Strategic behaviour in Schelling dynamics: theory and experimental evidence

In this paper we experimentally test Schelling’s (1971) segregation model and obtain the striking result of full segregation in most of the cases. In addition, we extend Schelling’s model theoretically by adding strategic behaviour and moving costs. We obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which rational agents facing moving costs may find it optimal not to move (anticipating other participants’ movements). This equilibrium is far from full segregation. We run experiments for this extended Schelling model, and find that the percentage of full segregated societies is notably reduced when the cost of moving is high, but it is not affected when it is low, relative to the baseline with costless moving. We also find that the degree of segregation depends on the distribution of strategic subjects relative of a baseline model where moving is costless

A distancia

Compendio de artículos que tratan de acercar a la comunidad universitaria algunos de los aspectos básicos para conocer la problemática del medio ambiente desde la perspectiva económica. La sensibilidad medioambiental y la actuación de los ciudadanos, de las empresas y del sector público; las políticas económicas ambientales -en su triple perspectiva: nacional, comunitaria e internacional- y la teoría de juegos, como modelo explicativo de la estrategia de los agentes de mercado, constituyen los temas analizados.MadridBiblioteca de Educación del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte; Calle San Agustín, 5 - 3 Planta; 28014 Madrid; Tel. +34917748000; [email protected]

Large-scale cross-societal examination of real- and minimal-group biases

Biases in favor of culturally prevalent social ingroups are ubiquitous, but random assignment to arbitrary experimentally created social groups is also sufficient to create ingroup biases (i.e., the minimal group effect; MGE). The extent to which ingroup bias arises from specific social contexts versus more general psychological tendencies remains unclear. This registered report focuses on three questions. First, how culturally prevalent is the MGE? Second, how do critical cultural and individual factors moderate its strength? Third, does the MGE meaningfully relate to culturally salient real-world ingroup biases? We compare the MGE to bias in favor of a family member (first cousin) and a national ingroup member. We propose to recruit a sample of > 200 participants in each of > 50 nations to examine these questions and advance our understanding of the psychological foundations and cultural prevalence of ingroup bias