Geduld von Vorschulkindern : Ergebnisse einer Experimentalstudie im Haushaltskontext von Kindern

In dieser Studie werden anhand einer experimentellen Datenerhebung im Rahmen der deutschen Längsschnittstudie Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) mögliche Determinanten des Belohnungsaufschubs im Alter von fünf bis sechs Jahren untersucht (im Folgenden als „Geduld bei Kindern“ bezeichnet). Unsere Ergebnisse verdeutlichen, dass mit ansteigendem Alter bei den jüngeren Kindern die Geduld zunimmt und bessere verbale Fähigkeiten und Geduld positiv miteinander korreliert sind. Freilich weisen das Geschlecht, die Anzahl Kinder im Haushalt, das Haushaltseinkommen sowie der Besuch einer Bildungseinrichtung keinen Zusammenhang mit der Geduld auf. Jedoch deuten die Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass eine geduldigere Mutter sowie eine längere Stilldauer im Säuglingsalter die Wahrscheinlichkeit geduldig zu sein erhöht. Geduld als Basis für Lebenserfolg ist damit nicht nur eine Frage der Biologie und Vererbung, sondern die frühe Gen-Umwelt-Interaktion, nämlich die Eltern-Kind-Interaktion und frühkindliche Sozialisation, scheint demnach auch im Bereich der Zeitpräferenz die „Wiege des Handelns“ zu sein

Inequality Aversion and Externalities

We conduct a general analysis of the effects of inequality aversion on decisions by homogeneous players in static and dynamic games. We distinguish between direct and indirect effects of inequality aversion. Direct effects are present when a player changes his action to affect disutility caused by inequality. Indirect effects occur when the own action is changed to affect other players' actions. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of either effect. Moreover, we examine the direction of the effects. Whereas indirect effects induce players to internalize externalities they impose on others, direct effects act in the opposite direction

Managerial Payoff and Gift Exchange in the Field

We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. The results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage gift and the agent's ability to repay the gift. We collect information on ability to control for differences and on reciprocal inclination to show that gift exchange is more effective with more reciprocal agents. We present a simple principal-agent model with reciprocal subjects that motivates our empirical findings. Our results offer an avenue to reconcile the recent conflicting evidence on the efficacy of gift exchange outside the lab; we suggest that the significance of gift exchange relations depends on details of the environment

Measuring Individual Risk Attitudes in the Lab: Task or Ask? An Empirical Comparison

This paper compares two prominent empirical measures of individual risk attitudes - the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery-choice task and the multi-item questionnaire advocated by Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Schupp, Sunde and Wagner (forthcoming) - with respect to (a) their correlation with actual risk-taking behaviour in the lab - here the amount sent in a trust game, and (b) their within-subject stability over time (one year). As it turns out, only the questionnaire measure is correlated with actual risk-taking behaviour (both studies) and with the Big Five personality measure (gathered prior to study 1); and the measures themselves are uncorrelated (both studies). Most importantly, however, both individual risk-taking behaviour and the questionnaire measure exhibit a significant high test-retest stability (r = 0:70 and r = 0:79, resp.), while virtually no such stability is present in the lottery-choice task. Thus, the results suggest that the questionnaire measure is more reliable in eliciting individual risk attitudes than the lottery-choice task. Moreover, with respect to trust, the data further support the conjecture that trusting behaviour indeed has a component which itself is a stable individual characteristic (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter, 2000)

The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving

We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome

Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment

There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences influence the effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence when making contracting decisions, employers should take into account that workers are heterogenous with respect to both their productivity and their social preferences. This paper presents causal evidence that they do. In a real-effort experiment, we elicit measures of workers' productivity and trustworthiness and make this information available to potential employers. Our data show that employers pay significant wage premia for both traits. Firms make highest profits with trustworthy workers, in particular with highly productive and trustworthy workers. We also document differences in the strength of gift exchange across worker types. In particular, output and profit levels of trustworthy workers are less dispersed than those of not-trustworthy workers

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration - can be used to render payoff-relevant observable information verifiable. Thus, if SPI mechanisms work as predicted they undermine the foundations of important economic results based on the observable but non-verifiable assumption. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of SPI mechanisms is, however, scarce. In this paper we show experimentally that SPI mechanisms have severe behavioral limitations. They induce retaliation against legitimate uses of arbitration and thus make the parties reluctant to trigger arbitration. The inconsistent use of arbitration eliminates the incentives to take first-best actions and leads to costly disagreements such that individuals - if given the choice - opt out of the mechanism in the majority of the cases. Incentive compatible redesigns of the mechanism solve some of these problems but generate new ones such that the overall performance of the redesigned mechanisms remains low. Our results indicate that there is little hope for SPI mechanisms to solve verifiability problems unless they are made retaliation-proof and, more generally, robust to other-regarding preferences