Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12: 381–408, 2003. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. Probabilistic Dynamic Epistemic Logic

Abstract. In this paper I combine the dynamic epistemic logic of Gerbrandy (1999) with the probabilistic logic of Fagin and Halpern (1994). The result is a new probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, a logic for reasoning about probability, information, and information change that takes higher order information into account. Probabilistic epistemic models are defined, and a way to build them for applications is given. Semantics and a proof system is presented and a number of examples are discussed, including the Monty Hall Dilemma

Semantic Leakage Enables Lie Detection, but First-Person Pronouns and Verbosity Can Get in the Way of Detection

We investigated the impact of linguistic cues and autistic traits on lie detection. Adult participants (N = 125) judged suspects’ statements in a detective game. Untruthful statements were marked by semantic leakage. Literature indicates that liars use fewer first-person pronouns and mental-state terms than truth-tellers. We manipulated the untruthful statements for the presence/absence of these cues to test their effect on lie detection. The adults were 89% accurate in detecting lies. Mental-state terms did not affect accuracy, while presence of first-person pronouns hindered it. Having autistic traits did not influence lie detection. However, adults with higher autistic traits struggled to detect lies when these contained both a first-person pronoun and a mental-state term. Post-hoc analysis revealed lower lie detection accuracy for longer sentences. Our findings underscore the significance of semantic leakage in lie detection, with nuanced effects of linguistic cues on accuracy, particularly for adults with higher autistic traits

Reasoning about local properties in modal logic

Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi (2011). Reasoning about local properties in modal logic. In K. Tumer and P. Yolum and L. Sonenberg and P. Stone (editors). Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), pp. 711-718

Three-valued logics in modal logic

<p>Every truth-functional three-valued propositional logic can be conservatively translated into the modal logic S5. We prove this claim constructively in two steps. First, we define a Translation Manual that converts any propositional formula of any three-valued logic into a modal formula. Second, we show that for every S5-model there is an equivalent three-valued valuation and vice versa. In general, our Translation Manual gives rise to translations that are exponentially longer than their originals. This fact raises the question whether there are three-valued logics for which there is a shorter translation into S5. The answer is affirmative: we present an elegant linear translation of the Logic of Paradox and of Strong Three-valued Logic into S5.</p>

Trying to resolve the two-envelope problem

After explaining the well-known two-envelope 'paradox' by indicating the fallacy involved, we consider the two-envelope 'problem' of evaluating the 'factual' information provided to us in the form of the value contained by the envelope chosen first. We try to provide a synthesis of contributions from economy, psychology, logic, probability theory (in the form of Bayesian statistics), mathematical statistics (in the form of a decision-theoretic approach) and game theory. We conclude that the two-envelope problem does not allow a satisfactory solution. An interpretation is made for statistical science at large.