Demography and housing demand - What can we learn from residential construction data?

There are obvious reasons why residential construction should depend on the population’s age structure. We estimate this relation on Swedish time series data and OECD panel data. Large groups of young adults are associated with higher rates of residential construction. But there is also a significant negative effect from those above 75. Age effects on residential investment are robust and forecast well out-of-sample in contrast to the corresponding house price results. This may explain why the debate around house prices and demography has been rather inconclusive. Rapidly aging populations in the industrialized world makes the future look bleak for the construction industry of these countries.demography; housing demand

Forecasting global growth by age structure projections

Demographic projections of age structure provide the best information available on long-term human resources and demand. In current data fairly robust correlations with GDP and GDP growth have been discovered. In this paper we use these two facts and study the forecasting properties of demographically based models. Extending the forecasts to 2050 suggests that due to fertility decreases poor countries of today will start to catch up with developed economies in which the growth process will stagnate due to the growth of the retired population.Global growth; age structure

Human Capital, Demographics, and Growth across the US States 1920-1990

This paper finds robust evidence that age structure matters for subsequent growth in per capita income across the US states 1920-1990. The age groups 25-65 year are positively related to subsequent per capita income growth. Another conclusion is that the average years of schooling affects subsequent per capita income growth positively when age structure is controlled for. Moreover, the estimated speed of convergence (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) increases substantially when schooling and age structure are held constant in the income growth regressions.Demographics; Human capital; Regions; Growth; Convergence

Demographically based global income forecasts up to the year 2050

Demographic projections of age structure provide the best information available on long-term future human resources and demand. In current data fairly robust correlations between age structure and GDP and GDP growth have been discovered. In this paper we use these two facts and study the forecasting properties of demographically based models. Extending the forecasts to 2050 suggests that due to fertility decreases poor countries of today will start to catch up with developed economies in which the growth process will stagnate due to the growth of the elderly population. That remains the case whether or not indications of positive longevity effects are taken into account.demographic projections; global income; long-term forecasts

Age Distributions and the Current Account -A Changing Relation?

In recent research age distribution effects on the current account have been found in cross-country panel regressions. The reason is different effects on saving and investment from cohort-size variation. In a panel of annual OECD data 1960-1995, we find that the age effects on saving are similar to results on world samples but the effects on investment are very different. The respective age profiles of saving and investment are much more similar in the OECD sample. This may be one factor accounting for the home-country bias found in international capital markets. Disaggregating investment we find that young cohorts have a positive correlation with housing investment while older but still active cohorts have a positive correlation with business investment. The differences in saving and investment effects are, nevertheless, sufficient to generate persistent and sizeable age effects on the current account. Our results suggest that policies concerning current account balance should take into consideration age distributions and the degree of development.age distribution; home-country bias; saving; investment; current account; OECD

Four Phases in the demographic transition. Implications for economic and social development.

Traditionally, the demographic transition model has focused primarily on long-term changes in mortality rates, fertility rates and population growth rates. Of equal, or perhaps even greater, importance is however the transformation of the age structure that the transition engenders. In this paper we focus on this age transition and argue that (1) The age transition is a more extended process than the mortality and fertility transition. It starts simultaneously with the mortality decline and continues almost one hundred years after a stabilization of the birth rates. (2) During the age transition population growth will be concentrated in turn to the youngest age groups, the young adult group, the middle age group and the old age group. (3) During these different phases of the age transition, the social and economic effects of population growth will be different. Poverty, child labor and low savings rates characterize the phase child abundance. The second phase, when young adults predominate, is characterized by high rates of migration, urbanization and proletarization, and by early industrialization and institutional transformation. In the third phase, when the number of middle aged increase, the economy is characterized by high savings rates and large increases in per capita income. The old age phase, finally is characterized by an increasing dependency burden, declining savings rates, inflationary pressures, an expanding public sector, and stagnating economic growth. The paper argues that these patterns may be explained by the shifts in economic behavior that take place during the life cycle. Recent studies of age structure effects on macro-economic variables are referred. The argument is illustrated with historical examples from Sweden, England, and Western Europe, along with modern examples from Asia, Africa and Latin-America.Age; transition

