Coordinating Sectoral Policymaking: Searching for Countervailing Mechanisms in the EU Legislative Process

In contrast to parliamentary systems, the Council of Ministers, the main legislative body of the European Union, consists of different formations in which national ministers with similar sectoral portfolios participate. This decision-making structure has led to a ‘loss of coherence’. In this paper I analyze several ways to strengthen policy coordination in the Union, including current coordination by the General Affairs Council and further involvement of the European Council. The analysis shows that ex ante-coordination, which is possible when drafting a proposal (for instance, in the case of Coreper) is more effective than ex post-coordination. In addition, imposing a hierarchical structure in which the European Council may review policy initiatives is also rather effective. However, this arrangement raises the question whether such a structure is suitable for a democratic system in which Parliament is not the principal decision-making body.

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion). --European Union,comitology,principal-agent-relationship,structure-induced agent discretion

Courts, Cabinet and Coalition Parties:The Politics of Euthanasia in a parliamentary Setting

An analysis is made of the interaction between the legislature and the judiciary in the Dutch parliamentary setting, focusing in particular on the issue of euthanasia. Using the methodology of positive political theory, two alternative hypotheses are derived about the extent to which the courts may affect public policies. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the decision-making process on euthanasia. First, the statutory interpretation the courts gave on euthanasia in the 1980s supports the hypothesis of the court as a policy advocate, not a policy conserver. Secondly, the fact that the courts were able to introduce and maintain a more liberal interpretation of euthanasia during the last decade can be explained as a consequence of the heterogenous preferences on this issue held by the political parties that formed the successive governing coalitions

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay: national policy coordination and the transposition of EU directives

Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition

Agent Discretion, regulatory Policymaking, and different institutional Arrangements

This paper examines agent discretion that is a result of the structure of the legislative process. Based on several distributions of lawmaking powers, different games are analyzed in which players decide on regulatory policies. The analysis shows that agent discretion increases as lawmaking powers are differentiated and assigned to specialized players. Particularly, monopoly initiation power, which allows a player to act as a gatekeeper, has a substantial impact on discretion. Agent discretion will be even larger when these players also have heterogenous preferences. The framework that is developed in this paper permits comparisons across different political systems with regard to agent discretion and legislative control on policymaking

Voter discernment and candidate entry in pluralitarian election

The paper develops a sequential model of candidate entry into elections decided on the basis of plurality. We analyze the kinds of candidates who are most likely to enter elections and simulate several plausible myopic entry sequences under various assumptions about voter abilities to discern differences in candidate positions. In the cases examined, open elections for “important” positions attract the entry of more than two candidates. Moreover, myopic entry often generates electoral outcomes which depart from the median-mean outcomes of the conventional models. These results are consistent with the observed diversity of candidates in presidential and other significant primary elections which contrasts with many previous analyses of electoral entry

EU policy, domestic interests, and the transposition of directives

Session 1: Governance in the European Unio