Financial Development in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems

This paper analyzes how the adversarial and inquisitorial evidence collection procedures affect financial development. In investigating the true returns of insolvent entrepreneurs, the adversarial procedure relies on lawyers whereas the inquisitorial procedure relies on judges. Investors are willing to lend more in adversarial than in inquisitorial legal systems if they are richer than entrepreneurs or if lawyers are more productive than judges. Manipulation of evidence by lawyers has an ambiguous impact on finance. The empirical evidence shows that a more inquisitorial procedure is associated with less developed financial markets.adversarial; inquisitorial; financial development; legal origins

Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development

This paper introduces a model of litigation in a growth framework. Investors use litigation to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. A contest ensues in which both agents hire lawyers to increase their probability of winning the trial. The issue and the cost of the contest determine how much investors are willing to lend. More lawyers are hired when judicial efficiency is lower and damages are higher. Higher judicial efficiency and tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers benefit the economy, while the impact of higher damages is ambiguous. Some empirical evidence is also presented

Contract Enforcement, Litigation, and Economic Development

This paper introduces a model of litigation in a growth framework. Investors use litigation to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. A contest ensues in which both agents hire lawyers to increase their probability of winning the trial. The issue and the cost of the contest determine how much investors are willing to lend. More lawyers are hired when judicial efficiency is lower and damages are higher. Higher judicial efficiency and tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers benefit the economy, while the impact of higher damages is ambiguous. Some empirical evidence is also presented.contract enforcement; litigation; lawyers; economic development

Contract enforcement, litigation, and economic development

This paper introduces a model of litigation in a growth framework. Investors use litigation to enforce their financial contracts with entrepreneurs. A contest ensues in which both agents hire lawyers to increase their probability of winning the trial. The issue and the cost of the contest determine how much investors are willing to lend. More lawyers are hired when judicial efficiency is lower and damages are higher. Higher judicial efficiency and tighter restrictions on the supply of lawyers benefit the economy, while the impact of higher damages is ambiguous. Some empirical evidence is also presented.contract enforcement, litigation, lawyers, economic development

How to Overcome the Digital Divide? The Determinants of Internet Diffusion

We document the existence and the persistence of the digital divide and investigate the determinants of the Internet diffusion in both developing and developed countries. Our study innovates on the following: i) we use a data set that covers more countries and years than the earlier studies ii) We use the GMM estimator which requires milder assumptions to be consistent than the traditionally used panel data estimators in technology diffusion studies. We find that i) the digital divide is likely to persist over time, ii) the Internet diffusion process is dynamic which makes static estimators inconsistent, iii) Internet adoption starts later but goes faster in developing countries, iv) inflows of the foreign investment and better human capital boost the diffusion of Internet for the developing countries only and v) GDP per capita has a negative impact on Internet diffusion in the developing countries and a positive impact in developed countries. This last finding seems surprising but it is consistent with the conditional convergence hypothesis as well as with the resource curse theory.internet diffusion, digital divide, panel data, GMM

Informal Sector and Economic Growth: The Supply of Credit Channel

A standard view holds that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement would reduce informality and boost investment and growth. We show, however, that this conclusion may not hold in countries with a concentrated bank- ing sector or with low financial openness. When the formal sector becomes larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy and the higher pres- sure in the credit market increases the interest rate. This reduces future capital accumulation. We show some empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.

Informal Sector and Economic Growth: The Supply of Credit Channel

A standard view holds that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial\ud enforcement would reduce informality and boost investment and growth. We show,\ud however, that this conclusion may not hold in countries with a concentrated bank-\ud ing sector or with low financial openness. When the formal sector becomes larger\ud in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy and the higher pres-\ud sure in the credit market increases the interest rate. This reduces future capital\ud accumulation. We show some empirical evidence consistent with these predictions

Financial development in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems

This paper analyzes how the adversarial and inquisitorial evidence collection procedures affect financial development. In investigating the true returns of insolvent entrepreneurs, the adversarial procedure relies on lawyers whereas the inquisitorial procedure relies on judges. Investors are willing to lend more in adversarial than in inquisitorial legal systems if they are richer than entrepreneurs or if lawyers are more productive than judges. Manipulation of evidence by lawyers has an ambiguous impact on finance. The empirical evidence shows that a more inquisitorial procedure is associated with less developed financial markets

Deterrence, settlement, and litigation under adversarial versus inquisitorial systems

In this paper, we compare deterrence, settlement, and litigation spending under adversarial and inquisitorial systems. We present a basic litigation model with three sequential stages—care, settlement, litigation—and we test the predictions on experimental data. In line with our theoretical expectations, we fnd that, compared with the adversarial system, the inquisitorial system is associated with lower litigation spending, lower rates of cases settled, and tends to strengthen deterrenc

Informal Sector and Economic Development: The Credit Supply Channel

A standard view holds that removing barriers to entry and improving judicial enforcement would reduce informality and boost investment and growth. We show, however, that this conclusion may not hold in countries with a concentrated bank- ing sector or with low financial openness. When the formal sector becomes larger in those countries, more entrepreneurs become creditworthy and the higher pres- sure in the credit market increases the interest rate. This reduces future capital accumulation. We show some empirical evidence consistent with these predictions