Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: theory and experimental evidence

In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and obtain the striking result of full segregation in most of the cases. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies is notably reduced when the cost of moving is high, but it is not affected when it is low, relative to the baseline with costless moving. We also find that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects relative of a baseline model where moving is costless

A distancia

Compendio de artículos que tratan de acercar a la comunidad universitaria algunos de los aspectos básicos para conocer la problemática del medio ambiente desde la perspectiva económica. La sensibilidad medioambiental y la actuación de los ciudadanos, de las empresas y del sector público; las políticas económicas ambientales -en su triple perspectiva: nacional, comunitaria e internacional- y la teoría de juegos, como modelo explicativo de la estrategia de los agentes de mercado, constituyen los temas analizados.MadridBiblioteca de Educación del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte; Calle San Agustín, 5 - 3 Planta; 28014 Madrid; Tel. +34917748000; [email protected]