Special issue on the ‘sources of peace and peaceful change in East Asia’¹

East Asia is usually associated with war and conflict. This applies to its historical past, as well as to the present post-Cold War period. In fact, this pessimism on the region has hardened with the worsening structural US-China competition since 2010. Challenging this prevailing view, this special issue argues that the concepts of peace and peaceful change are critical elements to explain East Asian regional dynamics in the post-Cold War period. It poses the following questions: (a) how could peace and peaceful change be analysed conceptually at the regional level?; (b) what type of peace and peaceful change notions are applicable to East Asia?; (c) what are the sources and mechanisms of regional peace in East Asia and its sub-regions and how have the sources and mechanisms changed over the post-Cold War period?; (d) how has the worsening US-China structural competition affected the prospects of peace in East Asia?; and (e) how do the middle powers, namely Japan, South Korea, Australia and Indonesia, contribute to peace and peaceful change in the region? The special issue is the first attempt to systematically apply the concepts of peace and peaceful change on East Asia. The articles identify the sources and mechanisms of peace and peaceful change, apply an eclectic conceptual approach that combines traditional and non-traditional IR theories; and assess the prospects of peace in East Asia in the context of the worsening structural tensions presented by the US-China competition

Minimal peace in Northeast Asia: a realist-liberal explanation

Northeast Asia is usually associated with conflict and war. Challenging this prevailing view, this article shows that the sub-region has achieved minimal peace since its peaceful transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. The questions posed are: (a) what factors are responsible for Northeast Asia’s minimal peace?; and (b) how will these factors respond to the worsening US-China competition since 2010? This article’s argument is two-fold. First, Northeast Asia’s minimal peace is explained by three realist-liberal factors: America’s hegemony; strong economic interdependence among the Northeast Asian states; and a stable institutional structure in East Asia, including Northeast Asia. These factors kept a stable balance of power, ensured development and prosperity, and mitigated the political and strategic tensions between the states. Second, Northeast Asia’s minimal peace would be durable to counter the negative effects of the Sino-US competition in the coming decades. While the economic interdependence and institutional building factors have shown resilience, the US hegemony faces a robust challenge from China. Nevertheless, the US hegemony is durable because of America’s enduring relative strategic and economic advantages over China, the expanded role of America’s regional allies to preserve US preponderance and China’s problems in building an alternative regional order

Japan’s responses to China’s rise : soft balancing in Southeast Asia

Japan’s threat perceptions toward China have hardened over the post-Cold War period. This led Tokyo to rely more on overt balancing strategies compared with engagement and hedging strategies. While hard balancing measures are widely discussed in the literature, little or no attention is paid to soft balancing. Though concerned about China’s strategic rise, Japan’s strategic options are limited by the entrenched normative constraints within the security policymaking structure. These conditions make soft balancing a critical and viable strategy for Japan. The prominence of soft balancing is illustrated by analyzing Japan’s response to China’s widening influence in Southeast Asia, primarily focusing on two areas–East Asian multilateralism and the South China Sea territorial disputes. Empirically, this paper offers a more nuanced analysis of Japan’s response to China’s strategic rise; and theoretically, explains the way Japan’s case strengthens the conceptual utility of soft balancing through the incorporation of a normative perspective.Submitted/Accepted versio

Beyond identity and domestic politics : stability in South Korea-Japan relations

South Korea and Japan have experienced their worst deterioration of bilateral relations since 2012. What are the long-term prospects for this relationship? Will it continue on this negative trajectory or recover positively in the long term? Challenging the conventional view that supports the former conclusion, this paper argues for a positive outlook for the relationship in the long term. This is defended from a structural perspective relying on two long-term strategic trends for Northeast/ East Asia-the elevated uncertainty in the regional environment (due to North Korea and China’s strategic rise); and the rising strain on the U.S. military presence in both countries. In response to these structural pressures, South Korea and Japan will adapt and adopt strategies to defend their national security within a reformed U.S. alliance structure and strengthen strategic cooperation through bilateral and trilateral (with the United States) means.Published versio

Japan's smart power strategy and securing the US-led order

What is Japan's strategy to secure the US-led order from the heightened China challenge? This article argues that Japan is pursuing a smart power strategy made up of two complementary strands. The first is the use of hard power resources, involving internal and external balancing measures, to assist the US and other partners and friends to secure the region's balance of power in favour of the US-led order. The second strand refers Japan's use of soft power resources to reinforce the multilateral orders in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific regions in support of the US-led order. It focuses on the promotion of norms that advocate for a regional rules-based order outlined in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy/vision. The article concludes that the smart power strategy has been successful in facilitating Japan's objective of securing the US-led order given its internal constraints and unique position between the US and China

Implications for Southeast Asia of the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/Bhubhindar Singh, Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, explains that "In light of the rising tensions in the South China Sea, the United States and Japan have strengthened cooperation to maintain regional stability and protect the security and economic interests of the regional states.

Is Japan tilting towards China?

Some media have recently suggested Japan is tilting towards China under the Hatoyama administration. Whilst Sino-Japanese relations have improved, the US will continue to remain the core of Japanese foreign policy

The Kim –Trump Summit in Singapore : North Korea’s End Goals

North Korea’s strong willingness to engage in active diplomacy has raised hopes for a ‘new era of peace’ on the Korean Peninsula. While many are wondering about Pyongyang’s intentions, two goals are driving the regime: legitimacy and reunification

Security indentity, policymaking regime and Japanese security policy developement

Compared to the Cold War, Japan’s post-Cold War security policy has undergone significant change. This is especially visible in the new means Japan has adopted, both outside and within the context of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, in contributing to regional and international affairs in military-strategic terms. Challenging realism’s dominance, this paper captures this shift through the use of collective identity, more specifically, Japanese security identity. It argues that Japan’s security policy expansion is captured by the shift in Japan’s security identity from a peace-state to an international-state. To understand this shift, the security identity is studied in the context of the Japanese security policymaking regime. Three elements of the regime are studied: the agents involved in the security policymaking process, the decision-making structure, and the role of the U.S. in Japan’s security policymaking process. The combined effect of these elements determines the dominant security identity and Japanese security policy

Abe's first overseas trip : why Southeast Asia?

New Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will make his first official visit overseas to Southeast Asia instead of the United States. This trip highlights two main points: Japan's 'return" to the region and the rise of Southeast Asia in Japan's strategic calculations