23 research outputs found
Administering Suspect Classes
It has been over forty years since the Supreme Court declared a class suspect under the Equal Protection Clause. In that time, the Court has denied suspect-class status—and the special judicial protections associated with it—to the elderly, the disabled, and the poor, and it has avoided suspect-class determinations when addressing laws that discriminate against members of the LGBTQ community. Administrative agencies, however, have stepped in to provide marginalized groups with some protections through their interpretation of civil rights laws. The Court has shown hostility to those agency interpretations, often in opaque decisions that seem to rest on principles of judicial supremacy as much as substantive constitutional principles.
This Article argues that the Court’s hostility to agencies’ role in this area is misguided. Courts should defer to administrative agencies when they protect suspect classes on the basis of reasonable interpretations of civil rights statutes. The principle of judicial supremacy is not relevant: the Court’s abandonment of suspect classes appears driven by the Justices’ concern that the judiciary is intervening too much into the political process rather than a genuine belief that the groups in question do not qualify for suspect status. Given that this court-centered institutional concern does not apply to agencies, it is entirely appropriate for administrative officials to step in to fill the gap in protecting vulnerable minorities. Further, agencies are better positioned than other institutions to calibrate the protection of groups according to the societal context and the need for intervention
Paths of Resistance to Our Imperial First Amendment
In the campaign finance realm, we are in the age of the imperial First Amendment. Over the past nine years, litigants bringing First Amendment claims against campaign finance regulations have prevailed in every case in the Supreme Court. A conservative core of five justices has developed virtually categorical protections for campaign speech and has continued to expand those protections into domains that states once had the authority to regulate. As the First Amendment’s empire expands, other values give way. Four key cases from this era illustrate the reach of this imperial First Amendment. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, the Court held that the state could regulate only the most obvious forms of express advocacy for a candidate, thus expanding the space in which First Amendment rights categorically trump other state interests. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court held that corporations have the same First Amendment rights as individuals and limited dramatically the state’s capacity to protect the integrity of the democratic process. Only the narrow interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption could justify independent corporate expenditure regulations. When the state of Montana in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock offered evidence of such corruption to support its regulation of independent corporate expenditures, the Court simply presumed that the regulation did not in fact protect against this type of corruption. This decision raised the possibility that no state actor would be able to support a campaign finance restriction with evidence of a compelling purpose. Finally, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court expanded this First Amendment regime from campaign expenditures to campaign contributions, holding that only quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of such corruption could justify contribution limits. The Court then simply concluded as a matter of logic that the regulation did not protect against such corruption in the face of legislative evidence to the contrary
Reconsidering Statutory Interpretive Divergence between Elected and Appointed Judges: A Response to Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl and Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory Interpretation, 79 U Chi L Rev 1215 (2012)
Voter Data, Democratic Inequality, and the Risk of Political Violence
Campaigns\u27 increasing reliance on data-driven canvassing has coincided with a disquieting trend in American politics: a stark gap in voter turnout between the rich and poor. Turnout among the poor has remained low in modern elections despite legal changes that have dramatically decreased the cost of voting. In this Article, we present evidence that the combined availability of voter history data and modern microtargeting strategies have contributed to the rich-poor turnout gap. That is the case despite the promises of big data to lower the transaction costs of voter outreach, as well as additional reforms that have lowered the barriers to voting in other ways. Because the poor are less likely to have voted in prior elections, they are also less likely to appear in the mobilization models employed by data-savvy campaigns.
In this Article, we draw on a novel data set of voter data laws in every state and show that turnout rates among the poor are lower in states that disclose voter history data to campaigns. We also find that after states change their laws to provide voter history to campaigns, these campaigns are far less likely to contact the poor.
The consequences of this vicious cycle are already known: the unique interests of the poor have been entirely unrepresented in the political process. Such political marginalization and alienation of an entire class from the democratic process is not only a problem for the poor; it poses a systemic threat to political moderation and democratic stability. Politically marginalized and alienated groups may resort to nonpolitical means to effectuate social change and may also become ripe for recruitment by extremist and anti-democratic elements that are latent in every society. Recent incidents of domestic political violence demonstrate that the United States is no exception.
To address this threat of marginalizing the poor from democratic politics, we advance three sets of proposals. First, we argue that states should regulate the information environment of political campaigns. Prohibiting the collection and distribution of voter history data is not practical, but states should lean into their privacy laws to prohibit the matching of voter files with other administrative data sets and should provide voter history data to campaigns independent of any information about individual political preferences. Second, states should create financial incentives for campaigns to expand their mobilization efforts to include a more representative target population that is more inclusive of the poor. Traditional campaign finance voucher and tax rebate programs are likely inadequate on their own. Instead, we propose a series of novel incentive programs that would provide cash grants to campaigns that report the most donors during each reporting period and to parties that generate more turnout than their historical average. Finally, we advance proposals for social media platforms to self-regulate look-alike targeting and segmented online political ads that amplify inequalities in mobilization and exacerbate political marginalization.
Political parties and individual campaigns in the United States are currently not mandated by law to promote political equality. The above reforms aim to align the short-term interests of parties and campaigns (winning the next election) with the long-term public interest in preserving a healthy democracy. Constructing a more inclusive political system will benefit everyone who seeks to live in a sustainable representative democracy, not just those who are currently marginalized