Selective contracting by health insurers:the perspective of enrolees

In een zorgstelsel gebaseerd op gereguleerde concurrentie spelen zorgverzekeraars een belangrijke rol. Van hen wordt verwacht dat zij contracten afsluiten met een selectie van zorgaanbieders, die zij kiezen op basis van prijs en kwaliteit. Het selectief contracteren van zorgaanbieders is een prikkel voor zorgaanbieders om met elkaar te concurreren en zou dus moeten leiden tot meer betaalbare en betere kwaliteit van zorg. Hiervoor is het belangrijk dat zorgverzekeraars in staat zijn om hun verzekerden te sturen naar gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders. Op deze manier verbeteren zij hun onderhandelingspositie ten opzichte van de zorgaanbieders [1, 2]. Verzekerden zijn echter heel negatief over restricties in hun keuzevrijheid. Daarom zijn zorgverzekeraars in Nederland terughoudend in het implementeren van selectief contracteren. Het doel van dit proefschrift is het identificeren van mechanismen die de acceptatie van selectief contracteren en het sturen van verzekerden naar gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders kan verklaren. De centrale onderzoeksvraag die we wilden beantwoorden is: Hoe kunnen we de acceptatie van selectief contracteren en het sturen van verzekerden naar gecontracteerde zorgaanbieders verklaren? (aut. ref.

Selective contracting and channelling patients to preferred providers: A scoping review

Selective contracting by health insurers and channelling patients to contracted providers is crucial in a health care system based on managed competition, as this should lead to better value for money delivery of healthcare. However, an important consequence for enrolees is that health insurers interfere with their choice of care provider. This scoping review aims to find out what is known about selective contracting from the enrolee's perspective. Is it being done and how do enrolees feel about the role of their health insurer in their care provider choice? A literature search was conducted, and, in addition, experts were consulted for extra information and documents. Results show that selective contracting and channelling are practised in several countries. This is mostly through negative financial incentives, which are also found to be the most effective strategy. However, enrolees are very negative about restrictions on provider choice introduced by their insurer. This results in enrolees feeling less satisfaction with, and trust in, care providers and health insurers. Choice is crucial in this respect since enrolees are more satisfied with their health plans and care providers when they have chosen them themselves. Future research should focus on the role of trust and how people weigh different attributes of health plans if selective contracting and channelling is to be implemented in a manner acceptable to enrolees

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In a health care system based on managed competition, health insurers negotiate on quality and price with care providers and are allowed to offer restrictive health plans. It is crucial that enrolees who need care choose restrictive health plans, as otherwise health insurers cannot channel patients to contracted providers and they will lose their bargaining power in negotiations with providers. We aim to explain enrolees' choice of a restrictive health plan in exchange for a lower premium. In 2014 an online survey with an experimental design was conducted on members of an access panel (response 78%; n=3,417). Results showed 37.4% of respondents willing to choose a restrictive health plan in exchange for a lower premium. This fell to 22% when the restrictive health plan also included a longer travelling time. Enrolees who choose a restrictive health plan are younger and healthier, or on lower incomes, than those preferring a non-restrictive one. This means that enrolees who use care will be unlikely to choose a restrictive health plan and, therefore, health insurers will not be able to channel them to contracted care providers. This undermines the goals of the health care system based on managed competition

Health plan choice in the Netherlands : Restrictive health plans preferred by young and healthy individuals

In a health care system based on managed competition, health insurers negotiate on quality and price with care providers and are allowed to offer restrictive health plans. It is crucial that enrolees who need care choose restrictive health plans, as otherwise health insurers cannot channel patients to contracted providers and they will lose their bargaining power in negotiations with providers. We aim to explain enrolees' choice of a restrictive health plan in exchange for a lower premium. In 2014 an online survey with an experimental design was conducted on members of an access panel (response 78%; n=3,417). Results showed 37.4% of respondents willing to choose a restrictive health plan in exchange for a lower premium. This fell to 22% when the restrictive health plan also included a longer travelling time. Enrolees who choose a restrictive health plan are younger and healthier, or on lower incomes, than those preferring a non-restrictive one. This means that enrolees who use care will be unlikely to choose a restrictive health plan and, therefore, health insurers will not be able to channel them to contracted care providers. This undermines the goals of the health care system based on managed competition

Advice from the health insurer as a channelling strategy:a natural experiment at a Dutch health insurance company

