„Stará“ a „nová“ dělba moci: nový pohled na starý koncept

Recenze publikacíMÖLLERS, Christoph. The Three Branches. A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 263 s.CAROLAN, Eoin. The New Separation of Powers. A Theory for Modern State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 286 s.VIBERT, Frank. The Rise of the Unelected: Democracy and the New Separation of Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 199 s

Odměňování soudců jako součást soudcovské nezávislosti

Článek se zabývá specifickou rolí odměňování soudců a možnými dopady manipulace se složkami odměňování na soudcovskou nezávislost. Vymezuje složky odměňování soudců a jeho vztah k soudcovské nezávislosti a analyzuje rozhodnutí vrcholných soudů (USA, Kanada, Česká republika, Slovensko, Polsko). Přístup soudů následně podrobuje kritice a poukazuje na aspekty vztahu soudcovské nezávislosti a odměňování soudců, které byly doposud do značné míry opomíjenyThe paper addresses the specific status of judicial remuneration and the possible consequences of interferences with judicial remuneration for the judicial independence. It provides an outline of components of judicial remuneration and of its relationship with the concept of judicial independence. Subsequently, relevant case law of several countries’ high courts (USA, Canada, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland) is analysed and the approach of the respective courts is evaluated. The paper concludes with pointing out the so far neglected aspects of relationship between judicial independence and judicial remuneration

Court Presidents: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Judicial Governance

The aim of this paper is to provide a new comprehensive understanding of roles of court presidents in judicial governance in Europe. It argues that in order to better understand the role of court presidents in comparative perspective it is necessary to unpack their power into smaller components that can be analyzed separately. We define seven such components: judicial career, jurisprudential, administrative, financial, ambassadorial, and media power, and ancillary powers as a residual category. Subsequently, we zero in on 13 European jurisdictions and rate them according to the strength of their court presidents’ powers. By doing so we are developing a Court President Power Index. Based on this Index we question the claim that Western court presidents are always weaker than their Eastern European counterparts and argue that powers of court presidents diverge both within Western Europe and within Eastern Europe, and hence it is difficult to draw the easy line along the West/East axis on this ground. Finally, we problematize our Court President Power Index and show that powers in the meaning of faculty do not necessarily translate into influence since various contingent circumstances (such as the length of court presidents’ terms of office, information asymmetry, the structure of the judiciary, the existence of competing judicial self governance bodies, the role of individuals, the proximity of court presidents to political leaders, the legal profession, legal culture, and the political environment) affect to what extent court presidents may exploit their powers in practice

Judicial Self-Government in Czechia: Europe’s Black Sheep?

This paper maps judicial self-government in Czechia and argues that although Czechia is sometimes perceived as a black sheep of Europe for not introducing any form of judicial council into its judicial system, there is in fact a substantial amount of judicial selfgovernment exercised by several bodies, the most important being the court presidents, and it is therefore a mistake to conflate judicial self-government with judicial councils. The most notable changes to judicial self-government are then introduced and their impact on values crucial for the functioning of the judiciary assessed. And, as the judicial selfgovernment in Czechia is primarily exercised by court presidents, the narrative of changes to judicial self-government and their impact is presented as a narrative of changes affecting court presidents and of their effects on the wider legal, social and political fields. The dominance of court presidents, built in part on informal powers, is a mixed blessing however, as it can have both positive and negative impact on the crucial values and may prove rather fragile in the future.This paper maps judicial self-government in Czechia and argues that although Czechia is sometimes perceived as a black sheep of Europe for not introducing any form of judicial council into its judicial system, there is in fact a substantial amount of judicial selfgovernment exercised by several bodies, the most important being the court presidents, and it is therefore a mistake to conflate judicial self-government with judicial councils. The most notable changes to judicial self-government are then introduced and their impact on values crucial for the functioning of the judiciary assessed. And, as the judicial selfgovernment in Czechia is primarily exercised by court presidents, the narrative of changes to judicial self-government and their impact is presented as a narrative of changes affecting court presidents and of their effects on the wider legal, social and political fields. The dominance of court presidents, built in part on informal powers, is a mixed blessing however, as it can have both positive and negative impact on the crucial values and may prove rather fragile in the future

Superjudges and the Separation of Powers: A Case Study of Judicial Informality in Czechia

Examining the practices of i) the selection of judges, ii) panel composition and case assignment, and iii) judicial off-bench activities, the article argues that some Czech judges, most often court presidents and apex court judges, use informal judicial institutions as tools to increase their influence on judicial administration and the decision-making of courts. As a result, these judges have far greater influence than the formal account of their roles might suggest. The article explores the context which facilitated the informal rise of these “Superjudges”, asserting that the key factors were institutionally independent judiciaries with individually dependent judges, the absence of a shared understanding of fundamental constitutional concepts, and the underperformance of Czech legal academia. The article then contends that while Superjudges may contribute to an informed, effective, and politically independent functioning of the judiciary, they also risk eroding important divisions of power which, in turn, might compromise the integrity of the judicial process, undermine the authority of courts, and disconnect the content of the law from the general interest