Cracking down on bribery

Do crackdowns on bribery impact corrupt behavior in the long run? In this paper we observe the long-run impact of a short-term punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on bribery behavior in a lab setting. We conduct lab experiments in two countries with cultures that differ in corruption norms, and which experience very different levels of bribery: the US and Pakistan. Bribery is implemented in the laboratory as a repeated three-player sequential game, consisting of a firm, a government official and a citizen. The design contains three phases: pre-crackdown, crackdown, and post-crackdown. Results show that post-crackdown behavior is not significantly different from pre-crackdown behavior in either country. We conclude that short-term crackdowns may impact behavior in the short run, depending on the strength of the existing corruption norms in the country. More importantly, in our setting crackdowns are completely ineffective in the long run, as corrupt behavior rebounds to pre-crackdown levels

The future of the CDM: same same, but differentiated?

Policy-makers and scientists have raised concerns about the functioning of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in particular regarding its low contribution to sustainable development, unbalanced regional and sectoral distribution of projects, and its limited contribution to global emission reductions. Differentiation between countries or project types has been proposed as a possible way forward to address these problems. An overview is provided of the different ways in which CDM differentiation could be implemented. The implications for the actors involved in the CDM are analysed, along with a quantitative assessment of the impacts on the carbon market, using bottom-up marginal abatement cost curves. The discounting of CDM credits, quota systems, or differentiated eligibility of countries could help to address several of the concerns raised. Preferential treatment may also make a limited contribution to achieving the aims of CDM differentiation by increasing opportunities for under-represented host countries. The impact on the carbon market appears to be limited for most options

Kinetics of immune responses to the AZD1222/Covishield vaccine with varying dose intervals in Sri Lankan individuals

Background To understand the kinetics of immune responses with different dosing gaps of the AZD1222 vaccine, we compared antibody and T cell responses in two cohorts with two different dosing gaps. Methods Antibodies to the SARS-CoV-2 virus were assessed in 297 individuals with a dosing gap of 12 weeks, sampled 12 weeks post second dose (cohort 1) and in 77 individuals with a median dosing gap of 21.4 weeks (cohort 2) sampled 6 weeks post second dose. ACE2-blocking antibodies (ACE2-blocking Abs), antibodies to the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of variants of concern (VOC), and ex vivo T cell responses were assessed in a subcohort. Results All individuals (100%) had SARS-CoV-2-specific total antibodies and 94.2% of cohort 1 and 97.1% of cohort 2 had ACE2-blocking Abs. There was no difference in antibody titers or positivity rates in different age groups in both cohorts. The ACE2-blocking Abs (p Conclusions Both dosing schedules resulted in high antibody and T cell responses post vaccination, although those with a longer dosing gap had a higher magnitude of responses, possibly as immune responses were measured 6 weeks post second dose compared to 12 weeks post second dose

Al Qaeda at the bar: coordinating ideologues and mercenaries in terrorist organizations

Most terrorist groups have limited lifespans. A number of scholars and casual observers have noted that terrorist organizations often are comprised of two types of participants: ideologues or "true believers" dedicated to the group's cause, and mercenaries, who are adept at raising money through illegal means. The latter are interested primarily in their personal gains and have relatively little ideological commitment. Terrorist groups need both participants in order to function effectively. The purpose of the study is to understand the impact of communication on the compositions of terrorist groups. Three experimental treatments consider a coordination problem, and focus on the behavior of the mercenaries. Participants choose whether or not to participate in a terrorist attack. Payoffs are U-shaped in the number of participants, and increase with the number of successful attacks. The treatments allow communication between a leader and frontline fighters ("leader" treatment) or among the frontline fighters themselves ("communication" treatment). In the first treatment, a group leader can post messages to the members, which has a 19 % coordination success rate. For the communication treatment, all participants can post messages anonymously to each other, which yields a 27 % coordination success rate. By contrast, the baseline ("no communication" treatment) shows a success rate of 11 %. We conclude from our experimental evidence that disrupting communications among the frontline fighters is more effective in terminating terrorist organizations

Foreign aid, instability and governance in Africa

This study contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instability on governance dynamics in fifty three African countries for the period 1996-2010. An autoregressive endogeneity-robust Generalized Method of Moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors and bilateral aid. Principal Component Analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice & accountability and political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-control) and general governance (political, economic and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Policy implications are discussed