1,416 research outputs found
The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs
Using the ExecuComp data set, which contains information on the five highest-paid executives in each of a large number of U.S. firms for the years 1992–97, the authors examine the gender compensation gap among high-level executives. Women, who represented about 2.5% of the sample, earned about 45% less than men. As much as 75% of this gap can be explained by the fact that women managed smaller companies and were less likely to be CEO, Chair, or company President. The unexplained gap falls to less than 5% with an allowance for the younger average age and lower average seniority of the female executives. These results do not rule out the possibility of discrimination via gender segregation or unequal promotion. Between 1992 and 1997, however, women nearly tripled their participation in the top executive ranks and also strongly improved their relative compensation, mostly by gaining representation in larger corporations
Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry
Does entry regulation hinder job creation? We investigate this question in the context of the French retail industry, a sector that has experienced especially low rates of job creation over the last 25 years. Since the early 70s, the French government has required regional zoning board approval for the creation or extension of any large retail store. Using a unique database that provides time and regional variation in boards' approval decisions, we show that this requirement created barriers to entry in the retail sector. We also show that these barriers to entry, either measured directly by approval rates or predicted by the political composition of the boards, weakened employment growth in the retail industry. Our findings indicate that retail employment could have been more than 10% higher today had entry regulation not been introduced. Promoting product market competition may thus be a key reform for countries with poor employment performance.
Profitable Investments or Dissipated Cash? Evidence on the Investment-Cash Flow Relationship From Oil and Gas Lease Bidding
The strong positive relationship between corporate cash flow and investment has been interpreted through the lens of both agency- and non-agency-based models. In this paper, we distinguish between these two interpretations using project-level data in the oil and gas industry. The specific projects we consider are auctioned-off leases that give mineral exploration rights to tracts of federal land. We find the standard positive relationship between investment and cash flow in this data, in that positive shocks to residual cash flow (netting out firm and time effects) are associated with higher spending on these leases. Interestingly, the increased investment comes from an increase in the price paid per tract with little to no change in the total number of tracts or total acreage of land bought. The positive association between price and cash flow holds even after controlling for a set of tract and firm characteristics that might be ex-ante related to expected return on a given tract. This data is most useful, however, because we can directly observe the eventual productivity of each of these projects. We find that the increase in price induced by higher cash flow is associated with lower average productivity. In fact, the total number of productive tracts does not increase with cash flow. In other words, while higher cash flow is associated with higher spending on these projects, higher cash flow does not lead to higher revenues from these projects. Combining this finding with the lack of a quantity response, we conclude that our results are best described by an agency model where managers use cash flow to simplify their job (or live a ``quiet life'') rather than ``empire-build.''
The Trouble with Boys: Social Influences and the Gender Gap in Disruptive Behavior
This paper explores the importance of the home and school environments in explaining the gender gap in disruptive behavior. We document large differences in the gender gap across key features of the home environment – boys do especially poorly in broken families. In contrast, we find little impact of the early school environment on non-cognitive gaps. Differences in endowments explain a small part of boys’ non-cognitive deficit in single-mother families. More importantly, non-cognitive returns to parental inputs differ markedly by gender. Broken families are associated with worse parental inputs and boys’ non-cognitive development, unlike girls’, appears extremely responsive to such inputs.
Profitable Investments or Dissipated Cash?: Evidence on the Investment-Cash Flow Relationship From Oil and Gas Lease Bidding
Both agency- and non-agency-based interpretations have been proposed to explain the strong positive empirical relationship between corporate cash flow and corporate investment. In this paper, we attempt to distinguish between these different interpretations using project-level data in the oil and gas industry. The specific projects we consider are mineral exploration leases on tracts of land. The standard positive relationship between investment and cash flow holds for these projects, in that we find that positive shocks to residual cash flow (netting out firm and time effects) are associated with higher spending on these projects. Interestingly, the increased investment comes from an increase in the price paid per tract with little to no change in the total number of tracts or total acreage of land bought. The positive association between price and cash flow holds even after controlling for a set of tract and firm characteristics that might be ex-ante related to expected return on a given tract. This data is most useful, however, because we can directly observe the eventual productivity of the projects undertaken. We find that the variation in bid price induced by higher cash flow is, if anything, negatively related to tract productivity. More importantly, the overall number of productive tracts does not increase with the cash flow in the year these tracts were bought. In other words, while higher cash flow is associated with higher spending on these projects, higher cash flow does not lead to higher revenues from these projects. Combining this finding with the lack of a quantity response, we conclude that our results are best described by an agency model where managers use cash flow to simplify their job (or live a “quiet life”) rather than “empire-build. ”
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Most Difference-in-Difference (DD) papers rely on many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes. Yet almost all these papers ignore the bias in the estimated standard errors that serial correlation introduce4s. This is especially troubling because the independent variable of interest in DD estimation (e.g., the passage of law) is itself very serially correlated, which will exacerbate the bias in standard errors. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly generate placebo laws in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey. For each law, we use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its 'effect' as well as the standard error for this estimate. The standard errors are severely biased: with about 20 years of data, DD estimation finds an 'effect' significant at the 5% level of up to 45% of the placebo laws. Two very simple techniques can solve this problem for large sample sizes. The first technique consists in collapsing the data and ignoring the time-series variation altogether; the second technique is to estimate standard errors while allowing for an arbitrary covariance structure between time periods. We also suggest a third technique, based on randomization inference testing methods, which works well irrespective of sample size. This technique uses the empirical distribution of estimated effects for placebo laws to form the test distribution.
