“To Bid or Not to Bid, This is the Question: The Italian Experience in Competitive Tendering for Local Bus Services”

Competitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of local bus services when a major objective is subsidy savings. Despite uncertainties in the legal rules some competitive tendering was implemented in Italy since 1998. The evidence so far is that participants were limited in number, the incumbents were almost everywhere able to gain the franchise, whilst subsidy savings were in many cases negligible. If some “political” conditions favouring more effective tendering procedures are not fulfilled, other regimes should be considered in order to obtain substantial subsidy savings.Local bus services; Competitive Tendering

Is the Leverage of European Commercial Banks Pro-Cyclical?

Detecting whether banks?leverage is indeed procyclical is relevant to support the view that booms and crises may be reinforced by some sort of supply side ?nancial accelerator, whilst ?nding a plausible ex- planation of banks?behaviour is crucial to trace the road for a sensible reform of ?nancial regulation and managers? incentives. The paper shows that procyclical leverage appears to be well entrenched in the behaviour of a sample of major European banks, which are commonly labelled as mainly "commercial banks".Banks, Pro-cyclicality, Financial Regulation.

Do Competition and Ownership Matter? Evidence from Local Public Transport in Europe

This paper investigates how the ownership and the procedure for the selection of firms operating in the local public transport sector affect their productivity. In order to compare different institutional regimes, we carry out a comparative analysis of 72 companies operating in large European cities. This allows us to consider firms selected either through competitive tendering or negotiated procedures. The analysis of the data on 77 European firms over the period 1997-2006 indicates that firms operate under constant returns to scale. Retrieving the residuals we obtain a measure of total factor productivity, which we regress on firm and city characteristics. We find that when firms are totally or partially in public hands their productivity is lower. Moreover, firms selected through competitive tendering display higher total factor productivity.Local Public Transport, Public Ownership, Translog Production Function

Labour market imperfections, "divine coincidence" and the volatility of employment and inflation

The dynamic general equilibrium model with hiring costs presented in this paper delivers involuntary unemployment in the steady state as well as involuntary fluctuations in unemployment. The existence of hiring friction introduces externalities that, in turn, entail the breakdown of the "divine coincidence" without assuming real wage rigidity. Our model with labour market imperfections outperforms the standard NK model as for the persistence of responses to monetary shocks. The model also allows for an analysis of the volatility of economies, differing in their "degrees of labour market rigidity". It turns out that "rigid" economies exhibit less unemployment volatility and more inflation volatility than "flexible" economies.Hiring Costs, Wage Bargaining, Output Gap, New Keynesian Phillips Curve

Unemployment, inflation and monetary policy in a dynamic New Keynesian model with hiring costs

The dynamic general equilibrium model with hiring costs presented in this paper delivers involuntary unemployment in the steady state and involuntary fluctuations in unemployment. After calibrating the model, through simulations we are able to show that our model with labour market imperfections outperforms the standard NK model as for the persistence of responses to monetary shocks. Besides, the model can be easily used to assess the impact of different market imperfections on both the steady state and the dynamics of the economy. We are also able to show how two economies, differing in their “degrees of imperfection”, react to policy or non policy shocks: a rigid economy turns out to be less volatile than a flexible economy. Something that reflects the actual experience of the US (flexible) and European (rigid) economies.Hiring Costs, Wage Bargaining, Output Gap, New Keynesian Phillips Curve, Monetary Policy

Unemployment, Inflation and Monetary Policy in a Dynamic New Keynesian Model with Hiring Costs

The dynamic general equilibrium model with hiring costs presented in this paper delivers involuntary unemployment in the steady state and involuntary fluctuations in unemploy- ment. After calibrating the model, through simulations we are able to show that our model with labour market imperfections outperforms the standard NK model as for the persis- tence of responses to monetary shocks. Besides, the model can be easily used to assess the impact of di¤erent market imperfections on both the steady state and the dynamics of the economy. We are also able to show how two economies, differing in their degrees of imperfection, react to policy or non policy shocks: a rigid economy turns out to be less volatile than a flexible economy. Something that reflects the actual experience of the US (flexible) and European (rigid) economies.Hiring Costs; Wage bargaining; Output Gap; New Keynesian Phillips Curve; Monetary Policy

Do Competition and Ownership Matter? Evidence from Local Public Transport in Europe

This paper investigates how the ownership and the procedure for the selection of firms operating in the local public transport sector affect their productivity. In order to compare different institutional regimes, we carry out a comparative analysis of 72 companies operating in large European cities. This allows us to consider forms selected either through competitive tendering or negotiated procedures. The analysis of the data on 77 European firms over the period 1997-2006 indicates that firms operate under constant returns to scale. Retrieving the residuals we obtain a measure of total factor productivity, which we regress on firm and city characteristics. We find that when firms are totally or partially in public hands their productivity is lower. Moreover, firms selected through competitive tendering display higher total factor productivity. productivity.local public transport; public ownership; translog production function

La mobilità costa: Milano in cerca di un nuovo equilibrio

Quando le due nuove linee della metropolitana milanese saranno completate, il comune dovrà iniziare a pagare i consistenti canoni pattuiti. Come? Oltre agli aumenti dei biglietti e ai tagli nel servizio di superfice, esiste anche una terza via: la riduzione dei costi. Le esperienze straniere

To bid or not to bid, this is the question: the Italian experience in competitive tendering for local bus services

Competitive tendering is a popular mechanism for the provision of local bus services when a major objective is subsidy savings. Despite uncertainties in the legal framework some competitive tendering was implemented in Italy since 1998. The evidence so far is that participants were limited in number, the incumbents were almost everywhere able to gain the franchise, whilst subsidy savings were in many cases negligible. If some “political” conditions favouring more effective tendering procedures are not fulfilled, other regimes should be considered in order to obtain substantial subsidy savings