A Generational Model of Political Learning

We propose a mathematical framework for modeling opinion change using large-scale longitudinal data sets. Our framework encompasses two varieties of Bayesian learning theory as well as Mannheim's theory of generational responses to political events. The basic assumptions underlying the model are (1) that historical periods are characterized by shocks to existing political opinions, and (2) that individuals of different ages may attach different weights to those political shocks. Political generations emerge endogenously from these basic assumptions: the political views of identifiable birth cohorts differ, and evolve distinctively through time, due to the interaction of age-specific weights with period-specific shocks. We employ this model to examine generational changes in party identification using survey data from the American National Election Studies

Predispositions and the Political Behavior of American Economic Elites: Evidence from Technology Entrepreneurs

Economic elites regularly seek to exert political influence. But what policies do they support? Many accounts implicitly assume economic elites are homogeneous and that increases in their political power will increase inequality. We shed new light on heterogeneity in economic elites' political preferences, arguing that economic elites from an industry can share distinctive preferences due in part to sharing distinctive predispositions. Consequently, how increases in economic elites' influence affect inequality depends on which industry's elites are gaining influence and which policy issues are at stake. We demonstrate our argument with four original surveys, including the two largest political surveys of American economic elites to date: one of technology entrepreneurs—whose influence is burgeoning—and another of campaign donors. We show that technology entrepreneurs support liberal redistributive, social, and globalistic policies but conservative regulatory policies—a bundle of preferences rare among other economic elites. These differences appear to arise partly from their distinctive predispositions

Erwartungsbildung über den Wahlausgang und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung

Erwartungen über den Wahlausgang haben einen festen Platz sowohl in Rational-Choice-Theorien des Wählerverhaltens als auch in stärker sozialpsychologisch orientierten Ansätzen. Die Bildung von Erwartungen und ihr Einfluss auf die Wahlentscheidung ist dabei jedoch ein noch relativ unerforschtes Gebiet. In diesem Beitrag werden anhand von Wahlstudien für Belgien, Österreich und Deutschland verschiedene Fragen der Erwartungsbildung und ihrer Auswirkungen untersucht. Zunächst wird die Qualität der Gesamterwartungen analysiert und verschiedene Faktoren identifiziert, die einen systematischen Einfluss auf die Erwartungsbildung haben. Im zweiten Schritt wenden wir uns den Einzelerwartungen über verschiedene Parteien und Koalitionen zu und finden eine moderate Verzerrung zugunsten der präferierten Parteien und Koalitionen. Dabei kann gezeigt werden, dass der Effekt des Wunschdenkens mit dem politischen Wissen und dem Bildungsgrad abnimmt. Schließlich werden in einem letzten Schritt zwei unterschiedliche Logiken für die Auswirkungen von Erwartungen getestet, das rationale Kalkül des koalitionsstrategischen Wählens zur Vermeidung der Stimmenvergeudung sowie der sozialpsychologisch begründete Bandwagon-Effekt. Das Ausmaß an politischem Wissen scheint dabei eine zentrale vermittelnde Variable zwischen den beiden Logiken zu sein

Dynamic Responsiveness in the U.S. Senate

I develop a theory of dynamic responsiveness that suggests that parties that win elections choose candidates who are more extreme and parties that lose elections choose candidates who are more moderate. Moreover, the size of past victories matters. Close elections yield little change, but landslides yield larger changes in the candidates offered by both parties. I test this theory by analyzing the relationship between Republican vote share in U.S. Senate elections and the ideology of candidates offered in the subsequent election. The results show that Republican (Democratic) victories in past elections yield candidates who are more (less) conservative in subsequent elections, and the effect is proportional to the margin of victory. This suggests that parties or candidates pay attention to past election returns. One major implication is that parties may remain polarized in spite of their responsiveness to the median voter