Fear Conditioning and Extinction: Examining the Role of GSK3β ser 389

GSK3β is a serine threonine kinase that has been shown to influence numerous biological and psychological interactions, including the regulation of cell survival and cell death, as well as influencing mood disorders such as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. Preliminary data from our lab showed an exaggerated conditioned fear response in homozygous GSK3β knock-in (GSK3β KI) mice, which lacked the ability to phosphorylate GSK3β at the ser 389 site due to a serine to alanine substitution. Based on heightened fear responses previously observed in our lab, we predicted that increased expression GSK3β would result in a prolonged and heightened fear response, as GSK3β expression would interfere with the ability to turn off fear of a conditioned stimulus. These mutants were given five tone plus shock fear conditioning trials, followed by six days of tone alone fear extinction training. In contrast to our preliminary data, GSK3β KI mice did not show exaggerated conditioned fear, and showed no significant differences to wild type mice in fear extinction. To examine if these results were influenced by the age of the mice, a second study was conducted using two different age subsets of GSK3β KI mice. The results demonstrated that there were no significant differences in fear acquisition or extinction based on age

The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies, and the Byrd Amendment

This paper examines Congressional support of the Byrd Amendment, a new antidumping law that directs the U.S. Customs Service to distribute collected duties to protected firms. A critical feature of the Byrd Amendment is that it produces a highly transparent measure of how much each firm is rewarded for its rent-seeking efforts to secure the bill’s passage, specifically the dollar value its Byrd disbursement. Therefore, this policy provides researchers with a unique setting in which to study the link between campaign contributions, Congressional behavior, and the subsequent financial returns to firms. Our empirical results show that campaign contributions from potential beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the Byrd Amendment. We also show that political contributions from the law’s beneficiaries increased with the rewards that they expected to receive, although not by as much as predicted by some political economy models of trade policy.Byrd Amendment, Antidumping, Campaign Contributions, Political Economy of Trade Policy

Steel Safeguards and the Welfare of U.S. Steel Firms and Downstream Consumers of Steel: A Shareholder Wealth Perspective

This paper analyzes the steel safeguards implemented and subsequently removed during 2001-2003. Our results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies, safeguards generated positive “abnormal” returns of approximately 6%; and the cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of -5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. violated WTO law. The results here are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Downstream consumers in transportation equipment and electrical equipment showed the clearest negative reaction to the safeguards. Moreover, steel firms that received larger cash disbursements under the Byrd amendment received additional wealth gains when the safeguard duties were imposed. Finally, empirical results indicate that U.S. downstreamconsuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with the initiation of the safeguard investigation and the imposition of the safeguard duties.Antidumping Policy; Welfare

Innovation Through Protection: Does Safeguard Protection Increase Investment in R and D?

We perform the first empirical study to focus on the relationship between trade protection and investment in Research and Development. Our results support predictions from the theoretical literature that temporary tariffs stimulate research and development, although we find no evidence that this effect diminishes as the termination of protection approaches as predicted by some theoretical models. We also find little evidence that quotas reduce research and development as predicted by multiple theoretical works. Finally, our results indicate that temporary tariffs result in decreased capital investment, perhaps because firms use periods of temporary protection to shutdown unprofitable facilities. This reveals an important distinction in firm behavior with regard to investment in tangible versus intangible capital during periods of trade protection.Research and Development, Strategic Protection

Assessing China's Legal Reforms

This essay will begin with a short summary of the dramatic changes in China's legal system during the reform era and will then discuss challenges that the legal system is confronting today. These include the need to balance populism with respect for legal institutions, excessive discretion, rising inequalities and unequal access to justice, lack of transparency, and the need to make courts more autonomous and independent. China is not alone in facing these challenges. Yet the ways that these problems are manifested in China differ significantly from those in other countries, reflecting both China's history and the institutional framework in which the Chinese legal system exists

Innovation through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China

Consider two recent defamation cases in Chinese courts. In 2004, Zhang Xide, a former county-level Communist Party boss, sued the authors of a best selling book, An Investigation into China\u27s Peasants. The book exposed official malfeasance on Zhang\u27s watch and the resultant peasant hardships. Zhang demanded an apology from the book\u27s authors and publisher, excision of the offending chapter, 200,000 yuan (approximately U.S.$25,000) for emotional damages, and a share of profits from sales of the book. Zhang sued in a local court on which, not coincidentally, his son sat as a judge. In 2000, Song Dianwen, a peasant, sued the Heilongiiang Daily, the official paper of the Communist Party, in his home province for defamation after it published an article reporting that, during a village disturbance, Song had lit a fire that killed two people. He won a judgment from a local court, affirmed on appeal, for 3,500 yuan (approximately U.S.$430) in emotional damages. The cases exemplify two different tracks of defamation litigation in present-day China. Track-one cases, like Zhang\u27s, are brought by local public officials, government and Communist Party entities, or corporations to punish and control the increasingly aggressive Chinese media. In these cases, courts serve as state institutions at the local, as opposed to central, level to restrict and retaliate against the media and to block central oversight. On the second track, persons without power or Party-state ties sue the media, which, despite widespread commercialization, virtually all continue to be linked to the Chinese Party-state. Many such cases are brought by ordinary persons against Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers. Track-two cases thus represent a deployment of the courts by ordinary citizens against state entities. Empirical evidence from 223 defamation cases studied in this Article indicates that the media lose the overwhelming majority of cases on both tracks

