Kapitalismus braucht Wachstum – aber es gibt kein Patentrezept

Die europäischen Länder unterscheiden sich nicht nur hinsichtlich ihrer Wohlstandsniveaus. Auch die Art und Weise, wie etwa die Institutionen des Wohlfahrtsstaats oder der Arbeitsbeziehungen auf die Wirtschaft einwirken, unterscheidet sich von Land zu Land. Der neue Forschungsbereich „Politische Ökonomie von Wachstumsmodellen“ am MPIfG untersucht, wie in den europäischen „Spielarten des Kapitalismus“ Wachstum erzeugt wird. Ein Vergleich zwischen Deutschland, Großbritannien, Schweden und Italien legt die Strategien offen, mit denen sich die für wirtschaftliches Wachstum notwendige Nachfrage generieren lässt

Civil Society Meets the State: A Model of Associational Democracy

At a time in which the state is in disrepute, civil society is often proposed as an alternative.1 In advanced countries, the crisis of dirigiste policy-making has spurred reflections on the role of social actors in the conception and execution of public policy (see Levy, 1999; Putnam, 1993 and 1995; Cable, 1995).Associational democracy Unresolved issues in the associational democratic project Concluding remarks Reference

Civil Society, NGOs, and Decent Work Policies: Sorting Out the Issues

This rather abstract paper is motivated by an eminently practical concern. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has recently restructured itself to emphasize the notion of “decent work.” “Decent work,” as argued by the ILO’s Director General in his report to the 1999 International Labour Conference, “means productive work in which rights are protected, which generates an adequate income, with adequate social protection.Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. The Notion of Civil Society 3. NGOs and Development theory 3.1 The Dark Side of NGOs 3.2 The More Luminous Side of NGOs 3.3 NGO Contribution to Decent Work Policies 4. Concluding Remarks Bibliography Table and Figure 1 Table 2, 3 and 4 Appendice

Has the “External Constraint” Contributed to Italy’s Stagnation? A Critical Event Analysis

Has the strategy of the “external constraint” (voluntarily limiting the country’s policy-making discretion by tying it to the European mast) contributed to Italy’s stagnation over the past twenty-five years? The existing literature is divided on this question. The dominant interpretation is that Italy’s stagnation is due to insufficient liberalization, and that the external constraint has had no negative and even a positive influence. An alternative interpretation emphasizes the demand compression and supply-side effects of the external constraint. Based on three case studies of public debt management, privatization, and labor market policy, this paper reconstructs the process by which the external constraint has affected outcomes. It argues that it has had a negative impact, but more as a necessary condition than as a sufficient one. In other words, it would probably have been possible to manage the external constraint differently to produce better outcomes, but without the external constraint, the stagnation would likely have been less deep.Hat die Strategie des „äußeren Zwangs“ (die freiwillige Einschränkung der politischen Gestaltungsmacht eines Landes durch seine Unterwerfung unter europäische Vorgaben) zu Italiens Stagnation in den letzten 25 Jahren beigetragen? Die vorliegende Literatur ist in dieser Frage zwiegespalten. Die vorherrschende Deutung besagt, dass Italiens Stagnation einer unzureichenden Liberalisierung geschuldet ist und der äußere Zwang keinen negativen, sondern im Gegenteil einen positiven Einfluss gehabt hat. Eine alternative Interpretation verweist jedoch auf die einbrechende Nachfrage und die Angebotseffekte, die der äußere Zwang verursacht. Auf der Grundlage dreier Fallstudien zum öffentlichen Schuldenwesen, zur Privatisierung und zur Arbeitsmarktpolitik rekonstruiert dieser Beitrag den Prozess, durch den der äußere Zwang Resultate beeinflusst hat. Er vertritt die These, dass dieser Zwang zwar einen negativen Einfluss ausgeübt hat, dies jedoch eher als notwendige denn als hinreichende Bedingung. Es wäre, anders ausgedrückt, also wahrscheinlich möglich gewesen, anders mit dem äußeren Zwang umzugehen, und zwar so, dass bessere Resultate erzielt worden wären; ohne diesen Zwang wäre die Stagnation allerdings wohl weniger einschneidend verlaufen.Contents 1 Introduction 2 Explanations of the Italian decline 3 External constraint as a critical event 4 Adoption of the external constraint The 1970s The Maastricht Treaty Entry into EMU 5 Consequences of the external constraint Management of public debt Privatization Industrial relations and labor market policy 6 Concluding remarks Appendix A Appendix B Reference

