Epistemological Aspects of Hope

Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order inductive reflection on when one should, or should not, be hopeful for an outcome with which one has a long record of experience: in other words, what is the epistemology behind when one should, if ever, stop hoping for outcomes which have failed one many times in the past

Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism

Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when combined with a plausible principle on the rationality of hope, they suggest that fallibilism is false. By contrast, the infallibilist about knowledge can straightforwardly explain why knowledge would be incompatible with hope, and can offer a simple and unified explanation of all the linguistic data introduced here. This suggests that fallibilists bear an explanatory burden which has been hitherto overlooked

Assertion, knowledge and predictions

John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA

Religious Diversity and Disagreement

Epistemologists have shown increased interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement, and in particular, in whether there is a rational requirement concerning belief revision in the face of peer disagreement. This article examines some of the general issues discussed by epistemologists, and then considers how they may or may not apply to the case of religious disagreement, both within religious traditions and between religious (and non-religious) views

Epistemology Personalized

Recent epistemology has focused almost exclusively on propositional knowledge. This paper considers an underexplored area of epistemology, namely knowledge of persons: if propositional knowledge is a state of mind, consisting in a subject's attitude to a (true) proposition, the account developed here thinks of interpersonal knowledge as a state of minds, involving a subject's attitude to another (existing) subject. This kind of knowledge is distinct from propositional knowledge, but it exhibits a gradability characteristic of context-sensitivity, and admits of shifty thresholds. It is supported by a wide range of unexplored linguistic data and intuitive cases; and it promises to illuminate debates within epistemology, philosophy of religion, and ethics

Lying, accuracy and credence

Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback of being unable to explain nearby cases; and even worse, that account fails to distinguish cases of telling lies from cases of telling the truth

Experiment K-6-24, K-6-25, K-6-26. Radiation dosimetry and spectrometry

Radiation experiments flown by the University of San Francisco on the Cosmos 1887 spacecraft were designed to measure the depth dependence of both total dose and heavy particle flux, dose and dose equivalent, down to very thin shielding. Three experiments were flown and were located both inside and outside the Cosmos 1887 spacecraft. Tissue absorbed dose rates of 264 to 0.028 rad d(-1) under shielding of 0.013 to 3.4 g/sq cm of (7)LiF were found outside the spacecraft and 0.025 rad d(-1) inside. Heavy particle fluxes of 3.43 to 1.03 x 10 to the minus 3rd power cm -2 sub s -1 sub sr -1 under shielding of 0.195 to 1.33 g/sq cm plastic were found outside the spacecraft and 4.25 times 10 to the minus 4th power cm -2 sub s -1 sub sr -1 inside (LET infinity H2O greater than or equal to 4 keV/micron m). The corresponding heavy particle dose equivalent rates outside the spacecraft were 30.8 to 19.8 mrem d(-1) and 11.4 mrem d(-1) inside. The large dose and particle fluxes found at small shielding thicknesses emphasize the importance of these and future measurements at low shielding, for predicting radiation effects on space materials and experiments where shielding is minimal and on astronauts during EVA. The Cosmos 1887 mission contained a variety of international radiobiological investigations to which the measurements apply. The high inclination orbit (62 degrees) of this mission provided a radiation environment which is seldom available to U.S. investigators. The radiation measurements will be compared with those of other research groups and also with those performed on the Shuttle, and will be used to refine computer models employed to calculate radiation exposures on other spacecraft, including the Space Station

Hedged Assertion

Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This essay considers the linguistic and normative issues side-by-side. We aim to bring some order and clarity to thinking about hedging, so as to illuminate aspects of interest to both linguists and philosophers. In particular, we consider three broad questions. 1) The structural question: when one hedges, what is the speaker’s commitment weakened from? 2) The functional question: what is the best way to understand how a hedge weakens? And 3) the taxonomic question: are hedged assertions genuine assertions, another speech act, or what

Radiation experiments on Cosmos 2044: K-7-41, parts A, B, C, D, E

The Cosmos 2044 biosatellite mission offered the opportunity for radiation measurements under conditions which are seldom available (an inclination of 82.3 deg and attitude of 294 x 216 km). Measurements were made on the outside of the spacecraft under near-zero shielding conditions. Also, this mission was the first in which active temperature recorders (the ATR-4) were flown to record the temperature profiles of detector stacks. Measurements made on this mission provide a comparison and test for modeling of depth doses and LET spectra for orbital parameters previously unavailable. Tissue absorbed doses from 3480 rad (252 rad/d) down to 0.115 rad (8.33 mrad/d) were measured at different depths (0.0146 and 3.20 g/sq cm, respectively) with averaged TLD readings. The LET spectra yielded maximum and minimum values of integral flux of 27.3 x 10(exp -4) and 3.05 x 10(exp -4)/sq cm/s/sr, of dose rate of 7.01 and 1.20 mrad/d, and of dose equivalent rate of 53.8 and 11.6 mrem/d, for LET(sub infinity)-H2O is greater than or equal to 4 keV/micron. Neutron measurements yielded 0.018 mrem/d in the thermal region, 0.25 mrem/d in the resonance region and 3.3 mrem/d in the high energy region. The TLD depth dose and LET spectra were compared with calculations from the modeling codes. The agreement is good but some further refinements are in order. In comparing measurements on Cosmos 2044 with those from previous Cosmos missions (orbital inclinations of 62.8 deg) there is a greater spread (maximum to minimum) in depth doses and an increased contribution from GCRs, and higher LET particles, in the heavy particle fluxes