What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory

This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects' behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.Experiments, Nash Bargaining Theory

Do People Plan?

We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance- if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning or not. We implement three sets of experiments: the first two (the Individual Treatments) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the third (the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. The two Individual treatments differed in that, in one, the subjects played sequentially, while, in the other, the subjects had to pre-commit to their future move. In all contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in all three experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience, except possibly when we force subjects to pre-commit to their future decision. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.

Tillage Research in Ohio A Guide to the Selection of Profitable Tillage Systems

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The influence of injured athletes perceptions of social support from ATCs on athletes' beliefs about rehabilitation

This is the publisher's version, also found at http://ehis.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=3&sid=cc60431c-6281-4940-bc2d-85f4c9ff2060%40sessionmgr11&hid=17&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=s3h&AN=24665314Objective: To determine whether athletes’ perceptions of social support from their certified athletic trainers (ATCs) were related to their beliefs about the rehabilitation process. Design: Division I athletes (N = 57) completed a survey including measures of social support and beliefs about rehabilitation. Participants: Division I college athletes (35 men, 22 women) who had sustained an injury that caused them to miss no less than 5 consecutive days. Measurements: The Social Support Survey (SSS) and the Sports Injury Rehabilitation Beliefs Survey (SIRBS). Results: Results revealed significant correlations between the SSS and the SIRBS scales only for athletes who had sustained severe injuries. Multiple-regression analyses revealed that the SSS scales were significant predictors of each of the SIRBS scales. Conclusions: Results suggest that when severely injured athletes perceive that their ATCs provide strong social support, they are more likely to believe in their rehabilitation programs. Key Words: psychology of injury, psychology of rehabilitatio

Are People in Groups More Farsighted than Individuals?

A dynamic decision making experiment recently conducted on individuals suggested that people may look ahead but seem either unable or unwilling to predict their own future behaviour. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the experiment with pairs of individuals. The experiment consisted of two decision nodes (interleaved with two chance nodes), with one of the pair choosing at the first decision node and the second of the pair choosing at the second. Given the structure of the experiment, it was simple for the first player to predict the decisions of the second player. Nevertheless, the decisions of the first player indicate strongly that the first player does not in fact do so. It seems that people are unwilling to predict not only their own future behaviour but also the future behaviour of others.A dynamic decision making experiment recently conducted on individuals suggested that people may look ahead but seem either unable or unwilling to predict their own future behaviour. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, we repeated the experiment with pairs of individuals. The experiment consisted of two decision nodes (interleaved with two chance nodes), with one of the pair choosing at the first decision node and the second of the pair choosing at the second. Given the structure of the experiment, it was simple for the first player to predict the decisions of the second player. Nevertheless, the decisions of the first player indicate strongly that the first player does not in fact do so. It seems that people are unwilling to predict not only their own future behaviour but also the future behaviour of others.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

What Price Compromise? Testing a Possibly Surprising Implication of Nash Bargaining Theory

This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects’ behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of Nash Bargaining Theory that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours the other. The third is an apparently reasonable compromise, but is in fact precluded as an agreed choice by the axioms of Nash Bargaining Theory. Experimental results show that agreement on this third alternative occurs rather often. So the axiomatic Nash theory is not well-supported by our evidence. Our subjects’ behaviour could be interpreted as the paying of an irrationally (according to the Nash theory) high price in order to reach a compromise agreement.Non-Refereed Working Papers / of national relevance onl

A Simple Risk-Sharing Experiment

This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploit efficiency gains in the sharing of a risky financial prospect. Observations from a previous experiment had suggested a general rejection of efficiency in favour of ex post equality. The present experiment explores some possible explanations for this. The results indicate that fairness is not a significant consideration, but rather that having to choose between prospects diverts partners from allocating the chosen prospect efficiently.This paper reports on an experiment designed to test whether pairs of individuals are able to exploit efficiency gains in the sharing of a risky financial prospect. Observations from a previous experiment had suggested a general rejection of efficiency in favour of ex post equality. The present experiment explores some possible explanations for this. The results indicate that fairness is not a significant consideration, but rather that having to choose between prospects diverts partners from allocating the chosen prospect efficiently.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Do people plan?

