Introduction to the Demography Volume

[Excerpt] This volume represents another effort by Research in the Sociology of Organizations to focus on a crucial issue in organizational sociology. In some of the previous volumes, we concentrated on organizations and professions (Volume 8, 1991), the structuring of participation in organizations (Volume 7, 1989), and the social psychological processes in organizations (Volume 3, 1984). This volume concentrates on one of the most important emerging issues in organizational sociology—the issue of organizational demography

QUANTITATIVE NON-DESTRUCTIVE NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS OF SILVER IN COINS

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/65909/1/j.1475-4754.1967.tb00617.x.pd

Proprietary Reasons and Joint Action

Some of the reasons one acts on in joint action are shared with fellow participants. But others are proprietary: reasons of one’s own that have no direct practical significance for other participants. The compatibility of joint action with proprietary reasons serves to distinguish the former from other forms of collective agency; moreover, it is arguably a desirable feature of joint action. Advocates of “team reasoning” link the special collective intention individual participants have when acting together with a distinctive form of practical reasoning that purports to put individuals in touch with group or collective reasons. Such views entail the surprising conclusion that one cannot engage in joint action for proprietary reasons. Suppose we understand the contrast between minimal and robust forms of joint action in terms of the extent to which participants act on proprietary reasons as opposed to shared reasons. Then, if the team reasoning view of joint intention and action is correct, it makes no sense to talk of minimal joint action. As soon as the reason for which one participates is proprietary, then one is not, on this view, genuinely engaged in joint action

Syncytial Hepatitis of Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus L.) is Associated With Orthomyxovirus-Like Virions in Hepatocytes

Using transmission electron microscopy (TEM), the presented work expands on the ultrastructural findings of an earlier report on “syncytial hepatitis,” a novel disease of tilapia (SHT). Briefly, TEM confirmed the presence of an orthomyxovirus-like virus within the diseased hepatocytes but not within the endothelium. This was supported by observing extracellular and intracellular (mostly intraendosomal), 60–100 nm round virions with a trilaminar capsid containing up to 7 electron-dense aggregates. Other patterns noted included enveloped or filamentous virions and virion-containing cytoplasmic membrane folds, suggestive of endocytosis. Patterns atypical for orthymyxovirus included the formation of syncytia and the presence of virions within the perinuclear cisternae (suspected to be the Golgi apparatus). The ultrastructural morphology of SHT-associated virions is similar to that previously reported for tilapia lake virus (TiLV). A genetic homology was investigated using the available reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) probes for TiLV and comparing clinically sick with clinically normal fish and negative controls. By RT-PCR analysis, viral nucleic acid was detected only in diseased fish. Taken together, these findings strongly suggest that a virus is causally associated with SHT, that this virus shares ultrastructural features with orthomyxoviruses, and it presents with partial genetic homology with TiLV (190 nucleotides). </jats:p

Discovery of an unrecognized nidovirus associated with granulomatous hepatitis in rainbow trout

Rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) is the principal species of inland-farmed fish in the Western hemisphere. Recently, we diagnosed in farmed rainbow trout a disease in which the hallmark is granulomatous-like hepatitis. No biotic agents could be isolated from lesions. Still, unbiased high-throughput sequencing and bioinformatics analyses revealed the presence of a novel piscine nidovirus that we named “Trout Granulomatous Virus” (TGV). TGV genome (28,767 nucleotides long) is predicted to encode non-structural (1a and 1 ab) and structural (S, M, and N) proteins that resemble proteins of other known piscine nidoviruses. High loads of TGV transcripts were detected by quantitative RT-PCR in diseased fish and visualized in hepatic granulomatous sites by fluorescence in situ hybridization. Transmission electron microscopy (TEM) revealed coronavirus-like particles in these lesions. Together, these analyses corroborated the association of TGV with the lesions. The identification and detection of TGV provide means to control TGV spread in trout populations

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117–147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264–265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on the conditions on collective action and intention that need to be fulfilled for Bacharach’s “team reasoning” to occur. Two influential approaches to collective action are related to the idea of team reasoning: Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intention and Raimo Tuomela’s theory of a we-mode of intending. I argue that neither captures the “agency transformation” that team reasoning requires. That might be an acceptable conclusion for Bratman but more problematic for Tuomela, who claims that Bacharach’s results support his theory. I sketch an alternative framework in which the perspectival element that is required for team reasoning - the ‘we-perspective’ - can be understood and functionally characterized in relation to the traditional distinction between mode and content of intentional states. I claim that the latter understanding of a collective perspective provides the right kind of philosophical background for team reasoning, and I discuss some implications in relation to Tuomela’s assumption that switching between individual and collective perspectives can be a matter of rational choice

The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis

International audienceThis paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to discriminate among the models presented in the paper

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well