Legal Reform: China\u27s Law-Stability Paradox

In the 1980s and 1990s, China devoted extensive resources to constructing a legal system, in part in the belief that legal institutions would enhance both stability and regime legitimacy. Why, then, did China’s leadership retreat from using law when faced with perceived increases in protests, citizen complaints, and social discontent in the 2000s? This law-stability paradox suggests that party-state leaders do not trust legal institutions to play primary roles in addressing many of the most complex issues resulting from China’s rapid social transformation. This signi½es a retreat not only from legal reform, but also from the rule-based model of authoritarian governance that has contributed much to the resilience of the Chinese system. The law-stability paradox also highlights the difficulties facing efforts by China’s new leadership to reinvigorate legal reform

Leniency in Chinese Criminal Law? Everyday Justice in Henan

This article examines one-year of publicly available criminal judgments from one basic-level rural county court and one intermediate court in Henan Province in order to better understand trends in routine criminal adjudication in China. I present an account of ordinary criminal justice in China that is both familiar and striking: a system that treats serious crimes, in particular those affecting state interests, harshly while at the same time acting leniently in routine cases. Most significantly, examination of more than five hundred court decisions shows the vital role that settlement plays in criminal cases in China today. Defendants who agree to compensate their victims receive strikingly lighter sentences than those who do not. Likewise, settlement plays a role in resolving even serious crimes, at times appearing to make the difference between life and death for criminal defendants. My account of ordinary cases in China contrasts with most western accounts of the Chinese criminal justice system, which focus on sensational cases of injustice and the prevalence of harsh punishments. The evidence I present provides insight into the roles being played by the Chinese criminal justice system and the functions of courts in that system. This article also provides empirical evidence that contributes to debates on a range of other issues, including the relationship of formal law to community norms in Chinese criminal justice, the roles of witnesses and lawyers, the function of appellate review, and how system confronts and handles a range of high profile topics. My findings also contribute to literature on courts in authoritarian regimes and the evolution of authoritarian transparency. This article provides a base for discussing the future of empirical research on Chinese court judgments, demonstrating that there is much to learn from the vast volume of cases that have in recent years become publicly available in China

China's Courts: Restricted Reform

This essay surveys recent developments in China’s courts. Part I examines recent top-down reforms in China’s courts, highlighting what some advocates of a stronger judiciary consider signs of progress. Part II discusses new challenges that may be undermining courts’ already limited autonomy. Part III argues that the most significant changes in China’s courts are coming from the ground up, in particular from growing horizontal interactions among judges. Part IV asks whether recent developments suggest fundamental changes to courts’ power, and then returns to the two questions posed above: First, why has the Party-state permitted the courts to develop even limited new roles? Second, can courts play an effective role in a non-democratic governmental system? My focus is primarily on civil and administrative litigation, where reforms have been more significant than in the criminal justice system. Much theoretical scholarship on courts focuses on why democratic systems permit and encourage the development of independent courts. Explanations include the knowledge that rulers may one day find themselves out of office, the desire to make commitments credible, and the need to constrain bureaucracies. Most such explanations have limited applicability in China, where courts are not designed to be independent of Party leadership. Scholarship on the role of courts in authoritarian societies has been limited. This essay seeks to add to this literature by exploring why a single-Party state might encourage court development, and whether courts can play significant new roles without necessarily challenging Party authority

Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System

Over the past decade, the Chinese media have emerged as among the most influential actors in the Chinese legal system. As media commercialization and increased editorial discretion have combined with growing attention to social and legal problems, the media have gained incentives to expand their traditional mouthpiece roles in new directions. As a result, the media have emerged as one of the most effective and important avenues of citizen redress. Their role in the legal system, however, has also brought them increasingly into conflict with China’s courts. This Article examines the implications of the media’s roles in the Chinese legal system for China’s legal development. It shows how media commercialization has resulted in incentives for the media to expand the scope of critical reporting, to challenge propaganda department content regulations, and to influence court decisionmaking. This Article details four distinct mechanisms by which the media influence China’s courts, demonstrating that the media’s effectiveness and influence stem from a combination of their continued position as an arm of the Party-state and their ability to reflect and create public opinion. Media commercialization may be reinforcing traditional norms of Party-state interference in the courts, while at the same time media scrutiny increasingly highlights problems in the Chinese justice system. Despite significant reforms and increasing caseloads, the authority of China’s courts remains limited. Yet the media’s ability to enjoy significant autonomy within the confines of Party supervision also suggests that a similar model of autonomy may be possible, and is perhaps already emerging, for China’s courts