Pragmatic Interpretation and Signaler-Receiver Asymmetries in Animal Communication

Researchers have converged on the idea that a pragmatic understanding of communication can shed important light on the evolution of language. Accordingly, animal communication scientists have been keen to adopt insights from pragmatics research. Some authors couple their appeal to pragmatic aspects of communication with the claim that there are fundamental asymmetries between signalers and receivers in non-human animals. For example, in the case of primate vocal calls, signalers are said to produce signals unintentionally and mindlessly, whereas receivers are thought to engage in contextual interpretation to derive the significance of signals. We argue that claims about signaler-receiver asymmetries are often confused. This is partly because their authors conflate two conceptions of pragmatics, which generate different accounts of the explanatory target for accounts of the evolution of language. Here we distinguish these conceptions, in order to help specify more precisely the proper explanatory target for language evolution research

How to do things with nonwords: pragmatics, biosemantics, and origins of language in animal communication

Recent discussions of animal communication and the evolution of language have advocated adopting a ‘pragmatics-first’ approach, according to which “a more productive framework” for primate communication research should be “pragmatics, the field of linguistics that examines the role of context in shaping the meaning of linguistic utterances”. After distinguishing two different conceptions of pragmatics that advocates of the pragmatics-first approach have implicitly relied on, I argue that neither conception adequately serves the purposes of pragmatics-first approaches to the origins of human linguistic communication. My main aim in this paper is to motivate–and begin to articulate–an intermediary conception whose scope is narrower than Carnapian pragmatics but broader than Gricean pragmatics. To do so, I first spell out what I take to be the key insight offered by proponents of the Gricean approach concerning the emergence of linguistic communication, namely, its being communication ‘from a psychological point of view’. I then develop this insight using key elements from the anti-Gricean ‘biosemantic’ account of linguistic communication due to Ruth Millikan, Philosophical Perspectives 9, Ridgeview Publishing, Atascedero CA, 1995, Millikan R Varieties of Meaning. Mass.: The MIT Press, Cambridge, Millikan, Beyond concepts: unicepts, language, and natural information, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2017, and elsewhere). I argue that the intermediary pragmatics-first approach that I propose, which draws on both Gricean and Millikanian resources, would be better equipped to serve the purposes of those who search for potential precursors of human linguistic communication in animal communication

Externalism and Self-Knowledge: Content, Use, and Expression

Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There’s water in the glass. The thought has the content that there is water in the glass; and it will be true if there is indeed water in the glass. According to external-world skepticism, even if my thought is true, I do not know that there is water in the glass, because my way of telling that this is the case does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under some illusion. But surely I can know that I am thinking that there is water in the glass! Yet according to external-content skepticism, that is not something that I know, since my way of telling what I am thinking does not allow me to rule out the possibility that I am only under an illusion about the content of my thought

(How) Is Ethical Neo-Expressivism a Hybrid View?

According to ethical neo-expressivism, all declarative sentences, including those used to make ethical claims, have propositions as their semantic contents, and acts of making an ethical claim are properly said to express mental states, which (if motivational internalism is correct) are intimately connected to motivation. This raises two important questions: (i) The traditional reason for denying that ethical sentences express propositions is that these were thought to determine ways the world could be, so unless we provide an analysis of ethical terms in terms of natural properties, are we not committed to the Moorean conclusion that ethical sentences describe sui generis “nonnatural” ways the world could be? (ii) If we reject the claim that motivational attitudes constitute any part of the semantics of ethical sentences, are we not committed to denying the intuition behind motivational internalism after all? This chapter argues for negative answers to both of these questions

Crude Meaning, Brute Thought (or: What Are They Thinking?!)

I address here the question what sense to make of the idea that there can be thought prior to language (both in ontogeny and among nonlinguistic animals). I begin by juxtaposing two familiar and influential philosophical views, one associated with the work of Paul Grice, the other associated with the work of Donald Davidson. Grice and Davidson share a broad, rationalist perspective on language and thought, but they endorse conflicting theses on the relation between them. Whereas, for Grice, thought of an especially complex sort is a precondition of linguistic meaning, for Davidson, there can be no genuine thought without language. I argue that both views present us with unpalatable alternatives concerning our understanding of the natural origins of objective thought and meaningful language. Drawing on what I take to be key insights from Grice and Davidson, I then lay out some broad desiderata for an intermediate position. I finally turn to a certain form of nonlinguistic communication of the sort of which both prelinguistic children and languageless animals are capable, viz., expressive communication. I propose that a proper appreciation of the character and function of expressive communication can help us trace the outlines of the desired intermediate position

Millikan's Beyond Concepts Summary Notes

These summary notes on Ruth Millikan’s latest book Beyond Concepts: Unicepts, Language, and Natural Information (OUP, 2017) were prepared by Dorit Bar-On for a discussion group that met in Summer 2018. The notes have been lightly edited by Millikan and prepared for online publication with the help of Drew Johnson

The role of inner speech in self-knowledge:: against Neo-Rylean views

Se piensa que nuestro conocimiento de nuestros actuales estados mentales es, a la vez, característico y privilegiado. Gilbert Ryle es célebre por haber ofrecido una explicación deflacionista del auto-conocimiento, argumentando que nuestros episodios de lenguaje interno podrían servir como base evidencial privilegiada (y posiblemente también característica) pa-ra el auto-conocimiento de los estados mentales. La explicación de Ryle ha sido, en gran parte, rechazada. Sin embargo, diversos autores han intentado recientemente traer de nuevo a la vida la explicación de Ryle como un modo de dar cuenta del papel que desempeña el lenguaje interno en el auto-conocimiento. En este artículo, evaluamos críticamente dos de tales explicaciones “neo-ryleanas”, argumentando que son insatisfactorias, especialmente porque no pueden dar cuenta del carácter privilegiado de nuestro auto-conocimiento de los estados mentales. Extraemos de tal evaluación algunos desiderata que debe cumplir una teoría que pueda explicar adecuadamente la significación de los episodios de lenguaje interno para el auto-conocimiento privilegiado. Concluimos sugiriendo que esos desiderata favorecen un enfoque neo-expresivista para la comprensión del papel que desempeña el lenguaje interno en el auto-conocimiento