A proposed formula for comparing kill password effectiveness in single password RFID systems

The Electronic Product Code standard for RFID systems plays a significant role in worldwide RFID implementations. A feature of the RFID standards has been the RFID Kill command which allows for the permanent destruction of an RFID tag through the issuing of a simple command. Whilst the inclusion of this command may be vital for user privacy it also opens up significant avenues for attack. Whilst such attacks may be well documented there has been little to no discussion of the efficacy of the differing mitigation approaches taken. A simple formula to calculate the full timing of such an attack on differing RFID setups is presented. The formula allows for users to model the effect that altering such aspects as timeout or transmission response time will have on RFID security

A proposed formula for comparing kill password effectiveness in single password RFID systems

The Electronic Product Code standard for RFID systems plays a significant role in worldwide RFID implementations. A feature of the RFID standards has been the RFID Kill command which allows for the permanent destruction of an RFID tag through the issuing of a simple command. Whilst the inclusion of this command may be vital for user privacy it also opens up significant avenues for attack. Whilst such attacks may be well documented there has been little to no discussion of the efficacy of the differing mitigation approaches taken. A simple formula to calculate the full timing of such an attack on differing RFID setups is presented. The formula allows for users to model the effect that altering such aspects as timeout or transmission response time will have on RFID security

A Single Channel Attack on 915MHz Radio Frequency Identification Systems

There has been some speculation as to the protection offered by the Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum utilised by RFID technology. This paper explores the construction of an attack based on the broadcast of an attack signal in a single channel. The study details an experiment on two groups of tags where the experimental group are exposed to an attack signal broadcast on a single channel. With consistent findings across both control and experimental groups the experiment clearly demonstrates that FHSS offers no protection against such an attack

\u3ci\u3eFutile Kicks\u3c/i\u3e

All during the helicopter trip, Kaye seemed mesmerized by the ground patterns. Green rectangles of gentlemen farmers\u27 plots, little sprinklings of villages, clusters of suburban developments, congested city blocks

Alien Registration- Bolan, William (Old Town, Penobscot County)

https://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/7687/thumbnail.jp

The Lazarus Effect: Resurrecting Killed RFID Tags

Several RFID Standards allow RFID Tags to be ‘killed’ using a specialised command code. ‘Killed’ RFID Tags should be irrevocably deactivated. In actuality, when a valid kill command is sent to a tag four sections of the tags management data are zeroed causing the tag to enter a ‘fault state’ and thus be ignored by RFID readers. Through the reinitialisation of these four sections to valid values it was discovered that a tag could be resurrected and function normally

Meeting the Challenge of Dynamic User Requirements Using Data-Driven Techniques on a 4GL-Database Environment

Accompanying the ever-growing reliance on computers within contemporary organisations, the task of software maintenance is, increasingly, becoming a resource burden. The author has identified that there is a need for proven techniques to allow the modelling of flexible/changing user requirement, to enable systems to cope with requirements creep without suffering major code change and associated down-time from rebuilds of the database. This study ascertains the applicability of extension to current data modelling techniques that allows innate flexibility within the data model. The extension of the data model is analysed for potential benefits in the provision of such a dynamic/flexible base to realise \u27maintenance friendly\u27 systems and, in consequence, alleviate the cost of later, expensive maintenance

Utilizing the RFID LOCK Command Against Multiple Targets

An unlocked Electronic Product Code (EPC) tag allows for issuance of most commands without the need for any authorization. This means that a system with unlocked tags would allow any attacker to modify tag data at will, whilst also opening the door to a range of other misuse. One possible avenue of active misuse against unlocked tags would be to issue LockID commands and ‘permanently’ lock some or all of a system‘s RFID tags. As this attack is simply an issuance of a valid command it fits firmly in the category of an active misuse and could also be considered a limited form of DoS as future valid commands would be ignored and limit or cripple the functionality of a system dependent on operation. This paper details an experiment using the LockID command to lock multiple tags within range

Spoofing Attack Against an EPC Class One RFID System

In computing the term spoofing historically referred to the creation of TCP/IP packets using another device’s valid IP address to gain an advantage. The Electronic Product Code (EPC) RFID system was investigated to test the efficacy of spoofing a valid tag response to basic requests. A radio frequency transmission device was constructed to determine whether a valid reader could distinguish between the response of an actual tag and a spoofed response. The results show that the device was able to successfully deceive the EPC reader and further, to replace actual tag responses with a spoofed response. The potential for such attacks against inventory systems using the EPC standard would be significant in terms of both operational and actual costs