Aggregate Financial Misreporting and the Predictability of U.S. Recessions

We rely on the theoretical prediction that financial misreporting peaks before economic busts to examine whether aggregate ex ante measures of the likelihood of financial misreporting improve the predictability of U.S. recessions. We consider six measures of misreporting and show that the Beneish M-Score significantly improves out-of-sample recession prediction at longer forecasting horizons. Specifically, relative to leading models based on yield spreads and market returns, M-Score increases the average probability of a recession across forecast horizons of six-, seven-, and eight-quarters-ahead by 56 percent, 79 percent, and 92 percent, respectively. These findings are robust to alternative definitions of interest rate spreads, and to controlling for the federal funds rate, investor sentiment, and aggregate earnings growth. We show that the performance of M-Score likely arises because firms with high M-Scores tend to experience negative future performance. Overall, this study provides novel evidence that accounting information can be useful to forecasters and regulators interested in assessing the likelihood of U.S. recessions a few quarters ahead

An Anatomy of the "S&P Game": The Effects of Changing the Rules.

This study analyzes the effects of changes in S&P 500 index composition from January 1986 through June 1994, a period during which Standard and Poor's began its practice of preannouncing changes five days beforehand. The new announcement practice has given rise to the 'S&P game' and has altered the way stock prices react. The authors find that prices increase abnormally from the close on the announcement day to the close on the effective day. The overall increase is greater than under the old announcement policy, although part of the increase reverses after the stock is included in the index. Copyright 1996 by American Finance Association.