6 research outputs found
On the Ontology of Linguistic Frameworks Toward a Comprehensive Version of Empiricism
Can the abstract entities be designated? While the empiricists usually took the positive answer to this question as the first step toward Platonism, in his ``Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’’ [Carnap 1950], Carnap tried to make a reconciliation between the language referring to abstract entities on the one hand, and empiricism on the other. In this paper, firstly, I show that the ingenuity of Carnap’s approach notwithstanding, it is prone to criticism from different aspects. But I also show how, even without leaving the empiricist research program, the shortcomings could be amended. Following Carnap’s 1950 outset, and adding some apparently untasteful (Meinongian) ingredients, I will sketch a refined way for dealing with the problem of existence of abstract entities within the framework of the philosophy of empiricism
On What Is Not There. Quine, Meinong, and the Indispensability Argument
Using the theory of definite descriptions, Russell and, following him, Quine masterfully challenged Meinong’s Theory of Objects (TO). In this paper, firstly I try to show that although the Russell-Quine’s interpretation of TO has been taken seriously even by many notable Neo-Meinongians and first-rate scholars, yet it is not the ultimately convincing reading of the Theory, at least not when we boil down the theory to Meinong’s primary motives and his essential arguments. Moreover, I show that a form of the indispensability argument is the backbone of Meinong’s theory. The argument is surprisingly akin to what Quine proposed for his realism with regard to the existence of mathematical entities. Consequently, I argue that mathematics plays an important role in Meinong’s argument and hence his overall theory. I believe that in this way the debate between Meinongian and Quinean can be directed to more compromising and fruitful grounds
On Logic, Syntax, and Silence
The relationship between Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language (hereafter LSL) ([1934] 1937) and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) ([1921] 1922) has been interpreted in several ways during past decades. One of the interpretations has gained keen advocates among Carnap scholars. It was originally provoked by what Caranp said in LSL, and it consists of two parts. First, it indicates that in TLP the possibility of speaking about the logical form of a language within the same language (which happens to be the only language that there is) had been foresworn by Wittgenstein, but Carnap proved him wrong by producing a book (LSL) written exactly in the manner which had been proscribed by Wittgenstein. This is the debate about the possibility of speaking about logical form
Logic and Philosophy of Science in Nancy (II)
This issue collects a selection of contributed papers presented at the 14th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Nancy, July 2011. These papers were originally presented within two of the main sections of the Congress. They deal with general philosophy of science (including ethical and historical aspects of philosophy of science), and philosophy of biology, physics, chemistry and economics. A first volume of contributed papers, dedicated to logic, philosophy of mathematics and cognitive science, and philosophy of technology, appeared in the last issue of Philosophia Scientiæ (18-3), 2014