The open future, bivalence and assertion

It is highly intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents is untenable. Intuition favours bivalence

The Invisible Thin Red Line

The aim of this paper is to argue that the adoption of an unrestricted principle of bivalence is compatible with a metaphysics that (i) denies that the future is real, (ii) adopts nomological indeterminism, and (iii) exploits a branching structure to provide a semantics for future contingent claims. To this end, we elaborate what we call Flow Fragmentalism, a view inspired by Kit Fine (2005)’s non-standard tense realism, according to which reality is divided up into maximally coherent collections of tensed facts. In this way, we show how to reconcile a genuinely A-theoretic branching-time model with the idea that there is a branch corresponding to the thin red line, that is, the branch that will turn out to be the actual future history of the world

Automating Agential Reasoning: Proof-Calculi and Syntactic Decidability for STIT Logics

This work provides proof-search algorithms and automated counter-model extraction for a class of STIT logics. With this, we answer an open problem concerning syntactic decision procedures and cut-free calculi for STIT logics. A new class of cut-free complete labelled sequent calculi G3LdmL^m_n, for multi-agent STIT with at most n-many choices, is introduced. We refine the calculi G3LdmL^m_n through the use of propagation rules and demonstrate the admissibility of their structural rules, resulting in auxiliary calculi Ldm^m_nL. In the single-agent case, we show that the refined calculi Ldm^m_nL derive theorems within a restricted class of (forestlike) sequents, allowing us to provide proof-search algorithms that decide single-agent STIT logics. We prove that the proof-search algorithms are correct and terminate

History-sensitive versus future-sensitive approaches to security in distributed systems

We consider the use of aspect-oriented techniques as a flexible way to deal with security policies in distributed systems. Recent work suggests to use aspects for analysing the future behaviour of programs and to make access control decisions based on this; this gives the flavour of dealing with information flow rather than mere access control. We show in this paper that it is beneficial to augment this approach with history-based components as is the traditional approach in reference monitor-based approaches to mandatory access control. Our developments are performed in an aspect-oriented coordination language aiming to describe the Bell-LaPadula policy as elegantly as possible. Furthermore, the resulting language has the capability of combining both history- and future-sensitive policies, providing even more flexibility and power.Comment: In Proceedings ICE 2010, arXiv:1010.530

The Intrinsic Quantum Nature of Nash Equilibrium Mixtures

Every undergraduate textbook in game theory has a chapter discussing the difficulty to interpret the mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Unlike the usual suggested interpretations made in those textbooks, here we prove that these randomised strategies neither imply that players use some coin flips to make their decisions, nor that the mixtures represent the uncertainty of each player about the others' actions.Instead, the paper demonstrates a fundamental connection between the Nash equilibrium 'randomised' or 'mixed' strategies of classical game theory and the pure quantum states of quantum theory in physics. This link has some key consequences for the meaning of randomised strategies:In the main theorem, I prove that in every mixed Nash equilibrium, each player state of knowledge about his/her own future rational choices is represented by a pure quantum state. This indicates that prior making his/her actual choice, each player must be in a quantum superposition over her/his possible rational choices (in the support of his probability measure). This result notably permits to show that the famous 'indifference condition' that must be satisfied by each player in an equilibrium is actually the condition that ensures each player is in a 'rational epistemic state of ignorance' about her/his own future choice of an action

Classical BI: Its Semantics and Proof Theory

We present Classical BI (CBI), a new addition to the family of bunched logics which originates in O'Hearn and Pym's logic of bunched implications BI. CBI differs from existing bunched logics in that its multiplicative connectives behave classically rather than intuitionistically (including in particular a multiplicative version of classical negation). At the semantic level, CBI-formulas have the normal bunched logic reading as declarative statements about resources, but its resource models necessarily feature more structure than those for other bunched logics; principally, they satisfy the requirement that every resource has a unique dual. At the proof-theoretic level, a very natural formalism for CBI is provided by a display calculus \`a la Belnap, which can be seen as a generalisation of the bunched sequent calculus for BI. In this paper we formulate the aforementioned model theory and proof theory for CBI, and prove some fundamental results about the logic, most notably completeness of the proof theory with respect to the semantics.Comment: 42 pages, 8 figure