A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.advantageous selection, health care utilization, supplementary private health insurance, moral hazard, panel data

Job search periods for welfare applicants:Evidence from a randomized experiment

We combine a randomized experiment with administrative data to study the effects of mandatory job search periods in the Dutch welfare system. Job search periods postpone the first welfare benefits payment and encourage applicants to start searching for jobs actively. Job search periods substantially reduce benefits take up. The decline in benefits receipt is permanent, but fully compensated by increased earnings because of higher reemployment rates. We do not find detectable effects on health and crime outcomes, nor do we observe income declines for more vulnerable applicants. Our results suggest that job search periods are an effective instrument for targeting benefits to welfare applicants

Intrinsic attenuation in multi-mode fiber interconnects

A Wilson basis is an ingenious modification of a Gabor frame, with basis functions that have a notionally compact support in phase space. We shall give a short description of an algorithm for the construction of a Wilson basis. Through spatial scaling of the Wilson basis relative to a higher-order LP-mode, the basis may appear to vary from effectively local to effectively global. For mode-matching purposes local is advantageous. However, the field expansion requires fewer coefficients in the more global basis

Does replacing grants by income-contingent loans harm enrolment? New evidence from a reform in Dutch higher education

This paper evaluates the impact of a reform which replaced universal basic grants by income-contingent loans on enrolment in Dutch higher education using administrative data of ten complete student cohorts. Estimates of differences between cohorts show no negative effect of the policy on enrolment. Moreover, difference-in-differences estimates exploiting variation in eligibility for supplementary grants show no negative effect on enrolment. These findings suggest that a system of income-contingent loans can facilitate an increase of private contributions without harming access to higher education.</p

Caseworker's discretion and the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs

In this paper we focus on the role of caseworkers in the assignment and take-up of welfare-to-work programs. We conduct a field experiment that generates exogenous variation in the assignment of caseworkers to different policy regimes. The experiment allows us to provide evidence on the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programs and to study how caseworkers exploit their discretion in assigning these programs to welfare recipients. We find substantial heterogeneity in how caseworkers assign welfare-to-work programs. Participation in the experiment and learning about the effectiveness of the different programs do not induce caseworkers to focus more on the effective programs. Obtaining knowledge about welfare-to-work programs is thus not enough to improve policy, also effort on implementation is required

Does replacing grants by income-contingent loans harm enrolment? New evidence from a reform in Dutch higher education

This paper evaluates the impact of a reform which replaced universal basic grants by income-contingent loans on enrolment in Dutch higher education using administrative data of ten complete student cohorts. Estimates of differences between cohorts show no negative effect of the policy on enrolment. Moreover, difference-in-differences estimates exploiting variation in eligibility for supplementary grants show no negative effect on enrolment. These findings suggest that a system of income-contingent loans can facilitate an increase of private contributions without harming access to higher education.</p

Evaluatie experimenten Participatiewet: Effecten op de uitstroom naar werk.

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin