A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences

In this paper, I present an argument for a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence – the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance of these results. So, my conclusion is that if Dutch Book Theorems do, in general, support norms on credal states, then we have support for the suggested norm on quantificational credences. Providing conditional support for this norm gives us a fuller picture of the normative landscape of credal states

Jazz Ensembles

Kennesaw State University School of Music presents Jazz Ensembles.https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/musicprograms/1362/thumbnail.jp

Partitioning the Heritability of Tourette Syndrome and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Reveals Differences in Genetic Architecture

The direct estimation of heritability from genome-wide common variant data as implemented in the program Genome-wide Complex Trait Analysis (GCTA) has provided a means to quantify heritability attributable to all interrogated variants. We have quantified the variance in liability to disease explained

Taking ‘Might’-Communication Seriously

In this paper, I show that, given seemingly plausible assumptions about the epistemic‘might’ and conditionals, we cannot explain why in some circumstances it is appropriate to utterconditional ‘might’-sentences, like “If Angelica has crumbs in her pocket, then she might be thethief” and not the corresponding simple ones, like “Angelica might be the thief.” So, one of ourassumptions must be incorrect. I argue that the root of the problem is an umbrella thesis aboutthe pragmatics of ‘might’-communication – one that says that the communicative impact of anutterance of a ‘might’-sentence is the performance of a consistency check on the information ofthe context. I conclude that we must reject this thesis. And I close the paper by sketching analternative view about what assertive uses of ‘might’-sentences typically do – one which avoidsthe problem. Such uses typically present a possibility as a serious option in reasoning anddeliberation

Quantificational Credences

In addition to full beliefs, agents have attitudes of varying confidence, or credences. For instance, I do not believe that the Boston Red Sox will win the American League East this year, but I am at least a little bit confident that they will – i.e. I have a positive credence that they will. It is also common to think that agents have conditional credences. For instance, I am very confident – i.e. have a conditional credence of very-likely strength – that the Red Sox will win the AL East this year given that their pitching staff stays healthy. There are good reasons to think that conditional credences are neither credences nor some combination of credences. In this paper, I show that similar reasons support thinking that agents have what we can call quantificational credences – attitudes like, thinking that each AL East team with a healthy pitching staff is at least a little bit likely to win the division – which are neither credences, conditional credences, nor some combination thereof. I provide a framework for assessing the rationality of credal states which involve quantificational credences. And I give a general picture of credal states that explains the similarities and differences between ordinary, conditional, and quantificational credences

Probabilistic Consistency Norms and Quantificational Credences

In addition to beliefs, people have attitudes of confidence called credences. Combinations of credences, like combinations of beliefs, can be inconsistent. It is common to use tools from probability theory to understand the normative relationships between a person’s credences. More precisely, it is common to think that something is a consistency norm on a person’s credal state if and only if it is a simple transformation of a truth of probability (a transformation that merely changes the statement from one about probability to one about credences). Though it is common to challenge the right-to-left direction of this biconditional, I argue in this paper that the left-to-right direction is false for standard versions of probability theory. That is, I make the case that there are consistency constraints on credal states that are not simple transformations of truths of standard versions of probability theory. I do so by drawing on a newly discovered type of credal attitude, a quantificational credence, and by showing how the consistency norms on this attitude can’t be represented as simple transformations of truths of standard versions of probability theory. I conclude by showing that a probability theory that could avoid the result would have to be strikingly different from the standard versions—so different that I suspect many would hesitate to call it a theory of probability at all

Simple Contextualism about Epistemic Modals is Incorrect

I argue against a simple contextualist account of epistemic modals. My argument, like theargument on which it is based (von Fintel and Gillies 2011 and MacFarlane 2011), charges thatsimple contextualism cannot explain all of the conversational data about uses of epistemicmodals. My argument improves on its predecessor by insulating itself from recent contextualistattempts by Janice Dowell (2011) and Igor Yanovich (2014) to get around that argument. Inparticular, I use linguistic data to show that an utterance of an epistemic modal sentence can bewarranted, while an utterance of its suggested simple contextualist paraphrase is not

What might but must not be

We examine an objection to analysing the epistemic ‘might’ and ‘may’ as existential quantifiers over possibilities. Some claims that a proposition “might” be the case appear felicitous although, according to the quantifier analysis, they are necessarily false, since there are no possibilities in which the proposition is true. We explain such cases pragmatically, relying on the fact that ‘might’-sentences are standardly used to convey that the speaker takes a proposition as a serious option in reasoning. Our account explains why it makes sense to utter these sentences despite their being literally false and why their falsity is easily missed