860 research outputs found
Do Consumers Benefit from Concentration in the New Economy? A Review of Google's Mergers, Acquisitions, and Arrangements
Within the last three years, Google has acquired YouTube and DoubleClick and has attempted to control part of Yahoo!'s search advertising business. Two of the deals have not raised antitrust concerns by competition authorities. I review these deals with a focus on consumer welfare. Consumers are affected by being on one side of a multisided platform. Provided that better matches of search ads are beneficial, I demonstrate that the mergers may have positive effects for consumers through better matches between users and search ads. However, this does not substitute an in-depth antitrust assessment of the deals. --merger control,multisided platforms,screening mechanism
Liberalization of the Postal Service Market in Europe: Entry with Universal Service and Partial Coverage
In the advent of postal market liberalization in several European countries we expect that the incumbent operators anticipate entry by competitors who are not required to offer universal service, i.e. coverage of the entire country and uniform pricing. The market for postal service exhibits stronger network effects than in telecommunications because of limited interconnection. In the present paper we model entrants which can opt for a partial geographical coverage and who enter with a higher service quality than the incumbent. This allows to predict possible deterrence or accommodating strategies by the incumbent. We show that dependent on the shape of the network costs and the network effects entrants may either offer a low quality in order to mitigate competition or offer a higher quality in order to restrict the entrant's geographical coverage. --regulation,liberalization,postal services
Ex Post Regulation Facilitates Collusion
Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned. --entry deterrence,access regulation,network infrastructure,vertical differentiation
Risk classification and cream skimming on the deregulated German insurance market
In a two-stage model insurance companies first decide upon risk classification and then compete in prices. I show that the observed heterogeneous behavior of similar firms is compatible with rational behavior. On the deregulated German insurance market individual application of classification schemes induces welfare losses due to cream skimming. Classification costs and pricing above marginal cost can be prevented by common industry-wide loss statistics which already exist to a rudimentary extent. They allow competition to approach Bertrand type. The computation of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for Bertrand competition allows to explain the decrease of industry profit after deregulation. --Insurance Regulation,Cream Skimming,Bertrand Competition
Ex-post assessment of merger effects: the case of Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003)
The paper studies the effects of the Pfizer and Pharmacia (2003) merger on competition in the Swiss pharmaceutical market and compares the assessment of the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO) with the post-merger market developments. We find that the merger has had a miniscule impact on the Swiss pharmaceutical market. This has primarily to do with the fact that the product portfolios of both companies have shown no or only slight overlaps. In both cases of potential anticompetitive effects, the companies successfully proposed to divest some of their assets in order to prevent a further strengthening of their dominant position. The remedies included products in the development phase which were not available on the market at the time of the decision. In other markets in which either an overlapping of businesses of both companies existed or in which one of the merging entities held a dominant market position, no significant effects of the merger were noticed. This might have to do with both, existing price regulation in the Swiss drug industry and changes in Pfizer's product portfolio following the merger. Furthermore, with respect to other potentially interesting market characteristics such as investment behaviour, R&D, sales or employment, available data on global company level does not allow an isolation of the possible effects of the merger. --mergers,ex-post evaluation,pharmaceutical markets
Entry deterrence in postal service markets
In this paper we analyze the incentive of the German postal service (Deutsche Post AG, DPAG) to increase quality in the light of the upcoming liberalization of the postal services market. Currently, there would be no incentive for DPAG to increase its quality if the market were not to be liberalized in six months. Therefore, we suggest that the current changes in market regulation have motivated this quality improvement. In particular we show that this rise in quality is only profitable to DPAG because it renders entry less profitable or even impossible. However, consumers benefit from higher quality, whether entry is deterred or accommodated
Do shorter product cycles induce patent thickets?
The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma where all firms would jointly prefer to patent less and to not have a patent thicket. If firms start applying for patents on technologies which are not yet mature in order to cover ideas that may eventually turn successful, this may create a patent thicket. The transition into a situation where firms start patenting many ideas instead of single mature technologies is initiated and accelerated when network effects are present or patents exhibit a blocking property
Do consumers benefit from concentration in the New Economy? : a review of Google's mergers, acquisitions, and arrangements
Within the last three years, Google has acquired YouTube and DoubleClick and has attempted to control part of Yahoo!'s search advertising business. Two of the deals have not raised antitrust concerns by competition authorities. I review these deals with a focus on consumer welfare. Consumers are affected by being on one side of a multisided platform. Provided that better matches of search ads are beneficial, I demonstrate that the mergers may have positive effects for consumers through better matches between users and search ads. However, this does not substitute an in-depth antitrust assessment of the deals
Ex post regulation facilitates collusion
Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient level. Ex post regulation facilitates this type of collusion and should be abandoned
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