Credit and Product Market Effects of Banking Deregulation: Evidence from the French Experience
Bankenreform, Deregulierung,, Industriestruktur, Frankreich, Banking reform, Deregulation, Industrial structure, France
Public Policy and Extended Families: Evidence from South Africa
Tightly knit extended families, in which people often give money to and get money from relatives, characterize many developing countries. These intra-family flows mean that public policies may affect a very different group of people than the one they target. To assess the empirical importance of these effects, we study a cash pension program in South Africa that targets the elderly. Focusing on three-generation households , we use the variation in pension receipt that comes from differences in the age of the elder(s) in the households. We find a sharp drop in the labor force participation of prime-age men in these households when elder women reach 60 years old or elder mean reach 65, the respective ages for pension eligibility. We also find that the drop in labor supply diminishes with family size, as the pension money is split over more people, and with educational attainment, as the pension money becomes less significant relative to outside earnings. Other findings suggest that power within the family might play an important role: (1) labor supply drops less when the pension is received by a man rather than by a woman; (2) middle aged men (those more likely to have control in the family) reduce labor supply more than younger men; and (3) female labor supply is unaffected. These last two findings also respectively suggest that the results are unlikely to be driven by increased human capital investment or by a need to stay home to care for the elderly. As a whole, this public policy seems to have had large effects on a group-prime age men living with the old-quite different from the one it originally targeted-elderly men and women.
Does Managed Care Change the Mission of Nonprofit Hospitals? Evidence From the Managerial Labor Market
This paper examines how the managerial labor market in nonprofit hospitals has adjusted to the negative income pressures created by HMO penetration. Using a panel of about 1500 nonprofit hospitals over the period 1992 to 1996, we find that top executive turnover increases following an increase in HMO penetration. Moreover, the increase in turnover is concentrated among the hospitals that have low levels of economic profitability and are more financially leveraged. While the link between top executive pay and for-profit performance measures is on average very weak, HMO penetration substantially tightens that link: as HMO penetration increases, top executives are compensated more for improving the profitability of their hospitals. These results are consistent with the view that HMO penetration increases the importance of for-profit performance objectives among not-for-profit hospitals. Boards appear to fire the managers that are least able to compete in the new competitive environment and reward incumbent managers more for achieving for-profit goals. Consistent with donors' belief that these changes represent a weakening of the nonprofit mission and not simply an attempt by altruistic boards to protect intergenerational equity, we find that public donations fall as HMO market share increases.
Does Corruption Produce Unsafe Drivers?
We follow 822 applicants through the process of obtaining a driver%u2019s license in New Delhi, India. To understand how the bureaucracy responds to individual and social needs, participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: bonus, lesson, and comparison groups. Participants in the bonus group were offered a financial reward if they could obtain their license fast; participants in the lesson group were offered free driving lessons. To gauge driving skills, we performed a surprise driving test after participants had obtained their licenses. Several interesting facts regarding corruption emerge. First, the bureaucracy responds to individual needs. Those who want their license faster (e.g. the bonus group), get it 40% faster and at a 20% higher rate. Second, the bureaucracy is insensitive to social needs. The bonus group does not learn to drive safely in order to obtain their license: in fact, 69% of them were rated as %u201Cfailures%u201D on the independent driving test. Those in the lesson group, despite superior driving skills, are only slightly more likely to obtain a license than the comparison group and far less likely (by 29 percentage points) than the bonus group. Detailed surveys allow us to document the mechanisms of corruption. We find that bureaucrats arbitrarily fail drivers at a high rate during the driving exam, irrespective of their ability to drive. To overcome this, individuals pay informal %u201Cagents%u201D to bribe the bureaucrat and avoid taking the exam altogether. An audit study of agents further highlights the insensitivity of agents%u2019 pricing to driving skills. Together, these results suggest that bureaucrats raise red tape to extract bribes and that this corruption undermines the very purpose of regulation.
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