Land reform, poverty reduction and growth : evidence from India

In recent times there has been a renewed interest in relationships between redistribution, growth and welfare. Land reforms have been central to strategies to improve the asset base of the poor in developing countries thought their effectiveness has been hindered by political constraints on implementation. In this paper we use panel data on the sixteen main Indian states from 1958 to 1992 to consider whether the large volume of land reforms as have been legislated have had an appreciable impact on growth and poverty. The evidence presented suggests that land reforms do appear to be associated with poverty reduction

Estimating the peace dividend: the impact of violence on house prices in Northern Ireland

This paper exploits data on the pattern of violence across regions and over time to estimate the impact of the peace process in Northern Ireland on house prices. We begin with a linear model that estimates the average treatment effect of a conflict-related killing on house prices .showing a negative correlation between house prices and killings. We then develop an approach based on an economic model where the parameters of the statistical process are estimated for a Markov switching model where conflict and peace are treated as a latent state. From this, we are able to construct a measure of the discounted number of killings which is updated in the light of actual killings. This model naturally suggests a heterogeneous effect of killings across space and time which we use to generate estimates of the peace dividend. The economic model suggests a somewhat different pattern of estimates to the linear model. We also show that there is some evidence of spillover effects of violence in adjacent regions.

Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence

This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.

Fragile States and Development Policy

It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a frame-work for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety of development policies in different types of states.9076:state fragility, development

Public-Private Partnership for the Provision of Public Goods: Theory and an Application to NGOs

This paper analyzes the role of public and private responsibility in the provision of public goods. We emphasise that a typical public good will require many different inputs which raises the possibility of partnerships to exploit comparative advantages of different parties. But hold-up problems due to contractual incompleteness in specifying tasks discourage separation of ownership and management. We extend our analysis to examine the role of project design or 'ideology' as a separate non-contractible input, and the possibility of crowding out in the form of a less caring government being elected , because of the presence of private providers. The main application developed here is to NGOs in developing countries which, in the last two decades, have been increasingly involved in various capacities in the provisions of a wide range of public goods and services.Public goods, non-governmental organizations, incomplete contracting, partnerships.

Estimating the Peace Dividend:The Impact of Violence on HousePrices in Northern Ireland

This paper exploits data on the pattern of violence across regions and over time toestimate the impact of the peace process in Northern Ireland on house prices. Webegin with a linear model that estimates the average treatment effect of a conflictrelatedkilling on house prices - showing a negative correlation between house pricesand killings. We then develop an approach based on an economic model where theparameters of the statistical process are estimated for a Markov switching modelwhere conflict and peace are treated as a latent state. From this, we are able toconstruct a measure of the discounted number of killings which is updated in thelight of actual killings. This model naturally suggests a heterogeneous effect ofkillings across space and time which we use to generate estimates of the peacedividend. The economic model suggests a somewhat different pattern of estimates tothe linear model. We also show that there is some evidence of spillover effects ofviolence in adjacent regions.Peace Dividend, Northern Ireland, Conflict, Housing Price, Markov Chain

Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission

The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who chooses a redistributive strategy in addition to providing information. We give conditions under which the outcome leads to over- or under-investment in high-return activities and the outcome is Pareto efficient.Political economy, cheap talk, redistribution, development

The de Soto Effect

This paper explores the consequences of creating and improving property rights so thatfixed assets can be used as collateral. This has become a cause célèbre of Hernando de Sotowhose views are influential in debates about policy reform concerning property rights.Hence, we refer to the economic impact of such reforms as the de Soto effect. We explore thelogic of the argument for credit contracts, both in isolation, and in market equilibrium. Weshow that the impact will vary with the degree of market competition. Where competition isweak, it is possible that borrowers will be worse off when property rights improve. Wediscuss the implications for optimal policy and the political economy of policy reform.