379 research outputs found

    Rent Seeking and Innovation

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    Equilibria with social security

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    We model pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social sucurity systems as the outcome of majority voting within a standard OLG model with production and an exogenous population growth rateo At each point in time individuals work, save, consume and invest by taking the social security policy as given. The latter consists of a tax on current wages transferred to elderly people. When they vote, individuals have to make two choices: If they want to keep the committment made by the previous generation by paying the elderly the promised amount of benefits, and which amount they want paid to themselves next periodo We show that when the growth rate of population is high enough compared to the productivity of capital there exists an equilibrium where PAYG pensions are voted into existence and maintained. PAYG systems are kept even when everybody knows that they will surely be abondoned, and that some generation will pay and not be paid back. We characterize the steady state and dynamic properties of these equilibria and study their welfare properties. Equilibria achieved by voting are typically inefficient; however, they may be so due to overaccumulation, as well as, in other cases, due to under accumulation. On the other hand, the efficient steady states turn out to be dynamically unstable: so we are presenting an unpleasant alternative for policy making

    Labor contracts and business cycles

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    This paper investigates tbe c1aim, often put forth by Real Business Cycle proponents (e.g Prescott (1986», that the poor performance of their models in matching real world aggregate labor market behavior are due to tbe fact that observed real wage payments do not correspond to the actual marginal productivity of labor but contain an insurance component which cannot be accounted for by the Walrasian pricing mecbanism. To test this idea we dispense with tbe Walrasian description of the labor market and introduce contractual arrangements between employees and employers. Assuming that the former are prevented from accessing capital markets and are more risk averse than the latter we use tbe theory optimal contracts to derive an equilibrium relation between aggregate states of the economy and wage-Labor outcomes. This contractual arrangement is then embedded into a standard one-sector, stochastic neoclassical growth model in order to look at the business cycle implications of the contractual hypotbesis. The resulting dynamic equilibrium relations are then parameterized and studied by means of standard numerical approximation techniques. The quantitative properties of our model appear to be somewhat encouraging. We have examined different contractual environments and in all circumstances the contracts-based equilibrium performs better than standard ones witb regard to the labor-market variables and at least as well witb regard to the otber aggregate macroeconomic variables. The present paper reports only the simulation results relative to what we consider tbe most empirically relevant cases. More results are available from the authors

    Equilibria with social security.

    Get PDF
    We model pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social sucurity systems as the outcome of majority voting within a standard OLG model with production and an exogenous population growth rateo At each point in time individuals work, save, consume and invest by taking the social security policy as given. The latter consists of a tax on current wages transferred to elderly people. When they vote, individuals have to make two choices: If they want to keep the committment made by the previous generation by paying the elderly the promised amount of benefits, and which amount they want paid to themselves next periodo We show that when the growth rate of population is high enough compared to the productivity of capital there exists an equilibrium where PAYG pensions are voted into existence and maintained. PAYG systems are kept even when everybody knows that they will surely be abondoned, and that some generation will pay and not be paid back. We characterize the steady state and dynamic properties of these equilibria and study their welfare properties. Equilibria achieved by voting are typically inefficient; however, they may be so due to overaccumulation, as well as, in other cases, due to under accumulation. On the other hand, the efficient steady states turn out to be dynamically unstable: so we are presenting an unpleasant alternative for policy making.

    Labor contracts and business cycles.

    Get PDF
    This paper investigates tbe c1aim, often put forth by Real Business Cycle proponents (e.g Prescott (1986», that the poor performance of their models in matching real world aggregate labor market behavior are due to tbe fact that observed real wage payments do not correspond to the actual marginal productivity of labor but contain an insurance component which cannot be accounted for by the Walrasian pricing mecbanism. To test this idea we dispense with tbe Walrasian description of the labor market and introduce contractual arrangements between employees and employers. Assuming that the former are prevented from accessing capital markets and are more risk averse than the latter we use tbe theory optimal contracts to derive an equilibrium relation between aggregate states of the economy and wage-Labor outcomes. This contractual arrangement is then embedded into a standard one-sector, stochastic neoclassical growth model in order to look at the business cycle implications of the contractual hypotbesis. The resulting dynamic equilibrium relations are then parameterized and studied by means of standard numerical approximation techniques. The quantitative properties of our model appear to be somewhat encouraging. We have examined different contractual environments and in all circumstances the contracts-based equilibrium performs better than standard ones witb regard to the labor-market variables and at least as well witb regard to the otber aggregate macroeconomic variables. The present paper reports only the simulation results relative to what we consider tbe most empirically relevant cases. More results are available from the authors.
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