A dynamic model of democratic elections in multidimensional policy spaces

We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in "simple" voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives maylead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters become-arbitrarily patient

A General Bargaining Model of Legislative Policy-making

We present a general model of legislative bargaining in which the status quo is an arbitrary point in a multidimensional policy space. In contrast to other bargaining models, the status quo is not assumed to be bad for all legislators, and delay may be Pareto efficient. We prove existence of stationary equilibria. We show that if all legislators are risk averse or if even limited transfers are possible, then delay is only possible if the status quo lies in the core. Thus, we expect immediate agreement in multidimensional models, where the core is typically empty. In one dimension, delay is possible if and only if the status quo lies in the core of the voting rule, and then it is the only possible outcome. Our comparative statics analysis yield two noteworthy insights: moderate status quos imply moderate policy outcomes, and legislative patience implies policy moderation

Social choice theory, game theory, and positive political theory

We consider the relationships between the collective preference and non-cooperative game theory approaches to positive political theory. In particular, we show that an apparently decisive difference between the two approachesthat in sufficiently complex environments (e.g. high-dimensional choice spaces) direct preference aggregation models are incapable of generating any prediction at all, whereas non-cooperative game-theoretic models almost always generate predictionis indeed only an apparent difference. More generally, we argue that when modeling collective decisions there is a fundamental tension between insuring existence of well-defined predictions, a criterion of minimal democracy, and general applicability to complex environments; while any two of the three are compatible under either approach, neither collective preference nor non-cooperative game theory can support models that simultaneously satisfy all three desiderata

A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces

We propose a general model of repeated elections. In each period, a challenger is chosen from the electorate to run against an incumbent politician in a majority-rule election, and the winner then selects a policy from a multidimensional policy space. Individual policy preferences are private information, whereas policy choices are publicly observable. We prove existence and continuity of equilibria in “simple” voting and policy strategies; we provide examples to show the variety of possible equilibrium patterns in multiple dimensions; we analyze the effects of patience and office-holding benefits on the persistence of policies over time; and we identify relationships between equilibrium policies and the core of the underlying voting game. As a byproduct of our analysis, we show how equilibrium incentives may lead elected representatives to make policy compromises, even when binding commitments are unavailable. We provide an informational story for incumbency advantage. Finally, we give an asymptotic version of the median voter theorem for the one-dimensional model as voters becomes arbitrarily patient.

Reviewed Work: Analytical Politics

Mathematical models of political processes have become increasingly sophisticated over the last few decades, with the lessons drawn from such models generating insights relevant for both political scientists and economists. In Analytical Politics, Professors Hinich and Munger present some of the primary building blocks of these models, show how they fit together, and describe some of the more fundamental conclusions established to date. The material is pitched to an audience of graduate and advanced undergraduate students in political science and economics (exercises are provided), as well as to scholars unfamiliar with the terrain. Most of the formal results are stated without proof, and no new results are presented

Conceptual design and analysis of roads and road construction machinery for initial lunar base operations

Recent developments have made it possible for scientists and engineers to consider returning to the Moon to build a manned lunar base. The base can be used to conduct scientific research, develop new space technology, and utilize the natural resources of the Moon. Areas of the base will be separated, connected by a system of roads that reduce the power requirements of vehicles traveling on them. Feasible road types for the lunar surface were analyzed and a road construction system was designed for initial lunar base operations. A model was also constructed to show the system configuration and key operating features. The alternate designs for the lunar road construction system were developed in four stages: analyze and select a road type; determine operations and machinery needed to produce the road; develop machinery configurations; and develop alternates for several machine components. A compacted lunar soil road was selected for initial lunar base operations. The only machinery required to produce this road were a grader and a compactor. The road construction system consists of a main drive unit which is used for propulsion, a detachable grader assembly, and a towed compactor