A trusted analyst’s opinion is worth gold for a company’s investors

It weighs more than a respected CEO's word, write Steven Boivie, Scott D. Graffin and Richard Gentr

Serving on corporate boards plays a vital role in the career success of executives

They're more likely to be promoted as first-time CEOs and to get a raise, even without a promotion, write Steven Boivie, Scott D. Graffin, Abbie G. Oliver and Michael C. Wither

Determinants and consequences of board-level human and social capital

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Open Sourced Database for CEO Dismissal 1992-2018

There is a new version of this data available. Look in the version log on this site. We update the change log, versioning and other information on a Google Doc that is updated and continuous between posted versions of this database. We have included a snapshot of the documentation file here to help with future use along with an Excel version of the file for non-STATA users. This document also includes information on submitting edits and corrections to the open source data, which we welcome and encourage. We will acknowledge the participation of editors in the versioning changes at the bottom of the Google Doc

Open Sourced Database for CEO Dismissal 1992-2018

<h3><a href="https://forms.gle/n9SvH4hoDFJxUnkN6">There is a newer version of this dataset available online. Click this link for the hosting site.</a></h3><p><i><strong>There is a new version of this data available on Zenodo. Look in the version log on this site.</strong></i></p><p>We have included a snapshot of the documentation file here to help with future use along with an Excel version of the file for non-STATA users. This document also includes information on submitting edits and corrections to the open source data, which we welcome and encourage. </p><p>This revision includes potentially relevant 8k filings from 270 days before and after the CEO's departure date. These filings were not all useful for understanding the departure, but might be useful in general.</p><p> </p><p>If you would like to get an email notification when we update the database, <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfiZZHwyeWYEZ5fOT1_RygH-ComG9ltad5IUUY60Fsw9z3hZg/viewform">sign-up here</a>. We're happy to let you know when it is updated. </p><p> </p&gt

Open Sourced Database for CEO Dismissal 1992-2019

<h3><a href="https://forms.gle/n9SvH4hoDFJxUnkN6">There is a newer version of this dataset available online. Click this link for the hosting site. </a></h3><p>We have included a snapshot of the documentation file here to help with future use along with an Excel version of the file for non-STATA users. This document also includes information on submitting edits and corrections to the open source data, which we welcome and encourage. We will acknowledge the participation of editors in the versioning changes at the bottom of the documentation file.</p><p>This version updates the set to the current turnovers as of May 30, 2022 version of Execucomp database and adds/clarifies several variables. Please check the documentation for the change log.</p><p>If you would like to get an email notification when we update the database, <a href="https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfiZZHwyeWYEZ5fOT1_RygH-ComG9ltad5IUUY60Fsw9z3hZg/viewform">sign-up here</a>. We're happy to let you know when it is updated. </p><p> </p&gt

Who's in the Driver's Seat? Exploring Firm-Level vs. CEO-Level Effects on Problemistic Search

The Behavioral Theory of the Firm suggests that performance below an aspiration triggers problemistic search that can lead to organizational change and risk-taking. This compelling perspective has spawned considerable empirical examination of diverse strategic outcomes as firms’ responses to performance feedback. However, empirical studies have provided inconsistent evidence of problemistic search effects on various organizational search outcomes. This empirical controversy is likely attributed to the fact that most research has considered problemistic search as a firm-level and relatively routinized process with a high degree of automaticity in firms’ responses to performance feedback while overlooking the role of managerial agency. Rather than viewing problemistic search as an automatic firm-level process, we believe that behavioral responses are shaped, at least partially, by top executives, notably CEOs. To this end, we first examine whether problemistic search effects vary across a range of organizational change and risk outcomes. We then explore whether the relative size of firm and CEO effects varies across different search outcomes. Using a multilevel approach, we show not only the heterogeneity in problemistic search effects on different organizational outcomes but also heterogeneity in the relative size of firm and CEO effects on these outcomes. While firm effects are substantial in directing some strategic decisions, as proposed by the problemistic search model, CEO effects are large for certain organizational outcomes, such as changes in resource allocation. This study serves as a jumping-off point for future theorizing and empirical work on problemistic search that incorporate the role of managerial agency.Immediate accessThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Me Or We: The Effects Of Ceo Organizational Identification On Agency Costs

Two primary remedies for the agency problem (i.e., the CEO\u27s opportunity to advance personal interests at the expense of the firm and its shareholders) have been emphasized in both research and practice: monitoring of the CEO by independent directors and the alignment of CEO and firm interests using financial incentives. Still, research evidence has not consistently shown these remedies to be effective. Noting that these traditional mechanisms aim to resolve the agency problem by extrinsically influencing the CEO\u27s behavior, we seek to provide a broader understanding by considering how intrinsic drivers of behavior might mitigate agency costs. In particular, we draw on the literature on organizational identification to examine how a CEO whose identity is intertwined with the organizations will be motivated to avoid corporate actions that impose agency costs. We further consider how traditional control mechanisms, which represent agency costs in themselves, are made less effective when organizational identification is high, as they are rendered somewhat redundant. Using survey and archival data from 793 large U.S. firms, we find a negative effect of CEO organizational identification on agency costs-measured as a) CEO personal use of corporate aircraft, and b) unrelated firm diversification-and we find that organizational identification weakens the negative effects of incentive alignment and board independence on those outcomes. Our theory and supportive findings suggest how a CEO who makes little distinction between self-interest and organizational-interest will be likely to eschew actions that benefit the self over the organization, and less influenced by extrinsic control mechanisms