21 research outputs found

    Upon the Birth of Mike\u27s Daughter, Some Unsolicited Advice Regarding Love and Other Such Vagaries

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    pages 49-5

    Ruin

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    Upon Charley\u27s Marriage to a Girl From Idaho

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    page 4

    Methyl 1-methyl-1H-1,2,3-triazole-4-carboxyl­ate

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    The title mol­ecule, C5H7N3O2, has an almost planar conformation, with a maximum deviation of 0.043 (3) Å, except for the methyl H atoms. In the crystal structure, inter­molecular C—H⋯O hydrogen bonds link the mol­ecules into layers parallel to the bc plane. Inter­molecular π–π stacking inter­actions [centroid–centroid distances = 3.685 (2) and 3.697 (2) Å] are observed between the parallel triazole rings

    A derelication of duty : Douglas MacArthur and the development of the Philippine military

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    Was Douglas MacArthur directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military during the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942? This question is still a point of debate among historians. During the six years that preceded the United States entrance into the Second World War, the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines attempted to implement a national defense plan devised by Douglas MacArthur. The end goal of MacArthur\u27s plan was the creation of a professional Filipino military force that would be able to adequately defend the Philippines against invasion. From late 1935 until mid 1941 , MacArthur served as the official United States military adviser to the Commonwealth government. When war with Japan occurred in late 1941 the Philippine military was in dismal shape. The argument that MacArthur was directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military in the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 is strongly supported by historical evidence of events that occurred during the creation, development, and fielding of the Philippine military in 1934-1941. An investigation of historical evidence shows that MacArthur is responsible for making a series of errors that caused rampant financial problems and an inadequate training program. These factors directly contributed to the ineffectiveness of Philippine military units during the 1941-1942 campaign

    The Tactical Considerations of Augmented and Mixed Reality Implementation

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    The U.S. Army, NATO armies, and other advanced nations actively seek to implement augmented reality (AR) and mixed reality (MR) support for their operational forces. These platforms are intended to improve tactical awareness, target acquisition, and situational awareness and also to develop information upstream for commanders to act upon. The United States’ example is the integrated visual augmentation system (IVAS), which provides an integrated suite of situational awareness capabilities to enable better decision-making and increase soldier tactical fighting ability.1 In the light of rapid developments and hurdles faced in fielding for the United States and its allies, we would like to add to the Army discourse the need to identify potential operational weaknesses in the AR/MR systems. The operational environment will test any equipment’s durability and reliability. A central question we investigate is the tactical value on the battlefield and whether the system losing full or partial functionality changes the system from a capability enhancement into something that obstructs or prevents mission success. We identify multiple areas and research topics for investigation in order for AR devices to become a combat multiplier
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