Abstract Background In a health care system based on managed competition it is important that health insurers are able to channel their enrolees to preferred care providers. However, enrolees are often very negative about financial incentives and any limitations in their choice of care provider. Therefore, a Dutch health insurance company conducted an experiment to study the effectiveness of a new method of channelling their enrolees. This method entails giving enrolees advise on which physiotherapists to choose when they call customer service. Offering this advice as an extra service is supposed to improve service quality ratings. Objective of this study is to evaluate this channelling method on effectiveness and the impact on service quality ratings. Methods In this experiment, one of the health insurer’s customer service call teams (pilot team) began advising enrolees on their choice of physiotherapist. Three data sources were used. Firstly, all enrolees who called customer service received an online questionnaire in order to measure their evaluation of the quality of service. Enrolees who were offered advice received a slightly different questionnaire which, in addition, asked about whether they intended to follow the advice they were offered. Multilevel regression analysis was conducted to analyse the difference in service quality ratings between the pilot team and two comparable customer service teams before and after the implementation of the channelling method. Secondly, employees logged each call, registering, if they offered advice, whether the enrolee accepted it, and if so, which care provider was advised. Thirdly, data from the insurance claims were used to see if enrolees visited the recommended physiotherapist. Results The results of the questionnaire show that enrolees responded favorably to being offered advice on the choice of physiotherapist. Furthermore, 45% of enrolees who received advice and then went on to visit a care provider, followed the advice. The service quality ratings were higher compared to control groups. However, it could not be determined whether this effect was entirely due to the intervention. Conclusions Channelling enrolees towards preferred care providers by offering advice on their choice of care provider when they call customer service is successful. The effect on service quality seems positive, although a causal relationship could not be determined

Advice from the health insurer as a channelling strategy: a natural experiment at a Dutch health insurance company

BACKGROUND: In a health care system based on managed competition it is important that health insurers are able to channel their enrolees to preferred care providers. However, enrolees are often very negative about financial incentives and any limitations in their choice of care provider. Therefore, a Dutch health insurance company conducted an experiment to study the effectiveness of a new method of channelling their enrolees. This method entails giving enrolees advise on which physiotherapists to choose when they call customer service. Offering this advice as an extra service is supposed to improve service quality ratings. Objective of this study is to evaluate this channelling method on effectiveness and the impact on service quality ratings. METHODS: In this experiment, one of the health insurer's customer service call teams (pilot team) began advising enrolees on their choice of physiotherapist. Three data sources were used. Firstly, all enrolees who called customer service received an online questionnaire in order to measure their evaluation of the quality of service. Enrolees who were offered advice received a slightly different questionnaire which, in addition, asked about whether they intended to follow the advice they were offered. Multilevel regression analysis was conducted to analyse the difference in service quality ratings between the pilot team and two comparable customer service teams before and after the implementation of the channelling method. Secondly, employees logged each call, registering, if they offered advice, whether the enrolee accepted it, and if so, which care provider was advised. Thirdly, data from the insurance claims were used to see if enrolees visited the recommended physiotherapist. RESULTS: The results of the questionnaire show that enrolees responded favorably to being offered advice on the choice of physiotherapist. Furthermore, 45% of enrolees who received advice and then went on to visit a care provider, followed the advice. The service quality ratings were higher compared to control groups. However, it could not be determined whether this effect was entirely due to the intervention. CONCLUSIONS: Channelling enrolees towards preferred care providers by offering advice on their choice of care provider when they call customer service is successful. The effect on service quality seems positive, although a causal relationship could not be determined

Advice from the health insurer as a channelling strategy: a natural experiment at a Dutch health insurance company

Abstract Background In a health care system based on managed competition it is important that health insurers are able to channel their enrolees to preferred care providers. However, enrolees are often very negative about financial incentives and any limitations in their choice of care provider. Therefore, a Dutch health insurance company conducted an experiment to study the effectiveness of a new method of channelling their enrolees. This method entails giving enrolees advise on which physiotherapists to choose when they call customer service. Offering this advice as an extra service is supposed to improve service quality ratings. Objective of this study is to evaluate this channelling method on effectiveness and the impact on service quality ratings. Methods In this experiment, one of the health insurerâ s customer service call teams (pilot team) began advising enrolees on their choice of physiotherapist. Three data sources were used. Firstly, all enrolees who called customer service received an online questionnaire in order to measure their evaluation of the quality of service. Enrolees who were offered advice received a slightly different questionnaire which, in addition, asked about whether they intended to follow the advice they were offered. Multilevel regression analysis was conducted to analyse the difference in service quality ratings between the pilot team and two comparable customer service teams before and after the implementation of the channelling method. Secondly, employees logged each call, registering, if they offered advice, whether the enrolee accepted it, and if so, which care provider was advised. Thirdly, data from the insurance claims were used to see if enrolees visited the recommended physiotherapist. Results The results of the questionnaire show that enrolees responded favorably to being offered advice on the choice of physiotherapist. Furthermore, 45% of enrolees who received advice and then went on to visit a care provider, followed the advice. The service quality ratings were higher compared to control groups. However, it could not be determined whether this effect was entirely due to the intervention. Conclusions Channelling enrolees towards preferred care providers by offering advice on their choice of care provider when they call customer service is successful. The effect on service quality seems positive, although a causal relationship could not be determined