The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory

According to accuracy-first epistemology, accuracy is the fundamental epistemic good. Epistemic norms — Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, etc. — have their binding force in virtue of helping to secure this good. To make this idea precise, accuracy-firsters invoke Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT) to determine which epistemic policies are the best means toward the end of accuracy. Hilary Greaves and others have recently challenged the tenability of this programme. Their arguments purport to show that EpDT encourages obviously epistemically irrational behavior. We develop firmer conceptual foundations for EpDT. First, we detail a theory of praxic and epistemic good. Then we show that, in light of their very different good-making features, EpDT will evaluate epistemic states and epistemic acts according to different criteria. So, in general, rational preference over states and acts won’t agree. Finally, we argue that based on direction-of-fit considerations, it’s preferences over the former that matter for normative epistemology, and that EpDT, properly spelt out, arrives at the correct verdicts in a range of putative problem cases

The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory

According to accuracy-first epistemology, accuracy is the fundamental epistemic good. Epistemic norms — Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, etc. — have their binding force in virtue of helping to secure this good. To make this idea precise, accuracy-firsters invoke Epistemic Decision Theory (EpDT) to determine which epistemic policies are the best means toward the end of accuracy. Hilary Greaves and others have recently challenged the tenability of this programme. Their arguments purport to show that EpDT encourages obviously epistemically irrational behavior. We develop firmer conceptual foundations for EpDT. First, we detail a theory of praxic and epistemic good. Then we show that, in light of their very different good-making features, EpDT will evaluate epistemic states and epistemic acts according to different criteria. So, in general, rational preference over states and acts won’t agree. Finally, we argue that based on direction-of-fit considerations, it’s preferences over the former that matter for normative epistemology, and that EpDT, properly spelt out, arrives at the correct verdicts in a range of putative problem cases

Deference Done Better

There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of deference break down: the most popular (“Reflection”-style) principles collapse to inconsistency, while their most popular (“New-Reflection”-style) variants allow you to defer to someone while regarding them as an anti-expert. We propose a middle way: deferring to someone involves preferring to make any decision using their opinions instead of your own. In a slogan, deferring opinions is deferring decisions. Generalizing the proposal of Dorst (2020a), we first formulate a new principle that shows exactly how your opinions must relate to an expert’s for this to be so. We then build off the results of Levinstein (2019) and Campbell-Moore (2020) to show that this principle is also equivalent to the constraint that you must always expect the expert’s estimates to be more accurate than your own. Finally, we characterize the conditions an expert’s opinions must meet to be worthy of deference in this sense, showing how they sit naturally between the too-strong constraints of Reflection and the too-weak constraints of New Reflection

S 38093, a histamine H3 antagonist/inverse agonist, promotes hippocampal neurogenesis and improves context discrimination task in aged mice

Strategies designed to increase adult hippocampal neurogenesis (AHN) may have therapeutic potential for reversing memory impairments. H3 receptor antagonists/inverse agonists also may be useful for treating cognitive deficits. However, it remains unclear whether these ligands have effects on AHN. The present study aimed to investigate the effects of a 28-day treatment with S 38093, a novel brain-penetrant antagonist/inverse agonist of H3 receptors, on AHN (proliferation, maturation and survival) in 3-month-old and in aged 16-month-old mice. In addition, the effects of S 38093 treatment on 7-month-old APPSWE Tg2576 transgenic mice, a model of Alzheimer’s disease, were also assessed. In all tested models, chronic treatment with S 38093 stimulated all steps of AHN. In aged animals, S 38093 induced a reversal of age-dependent effects on hippocampal brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) BDNF-IX, BDNF-IV and BDNF-I transcripts and increased vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) expression. Finally, the effects of chronic administration of S 38093 were assessed on a neurogenesis-dependent “context discrimination (CS) test” in aged mice. While ageing altered mouse CS, chronic S 38093 treatment significantly improved CS. Taken together, these results provide evidence that chronic S 38093 treatment increases adult hippocampal neurogenesis and may provide an innovative strategy to improve age-associated cognitive deficits