A Game Theoretic Approach to Analyse Cooperation between Rural Households in Northern Nigeria

Much research focuses on development of new agricultural technologies to reduce poverty levels of the large population of smallholder farms in Sub Saharan Africa. In this paper we argue that smallholders can also increase their production in a different way, namely by using their resources more efficiently through cooperation. This is obtained by grouping their (heterogeneous) resources and making joint decisions based on the aggregate resources. Afterwards, the gains of the joint production are divided, such that each farmer remains independent. This type of cooperation is modeled using linear programming and cooperative game theory. While linear programming establishes insight in optimal farm plans for farmers that cooperate, game theory is used to generate fair divisions of the extra gain that is established by cooperation. The model is applied to a village in Northern Nigeria. Households are clustered based on socio-economic parameters, and we explore cooperation. The optimal farm plan of the cooperative (i.e., farmers cooperate) contains more crops with high market and nutritional value, such as cowpea and sugarcane. We show that the gross margin of the cooperative is 12% higher than the sum of the individual gross margins. To divide these gains, we consider four established solution concepts from game theory that divide these extra gains: the Owen value, Shapley value, compromise value and nucleolus. An interesting result is that all farmers gain from cooperation and that the four solution concepts give similar results. Finally, we show how the provision of micro-credit can be used to stimulate cooperation in practice, benefiting the least-endowed farmers as well.Linear Programming;Agriculture;Household models;Cooperative Game Theory;Nigeria

A Game Theoretic Approach to Analyse Cooperation between Rural Households in Northern Nigeria

To improve the livelihood of the poor in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) much attention has been paid to the development of new agricultural technologies. We hypothesize that farmers can also improve their livelihood through cooperation. Partial cooperation, in which knowledge is shared or bargaining power improved, is relatively common in SSA, while cooperation where all resources are fully shared, which we address, has rarely been investigated. An important pre-requisite to establish such cooperation, is the need for a fair division rule for the gains of the cooperation. This paper combines linear programming and cooperative game theory to model the effects of cooperation of (individual) households on income and farm plans. Linear programming establishes insight in the optimal farm plans in cooperation, and cooperative game theory is used to generate fair division rules. The model is applied to a village in Northern Nigeria. Households are clustered based on socio-economic parameters, and we explore cooperation between clusters. Cooperation leads to increased income and results in changes in farm plans, because more efficient use of resources leads to more intensified agriculture (labour intensive – high value crops).Cooperations, Linear Programming, Nigeria, Livelihood, Agricultural and Food Policy, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Consumer/Household Economics, Environmental Economics and Policy, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Food Security and Poverty, International Relations/Trade, Marketing, Productivity Analysis, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Interest groups

The European institutions are sometimes depicted as a ‘lobbyists’ paradise’ where especially business interest representatives will find a favourable hearing for their wishes, concerns and political interests. We identify a number of unique features of the EU lobbying environment: narrow EU-only media environment, multilevel institutional structure and market-regulatory policy focus of the EU. We subsequently discuss existing academic studies into the mobilisation, strategies and policy influence of all organizations that attempt to influence EU decision-making. Due to the Transparency Register, the organizations mobilized to lobby the EU are currently relatively well-known, and, seemingly largely attracted to the policy areas where the EU has strong legal competences such as competition and market regulation. Cause groups narrowly target their engagement and in particular circumstances benefit from several EU-funding schemes. The EU political opportunities are especially conducive to ‘inside lobbying’ compared to ‘outside lobbying’. Interest groups also strategically select the most favourable institutional venues for their messages. Academic studies are inconclusive regarding the relative policy influence of different types of interest groups. They suggest that particular issue characteristics such as salience in public opinion or media attention largely determine whether business interest representatives or other actors find their preferences attainted in public policy outcomes

Destabilization of the TAR hairpin affects the structure and function of the HIV-1 leader RNA

The TAR hairpin of the human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) RNA genome is essential for virus replication. TAR forms the binding site for the transcriptional trans-activator protein Tat and multiple additional TAR functions have been proposed. We previously constructed an HIV-1 variant in which the TAR-Tat transcription control mechanism is replaced by the components of the Tet-ON regulatory system. In this context, the surprising finding was that TAR can be truncated or even deleted, but partial TAR deletions that destabilize the stem structure cause a severe replication defect. In this study, we demonstrate that the HIV-1 RNA genome requires a stable hairpin at its 5′-end because unpaired TAR sequences affect the proper folding of the untranslated leader RNA. Consequently, multiple leader-encoded functions are affected by partial TAR deletions. Upon evolution of such mutant viruses, the replication capacity was repaired through the acquisition of additional TAR mutations that restore the local RNA folding, thus preventing the detrimental effect on the leader conformation

An audio FIR-DAC in a BCD process for high power Class-D amplifiers

A 322 coefficient semi-digital FIR-DAC using a 1-bit PWM input signal was designed and implemented in a high voltage, audio power bipolar CMOS DMOS (BCD) process. This facilitates digital input signals for an analog class-D amplifier in BCD. The FIR-DAC performance depends on the ISI-resistant nature of this PWM-signal. An impulse response with only positive coefficients was chosen, because of its resistance to deadzone and mismatch. With a DAC current of 0.5 mA, the dynamic range is 111 dB (A-weighted), with SINAD = 103 dB (A-weighted). The current consumption is 1mA for the analog part and 4.8 mA for the digital part. The power consumption is 29 mW at V/sub dd/ = 5 V and the chip area is 2 mm/sup 2/ including the reference diode that can be shared by more channels

Giant Quantum Reflection of Neon Atoms from a Ridged Silicon Surface

The specular reflectivity of slow, metastable neon atoms from a silicon surface was found to increase markedly when the flat surface was replaced by a grating structure with parallel narrow ridges. For a surface with ridges that have a sufficiently narrow top, the reflectivity was found to increase more than two orders of magnitude at the incident angle of 10 mRad from the surface. The slope of the reflectivity vs the incident angle near zero was found to be nearly an order of magnitude smaller than that of a flat surface. A grating with 6.5% efficiency for the first-order diffraction was fabricated by using the ridged surface structure.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures. To be published in J. Phys. Soc. Jp