Power, norms and institutional change in the European Union: the protection of the free movement of goods

How do institutions of the European Union change? Using an institutionalist approach, this article highlights the interplay between power, cognitive limits, and the normative order that underpins institutional settings and assesses their impact upon the process of institutional change. Empirical evidence from recent attempts to reinforce the protection of the free movement of goods in the EU suggests that, under conditions of uncertainty, actors with ambiguous preferences assess attempts at institutional change on the basis of the historically defined normative order which holds a given institutional structure together. Hence, path dependent and incremental change occurs even when more ambitious and functionally superior proposals are on offer

Leveraging the sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Olympics: Senior managers’ perceptions

The purpose of this study was to understand how a sports mega event (SME) was leveraged to try and increase participation, through the investigation of national governing bodies (NGBs) opinions and atti- tudes. Critical realism (CR) was used as a tool to aid understanding of leveraging and legacy conceptualisation, through an empirical investiga- tion. An extensive, mixed method online survey was conducted post London 2012 with senior staff members of NGBs, the main delivery agent chosen to support the participation initiatives associated with the London 2012 Olympics. This research provides valuable findings surrounding the use of CR as a tool to investigate legacy creation, whilst at the same time offering insights to enhance the policy implementation process within the sports development sector. The importance of com- munication, competitive nature of sports system, media, club engage- ment, organisational capacity and monitoring and evaluation were highlighted, which provided useful insights into the multidimensional constructs that can aid future leveraging strategies prior to hosting SMEs

Democracy and governance networks: compatible or not?

The relationship between representative democracy and governance networks is investigated at a theoretical level. Four conjectures about the relationship are defined. The incompatibility conjectures rests on the primacy of politics and sees governance networks as a threat. The complementarity conjecture presents governance networks as a means of enabling greater participation in the policy process and sensitivity in programme implementation. The transitional conjecture posits a wider evolution of governance forms towards network relationships. The instrumental conjecture views governance networks as a powerful means through which dominant interests can achieve their goals. Illustrative implications for theory and practice are identified, in relation to power in the policy process, the public interest, and the role of public managers. The heuristic potential of the conjectures is demonstrated through the identification of an outline research agenda

EVALUATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY: LESSONS FROM DETROIT'S CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL PARK PROJECT

Success in implementing the Central Industrial Park project required clearing a 500-acre site for a new General Motors assembly plant, at a public sector cost of more than $200 million, in less than two years, to meet a deadline set by the corporation; clearance involved relocation of 3.500 people and more than 100 businesses, and demolition of 1,500 structures. Despite the complexity of the project and the need for approvals from multiple decision makers at the local, state, and national level, timely implementation was possible because of consensus on the project and i t s importance, formulation of special organizational structures and procedures, the actions and influence of the mayor and his development director as I'fixers, and redefinition and expansion of the statutory authority of officials responsible for project implementation. The crisis atmosphere in which project decisions were made, a consequence of corporate deadlines and the city's desperate economic situation, was essential to the effective combination of these forces. The price for success was steep, however, including higher acquisition and relocation costs, reduction of property tax revenues from the project to minimal levels for 30 years, and transfer of control over the formation and implementation of economic development policy to the private sector. Copyright 1985 by The Policy Studies Organization.