Low fertility and the housing market: evidence from Swedish regional data

The long-term effect of low birth rates is a decline in the population share of children and young adults. How will such changes in age structure affect the housing market? In this article, panel data sets for Swedish municipalities from 1981 to 2006 are used to answer this question. The use of panel data makes it possible to control for the effect of national-level policy shifts and macroeconomic events through the introduction of fixed time effects. The results show that population aging could lead to less rapid house price growth in the first decades of the twenty first century, compared to the last decades of the twentieth century. These results also hold when local population growth, income growth, and educational levels are controlled for.A long terme, des taux de natalité faibles entraînent une baisse de la proportion d'enfants et de jeunes adultes dans la population. Quelles sont les répercussions possibles de ce changement de structure d'âge sur le marché du logement? Dans cet article, des données de panel provenant de municipalités en Suède et couvrant la période de 1981 à 2006 sont exploitées pour répondre à la question. L'utilisation de données de panel permet de contrôler l'effet des changements de politiques à l'échelle nationale et des événements macro-économiques par l'introduction d'effets temporels fixes. Les résultats indiquent qu'un vieillissement de la population pourrait ralentir la hausse du prix des logements au cours des premières décennies du 21e siècle, par rapport à celle des dernières décennies du 20e siècle. Ces résultats se maintiennent lorsque la croissance locale de la population, la hausse des revenus et l'élévation des niveaux d'instruction sont contrôlés

Remittances from Sweden. an Exploration of Swedish Survey Data

The present study explores data on transfers of gifts/economic support to relatives from a recent Swedish Household Income Survey (HEK) compiled by Statistics Sweden. It provides the first analysis of demographic determinants of remittances from Sweden based on official household survey and register data. By exploring a data set that also includes non-migrant households, it presents a unique comparison of patterns of gift-giving and intra-family support between migrant and non-migrant households. We argue that data from the Household Income Survey can be used to obtain an empirically based estimation of the determinants of remittances from Sweden. According to our results, the flows of remittances to developing countries from Sweden appear to be relatively small in comparison with remittance flows from other developed countries. The article analyses these transfers of gifts/economic support in relation to different kinds of income, education, age, time since migration, acquisition of citizenship and family situation. Analyses are made for three types of country groups : developing countries, non-developing countries and Sweden. Whereas the general propensity to give economic support to relatives is similar among native Swedes and migrants from developing and non-developing countries, the patterns of gift-giving and intra-family economic support differ significantly over the life course between individuals from different country groups. Native Swedes tend to give gifts and economic support to relatives at higher ages and when they have adult children who have moved away from home. Migrants from developing countries tend to be younger and have children living at home. The propensity of native Swedes to remit increases with increasing income. Among migrants born in developing countries, other factors than income seem to be more decisive for the propensity to remit. Diverging patterns of remittances between migrants from developing countries and the other groups indicate that remittances are strongly related to phases in the individual life course that vary with the individual migration history.Remittances; Intra-family transfers; Life course

Tunga trender i den globala utvecklingen

Huvudsyftet med denna rapport är att identifiera vilka ”tunga trender” som kommer att prägla samhällsutvecklingen under 2000-talet. Metodiskt har vi valt att utnyttja en demografisk förklaringsansats. På basis av befolkningsprognoser som visar förskjutningar i den globala åldersstrukturen, konstruerar vi prognoser över förväntad inkomstutveckling i olika delar av världen år fram till år 2050. Dessa prognoser utgör, enligt vår uppfattning, det basscenario, som varje framtidsdiskussion måste förhålla sig till. I rapporten diskuteras vidare vad de globala demografiska och ekonomiska trenderna kan komma att betyda ur ett miljöperspektiv. Dels analyseras möjliga samband mellan åldersstruktur, inkomstnivå och miljöpåverkan, dels försöker vi identifiera centrala utmaningar för 2000-talets miljöarbete.trender; samhällsutvecklingen; 2000-talet

In Los Angeles, increasing neighborhood diversity means that segregation is on the decline

The makeup of American communities is changing – some communities are becoming more diverse, whilst others are becoming more segregated. In new research, William A.V. Clark, Eva Andersson, John Osth and Bo Malmberg examine trends in neighborhood diversity in Los Angeles since 2000. They find that only one third of people now live in strongly segregated neighborhoods, down from 40 percent in 2010, and that this increasing diversity has mainly been driven by the decline of homogenous white and black neighborhoods