Emerging Technologies, Extreme Uncertainty, and the Principle of Rational Precautionary Reasoning

This paper argues that, in a context of 'extreme uncertainty' (where it is believed that it is possible that an emerging technology might cause harm to humans, damage to the environment, or some form of moral violation; but where the likelihood of such harm can be expressed only as lying in the range >0<1), regulators should be guided by a 'Principle of Rational Precautionary Reason' (the PRPR). The PRPR, which is to be distinguished from the precautionary principle, is presented as a rational response to cases of extreme uncertainty that regulators might encounter in both their prudential and moral calculations. For illustrative purposes, the application of the PRPR is tested in relation to the Large Hadron Collider, nanotechnologies and food, and the application of neuroscience and neurotechnologies in the criminal justice system

Morality in Intellectual Property Law: A Concept-Theoretic Framework

This paper presents a ‘concept-theoretic’ position on the relationship between law and morality in any legal system that includes respect for human rights as a fundamental principle of the legal validity of its rules. With European Union law (EU law) as its central focus, this concept-theoretic position is premised upon the adoption by the EU of fundamental principles, which include human rights. Therefore, given the current status of human rights within the EU, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and, indeed, any EU law hence any EU Intellectual Property law (IP law)must be consistent with what follows logically and conceptually from the concept of a human right given by the UDHR. The paper will first present the concepttheoretic framework with reference to EU patent law arguing that some requirements need to be read into EU patent law even when not expressly stated. Furthermore, with reference to Article 6 of Directive 1998/44/EC we argue that this provision must be interpreted broadly to give full effect to human rights and human dignity. The second part of the paper looks at the CJEU ruling in Brüstle v Greenpeace (Case C-34/10 2011) as viewed from the concept-theoretic position. We argue that the CJEU reasoning is substantially sound on the requirements of the Directive and the CJEU had no option but to make the rulings it did. The third part of the paper looks at several objections raised by scientist and lawyers regarding the CJEU decision in Brüstle from the concept-theoretic position. We conclude that the CJEU has not misinterpreted the law. Finally, we conclude that the law governing the grant of patents must be read in line with the concept of human rights and human dignity

When is Personal Data Rendered Anonymous? Interpreting Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC

Outlines the scope of Council Directive 95/46. Discusses whether the principles of data protection apply to data rendered anonymous. Examines the difficulty in applying sufficient protection to data once it has been rendered anonymous and stresses the importance of data controllers informing data subjects of any anticipated anonymisation