Reactions to claimed and granted overinclusion:Extending research on the effects of claimball versus cyberball

Social outcomes can result both from people’s own behavior (claim process) and from the behavior of others (grant process). Prior research compared the effect of these two processes on people’s experience of inclusion and outperformance, using two virtual ball-toss games: claimball and cyberball. We extend this work by using the same games to assess reactions to a third social outcome, overinclusion. Participants obtained the majority of the ball-tosses (overinclusion) or almost no ball-tosses (ostracism) in claimball or cyberball. Results showed that (1) overinclusion was more satisfying than ostracism, (2) especially when granted by others and less so when claimed for oneself. These results advance knowledge about people’s experience of social outcomes, depending on the processes leading to them

Raising awareness about social exclusion in schools through experiential learning

Social exclusion has a myriad of negative effects on students’ psychological and social well-being. One way to combat such negative effects is to raise awareness about social exclusion in schools. Here, we describe and evaluate a training program that was carried out across schools in the Netherlands. The program relies on basic experiential learning principles and a well-established social exclusion paradigm to make participants experience and discuss social exclusion. We had three goals in the current paper: (1) discussing previous work supporting the feasibility of such programs, (2) presenting a secondary analysis of the data generated by the program, and finally (3) testing a core assumption of Temporal Need-threat Model of Ostracism (Williams, 2009). The analyses are based on 14,065 participants (ages 12 to 19) and a subset of those who evaluated the program later (n = 386). Our review of the literature supports the feasibility of the program in raising awareness about social exclusion. The results of the secondary data analyses further corroborate this finding and, importantly, offer preliminary evidence for the effectiveness of the program. Lastly, stressing a core assumption of the ostracism model, the results indicated that the experience of ostracism was not substantially altered by the characteristics of the participants such as age and gender

Seeking solitude after being ostracized:A replication and beyond

Individuals may respond to ostracism by either behaving prosocially or antisocially. A recent paper provides evidence for a third response: solitude seeking, suggesting that ostracized individuals may ironically engage in self-perpetuating behaviors which exacerbate social isolation. To examine this counterintuitive response to ostracism, we conceptually replicated the original paper in three studies (N = 1,118). Ostracism experiences were associated with preference for solitude across four samples (Study 1), and being ostracized increased participants’ desires for solitude (Studies 2 and 3). Extending beyond the original paper, we demonstrated that only the experience of being ostracized, but not ostracizing others or the feeling of conspicuousness, triggered the desire for solitude. Diverging from the original paper, trait extraversion did not moderate the effect of ostracism on solitude desires. Taken together, the current research provides additional and stronger empirical evidence that solitude seeking is a common response to ostracism

Why and when suffering increases the perceived likelihood of fortuitous rewards

Cultural practices and anecdotal accounts suggest that people expect suffering to lead to fortuitous rewards. To shed light on this illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association, we tested why and when this effect manifests. Across three vignette studies in which we manipulated the degree of suffering experienced by the protagonist, we tested a ‘just‐world maintenance’ explanation (suffering deserves to be compensated) and a ‘virtuous suffering’ explanation (suffering indicates virtues, which will be rewarded). Our findings revealed that the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association (1) could serve as a way for people to cope with just‐world threats posed by the suffering of innocent victims, and (2) manifested when the suffering was not caused by the victim's own behaviour and not readily attributable to bad luck. Taken together, these findings not only provide evidence for the existence of the illusory ‘suffering–reward’ association but also elucidate its psychological underpinnings

Get Angry, Get Out: The Interpersonal Effects of Anger Communication in Multiparty Negotiation

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation

Can we reduce facial biases?:Persistent effects of facial trustworthiness on sentencing decisions

