Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or negative. We provide either public or private information about personal values. This produces two distinct public provision games, which are experimentally implemented and analyzed for various projects. In spite of the complex experimental task, participants do not rely on bidding their own personal values as an obvious simple heuristic whose general acceptance would result in fair and efficient outcomes. Rather, they rely on strategic underbidding. Although underbidding is affected by projects’ characteristics, the provision mechanism mostly leads to the implementation of the most efficient project

Protecting Minorities through the Average Voting Rule

In the average voting rule, the outcome is some weighted average of votes. The unique average voting outcome is characterized by a median formula, which depends on voters' preferred allocations and some parameters constructed from voters' weights. A minority is said to be protected by a switch in voting rule if the outcome becomes closer to the median bliss point of the minority. Sufficient conditions for minority protection are that, either the minority's weight is sufficiently large or the majority outcome is too unfavorable to the minority. Applications to the composition of public goods and to public expenditures level are considered. We explore the combined use of average and majority voting in a two-stage procedure for determining the level and the composition of public expenditures. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

Ethical differentiation and consumption in an incentivized market experiment

In surveys consumers express preferences for ethical goods. Some authors claim, however, that survey responses do not translate into actual costly purchase behavior. To study if ethical consumption and differentiation occur in an incentive-compatible setting, this paper implements a design of an incentivized market experiment, which has been studied in the context of homogenous goods and both theoretically and experimentally engenders a dynamic of price decrease. This experiment establishes that ethical differentiation can be an effective strategy for sellers with ethically motivated buyers; and, although there is an ethical price premium, it accrues to the charity rather than to the seller.FEDER funds through Programa Operacional Factores de Competitividade—COMPETE and by national funds through FCT—Fundacão para a Ciência e Tecnologia (FCT Portugal) project Grant No. PTDC/IIM-ECO/4574/2012 andPEst-OE/EGE/UI3181/2014

The provision point mechanism with reward money

We modify the provision point mechanism by introducing reward money, which is distributed among the contributors in proportion to their contributions only when the provision point is not reached. In equilibrium, the provision point is always reached as competition for reward money and preference for the public good induce sufficient contributions. In environments without aggregate uncertainty, the mechanism not only ensures allocative efficiency but also distributional. At a specific level of reward money, there is a unique equilibrium, where all consumers contribute the same proportion of their private valuations. The advantages of the mechanism are also demonstrated for collective action problems