ understanding of freedom may not be the whole story

Religion, hate speech, and non-domination

In this paper I argue that one way of explaining what is wrong with hate speech is by critically assessing what kind of freedom free speech involves and, relatedly, what kind of freedom hate speech undermines. More specifically, I argue that the main arguments for freedom of speech (e.g. from truth, from autonomy, and from democracy) rely on a “positive” conception of freedom intended as autonomy and self-mastery (Berlin, 2006), and can only partially help us to understand what is wrong with hate speech. In order to fully grasp the wrongness of hate speech and to justify hate speech legislation, I claim, we need to rely instead on the republican idea of freedom as “non-domination” (Pettit, 1997, 2012, 2014; Laborde, 2008). I conclude that the hate speech used by religious citizens, even though it is a manifestation of their religious freedom, should be subject to the same restrictions that also apply to other citizens’ speech, because republicans should be concerned with the undominated (i.e. robustly secured) religious freedom of all religious citizens and, more generally, with the undominated freedoms of all citizens, including those who are victims of religious hate speech

Political liberalism, linguistic diversity and equal treatment

This article explores the implications of John Rawls’ political liberalism for linguistic diversity and language policy, by focusing on the following question: what kind(s) of equality between speakers of different languages and with different linguistic identities should the state guarantee under political liberalism? The article makes three claims. First, language policy under political liberalism should guarantee the equal basic rights and liberties of all citizens, regardless of language(s) spoken. This may require positive forms of state intervention, such as the provision of interpreters and translators in courts of law or hospitals. Second, while permissible under political liberalism, symbolic recognition by the state of all languages is not required, because the notion of self-respect does not involve the ability to identify with the institutions of one’s own political community. Finally, while neither the protection of citizens’ basic rights and liberties, nor the guarantee of their self-respect, demands multilingual policies, the latter may be required under political liberalism by the principle of fair equality of opportunity. This last step involves recourse to democratic deliberation in order to ascertain people’s linguistic identities, the costs they associate with the enjoyment of available opportunities and their resulting demands with regard to language policy

Democratic debate among speakers of different European languages is not only possible, but also helps to protect linguistic diversity

One of the key problems in strengthening democracy across the EU is the diverse range of languages spoken by European citizens. Matteo Bonotti writes on theoretical approaches to language policy and outlines their relevance for the European debate. He argues that although some theorists have viewed a common language as being necessary in a democracy, it is not necessary for this to be a common mother tongue. Mandating the use of English or an alternative language such as Esperanto at the European level would pose both moral and practical problems, but it might be necessary in order to justify the protection of linguistic diversity

Tongue-tied: Rawls, political philosophy and metalinguistic awareness

Is our moral cognition “colored” by the language(s) that we speak? Despite the centrality of language to political life and agency, limited attempts have been made thus far in contemporary political philosophy to consider this possibility. We therefore set out to explore the possible influence of linguistic relativity effects on political thinking in linguistically diverse societies. We begin by introducing the facts and fallacies of the “linguistic relativity” principle, and explore the various ways in which they “color,” often covertly, current normative debates. To illustrate this, we focus on two key Rawlsian concepts: the original position and public reason. We then move to consider the resulting epistemic challenges and opportunities facing contemporary multilingual democratic societies in an age of increased mobility, arguing for the consequent imperative of developing political metalinguistic awareness and political extelligence among political scientists, political philosophers, and political actors alike in an irreducibly complex linguistic world

Pluralism and moderation in an inclusive political realm: a normative defence of religious political parties

In this thesis, I outline the normative relevance of religious political parties as carriers of values in the context of contemporary political theory. The central argument of my thesis is that religious political parties are, in ideal terms, vital institutional tools for channelling religious claims into the public political realm of liberal democratic polities, in a way that favours democracy. The reason for my claim is that there is a set of normative criteria that all political parties ought to comply with. These include loyal opposition (i.e. the endorsement of the constitutional and institutional framework in which parties operate), acknowledgement and respect of political pluralism and commitment to pursuing power only through legal means. These normative criteria are grounded in the idea that political parties are “bilingual”, i.e. they occupy a unique position between civil society and public political realm. By complying with these criteria political parties can contribute in channelling and moderating religious and other perfectionist claims in a way that renders them suitable for democratic politics. Furthermore I argue that religious political parties are best incorporated, in ideal terms, by a regime of nonconstitutional pluralism, where no religious faith is officially recognized in the constitution but the political guarantees exist for the expression of religious views in the public political realm through religious political parties. Finally, I examine two specific religious parties, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP) in Turkey and the former Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana - DC) in Italy, in order to assess to which extent they have complied with the normative criteria of party politics and, therefore, contributed in enhancing democracy in their respective polities

Recovering Civility during COVID-19

This Open Access book examines many of the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic through the distinctive lens of civility. The idea of civility appears often in both public and academic debates, and a polarized political climate frequently leads to allegations of uncivil speech and behaviour. Norms of civility are always contested, even more so in moments of crisis such as a global pandemic. A focus on civility provides crucial insight and guidance on how to navigate the social and political challenges resulting from COVID-19. Furthermore, it offers a framework through which citizens and policymakers can better understand the causes and consequences of incivility, and devise ways to recover civility in our social and political lives

Comparing the policy narratives of Angela Merkel and Boris Johnson during the Covid-19 pandemic

The Covid-19 pandemic has required citizens to adhere to strict restrictions to help tackle infection rates. Drawing on a new study, Michael Mintrom, Maria Rost Rublee, Matteo Bonotti and Steven T. Zech compare the effectiveness of the policy narratives used by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to encourage citizens to follow their advice

The democratic production of political cohesion: partisanship, institutional sesign and life form

Online: 27 November 2018What binds a democratic society together? This would seem a well-rehearsed topic in modern political theory, but on closer scrutiny, it may appear less so. If we reformulate the question, it may become clearer why: what binds democratic society together? The emphasis on ‘democratic’ is the clue here. Much recent discussion on the cohesive force in democracies has been parasitic on other debates, such as that between cosmopolitans and communitarians on justice as the first virtue of society; that between nation-state-based and post-national views of contemporary politics or that about the cultural aspects of democratic citizenship as the glue that makes democracy work. All such views and debates tend to assume a somewhat ‘externalist’ perspective, so to speak, of the problem of cohesion in democracies. Cosmopolitans and liberal communitarians have argued over the relative importance of values and identity as the basis for the stability of a just society, whose legitimate political arrangements they generally agree must be democratic, so as to reflect the demands of equality and self-government. Disputes over whether the institutions of democracy still require the background conditions provided by the nation-state, with its consolidated networks of party system, solidarity, civil society organisations and public opinion formation, or whether similar conditions can be reproduced at a more trans- and post-national level, are very similar in scope to those between cosmopolitans and liberal communitarians. Both these disputes concern the social, institutional, ideal or identitarian pre-conditions of democracy, which help it to work with a modicum of stability, in so far as they guarantee the political cohesion of either the demos or the regime itself. Discussions over the quality and competence of citizenship look at democratic culture as an important condition for democratic institutions and procedures to function smoothly and effectively. Debates over the ‘civic culture’ in the 1960s and more recently on ‘social capital’ lay emphasis on a mixture of attitudes, practices, participation in associational networks and consolidated norms of sociability as formative components of democratic citizenship, on which the working of democratic institutions and rules depends. This suggests something more internal, or at least a virtuous circle between the culture and the institutions of democracy. But is democracy itself capable of producing political cohesion, and on what basis