We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance- if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning or not. We implement three sets of experiments: the first two (the Individual Treatments) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the third (the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. The two Individual treatments differed in that, in one, the subjects played sequentially, while, in the other, the subjects had to pre-commit to their future move. In all contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in all three experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience, except possibly when we force subjects to pre-commit to their future decision. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.We report the results of an experimental investigation of a key axiom of economic theories of dynamic decision making – namely, that agents plan. Inferences from previous investigations have been confounded with issues concerning the preference functionals of the agents. Here, we present an innovative experimental design which is driven purely by dominance- if preferences satisfy dominance, we can infer whether subjects are planning or not. We implement three sets of experiments: the first two (the Individual Treatments) in which the same player takes decisions both in the present and the future; and the third (the Pairs Treatment) in which different players take decisions at different times. The two Individual treatments differed in that, in one, the subjects played sequentially, while, in the other, the subjects had to pre-commit to their future move. In all contexts, according to economic theory, the players in the present should anticipate the decision of the player in the future. We find that over half the participants in all three experimental treatments do not appear to be planning ahead; moreover, their ability to plan ahead does not improve with experience, except possibly when we force subjects to pre-commit to their future decision. These findings identify an important lacuna in economic theories, both for individual behaviour and for behaviour in games.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

All that fractures is not bone: microscopic anatomy of vertebral bodies.

Abstract for poster P25 presented at Bone Research Society, Winchester 28/6/2018 All that fractures is not bone: microscopic anatomy of vertebral bodies. Alan Boyde and David Mills, Dental Physical Sciences, QMUL, London E1 4NS Objectives: To understand interface between cortical shell and cancellous bone in human vertebral bodies, age changes, and probable mechanical significance. Archival material, 3-4 mm mid-body vertical slices, 80 L2 embedded PMMA: blocks polished, carbon coated, 20 kV qBSE SEM; high contrast resolution x-ray microtomography (XMT: 44 hour scans); iodine vapour staining and further BSE SEM, uncoated. Some 10µm laser ablation machined sections from block surfaces for polarised light microscopy (PLM). 50 L4 macerated for 3D BSE SEM. Mineral concentration: cortex contains lamellar bone and more highly mineralised tissues: ligament, dense fibrous periosteum, or Sharpey fibre bone. 2D SEM with iodine staining, PLM: uncalcified osteoid, ligament, fibrous periosteum, and Sharpey fibres can be distinguished. 3D SEM: inimitable branching bundle morphology of bone collagen lamellae was displayed on all (re)modelled surfaces of trabeculae and endocortex, modified where penetrated by any Sharpey fibres at ectocortex. However, the greatest part of the most exterior cortex is composed of strictly parallel ─ non-branching ─ collagen, either mostly longitudinal ─ ligament ─ or decussating layers of dense fibrous periosteum. Ligament tissue becomes incorporated in the bone organ by calcification extending into it from the mineralising front of bone tissue proper. Owing to endocortical resorbtion, sections of the entire shell thickness can be composed of non-bone. Calcified tissues in vertebral cortical shells include matrices which are, emphatically, not bone: they have a different structure, their collagen is not made by osteoblasts, and generally reach a higher level of mineralisation than bone: they will be assessed as ‘thicker bone’ with CT. Further, these phases cannot be recognised from bone by clinical imaging, and it is highly improbable that they will be distinguished using decalcification and staining LM histology. If lamellar structure is ideal, then the anterior cortex in particular is not. The proportion of calcified ligament tissue masquerading as bone dramatically increases in anterior collapse, often in hand with thickening of this cortex. It remains to be elucidated whether failure is favoured by this less auspicious and perhaps more fragile structure. A vicious circle

The influence of the strength of bone on the deformation of acetabular shells : a laboratory experiment in cadavers

Date of Acceptance: 24/08/2014 ©2015 The British Editorial Society of Bone & Joint Surgery. The authors would like to thank N. Taylor (3D Measurement Company) for his work with regard to data acquisition and processing of experimental data. We would also like to thank Dr A. Blain of Newcastle University for performing the statistical analysis The research was supported by the NIHR Newcastle Biomedical Research Centre. The authors P. Dold, M. Flohr and R. Preuss are employed by Ceramtec GmbH. Martin Bone received a salary from the joint fund. The author or one or more of the authors have received or will receive benefits for personal or professional use from a commercial party related directly or indirectly to the subject of this article. This article was primary edited by G. Scott and first proof edited by J. Scott.Peer reviewedPostprin