Trait impressions from faces influence many consequential decisions even in situations in which decisions should not be based on a person's appearance. Here, we test (a) whether people rely on trait impressions when making legal sentencing decisions and (b) whether two types of interventions—educating decision-makers and changing the accessibility of facial information—reduce the influence of facial stereotypes. We first introduced a novel legal decision-making paradigm. Results of a pretest (n = 320) showed that defendants with an untrustworthy (vs. trustworthy) facial appearance were found guilty more often. We then tested the effectiveness of different interventions in reducing the influence of facial stereotypes. Educating participants about the biasing effects of facial stereotypes reduced explicit beliefs that personality is reflected in facial features, but did not reduce the influence of facial stereotypes on verdicts (Study 1, n = 979). In Study 2 (n = 975), we presented information sequentially to disrupt the intuitive accessibility of trait impressions. Participants indicated an initial verdict based on case-relevant information and a final verdict based on all information (including facial photographs). The majority of initial sentences were not revised and therefore unbiased. However, most revised sentences were in line with facial stereotypes (e.g., a guilty verdict for an untrustworthy-looking defendant). On average, this actually increased facial bias in verdicts. Together, our findings highlight the persistent influence of trait impressions from faces on legal sentencing decisions

Moral relevance varies due to Inter‐individual and Intra‐individual differences across big data technology domains

Theories of moralization argue that moral relevance varies due to inter-individual differences, domain differences, or a mix of both. Predictors associated with these sources of variation have been studied in isolation to assess their unique contribution to moralization. Across three studies (N-Study1 = 376; N-Study2a = 621; N-Study2b = 589), assessing attitudes towards new big data technologies, we found that moralization is best explained by theories focusing on inter-individual variation (similar to 29%) and intra-individual variation across technology domains (similar to 49%), and less by theories focusing on differences between technology domains (similar to 6%). We simultaneously examined 15 inter-individual and 16 intra-individual predictors that potentially explain this variation. Predictors directly relevant to the technologies (e.g., justice concerns), cognitive styles (e.g., faith in intuition), and emotional reactions (e.g., anger) best explain variation in moral relevance. Accordingly, scholars should simultaneously adopt and adapt moralization theories related to inter-individual and intra-individual differences across domains rather than in isolation

Moral frames are persuasive and moralize attitudes:Nonmoral frames are persuasive and de-moralize attitudes

Moral framing and reframing strategies persuade people holding moralized attitudes (i.e., attitudes having a moral basis). However, these strategies may have unintended side effects: They have the potential to moralize people’s attitudes further and as a consequence lower their willingness to compromise on issues. Across three experimental studies with adult U.S. participants (Study 1: N = 2,151, Study 2: N = 1,590, Study 3: N = 1,015), we used persuasion messages (moral, nonmoral, and control) that opposed new big-data technologies (crime-surveillance technologies and hiring algorithms). We consistently found that moral frames were persuasive and moralized people’s attitudes, whereas nonmoral frames were persuasive and de-moralized people’s attitudes. Moral frames also lowered people’s willingness to compromise and reduced behavioral indicators of compromise. Exploratory analyses suggest that feelings of anger and disgust may drive moralization, whereas perceiving the technologies to be financially costly may drive de-moralization. The findings imply that use of moral frames can increase and entrench moral divides rather than bridge them

Confirmation bias and misconceptions: Pupillometric evidence for a confirmation bias in misconceptions feedback

It has long been supposed that the confirmation bias plays a role in the prevalence and maintenance of misconceptions. However, this has been supported more by argument than by empirical evidence. In the present paper, we show how different types of belief-feedback evoke physiological responses consistent with the presence of a confirmation bias. Participants were presented with misconceptions and indicated whether they believed each misconception to be true or false, as well as how committed they were to the misconception. Each response was followed by feedback that was either clear (i.e., “correct” or “incorrect”) or ambiguous (i.e., “partly correct” or “partly incorrect”). Pupillary response to each feedback condition was assessed. The results show an interaction between feedback accuracy and feedback clarity on pupil size. The largest pupil size was found in response to clear disconfirmatory feedback. The smallest pupil size was found in response to both clear and ambiguous confirmatory feedback. Crucially, the pupil responded to ambiguous confirmatory feedback as though it were wholly confirmatory. Moreover, pupil size in response to ambiguous disconfirmatory feedback was significantly smaller than response to clear disconfirmatory feedback, showing an overall trend towards confirmatory processing in the absence of clear disconfirmation. Additionally, we show a moderation by commitment towards the misconception. The greater the commitment, the larger the effect of belief-violating feedback on pupil size. These findings support recent theorizing in the field of misconceptions and, more generally, the field of inconsistency-compensation