Social Dialogue during the Financial and Economic Crisis: Results from the ILO/World Bank Inventory Using a Boolean Analysis on 44 Countries

Using information collected by the ILO/WB Inventory of policy responses to the financial and economic crisis on 44 countries, this paper identified conditions under which there was a social dialogue response to the financial crisis between 2008 and 2010. For that purpose, they use a particular definition of social dialogue, e.g. the emergence of tripartite nationallevel agreements or major agreements at the sector level; and rely on a Boolean analysis, e.g. a statistical method to detect relationships between variables, for example between answers to a questionnaire. Based on this definition, 13 out of 44 countries adopted national level agreement or major sector level agreement in formulating their crisis response, including seven in Europe, three in Americas, two in Asia, and one in Africa. Explanatory factors for the emergence of social dialogue include freedom of association, the severity of the crisis, and the strength of trade unions.Preface 1. Introduction 2. The evolution of national social dialogue in recent years 3. Coding the dependent variable 4. Coding the independent variables Tripartite legacy Serious crisis Union Strength Freedom of Association 5. Boolean analysis 6. Dealing with limited diversity 7. Country experiences Germany Switzerland Ireland Spain Czech Republic Hungary Brazil South Africa Japan Korea 8. Concluding remarks Reference

The Politics of Growth Models

This article develops a framework for studying the politics of growth models. These, the authors posit, are sustained by ‘growth coalitions’ based in key sectors. Their members are first and foremost firms and employer associations, but fractions of labor are also included, if their interests do not impair the model’s functionality. There is no guarantee that a growth coalition and a winning electoral coalition coincide. In normal times, a growth coalition effectively insulates itself from political competition, and mainstream political parties converge on key growth model policies. In moments of crisis, however, the coalition shrinks, favoring the emergence of challengers that fundamentally contest the status quo. The way governing parties respond to electoral pressures can also play an important role in the recalibration of growth models. The authors illustrate the argument by examining the politics of ‘export-led growth’ in Germany, ‘construction-led growth’ in Spain, and ‘balanced growth’ in Sweden.1 Introduction 2 The comparative capitalisms debate 3 Sectoral interests in macroeconomic policy 4 Social class and power resources 5 Parties and electoral politics 6 The politics of export-led growth in Germany 7 The politics of construction-led growth in Spain 8 The politics of growth-model recalibration in Sweden 9 Concluding remarks Reference

Operationalizing Growth Models

We present a new methodology for operationalizing growth models based on import-adjusted demand components. Applying the methodology to the latest release of OECD Input-Output Tables, we calculate the growth contributions of consumption, investment, government expenditures, and exports for sixty-six countries in the periods 1995 to 2007 and 2009 to 2018 and identify the respective growth models. We find that most countries are export-led or domestic demand-led and that other forms of growth are rare. Our results corroborate previous classifications in comparative political economy but also differ from them in significant respects. Importantly, our classification improves on previous ones by covering not just the advanced capitalist economies but also Central and Eastern European and South-East Asian and Latin American countries. In a further step, we illustrate how the new indicators can be used to analyze the “drivers” of different types of growth. This examination reveals that there is a clear trade-off between consumption- and export-led growth in advanced Western economies in the period 1995 to 2007 and a dependence of export-led growth in these countries on real exchange rate devaluation in the same period, while export complexity is not a significant predictor of export-led growth.Wir stellen eine neue Methode zur Operationalisierung von Wachstumsmodellen auf der Grundlage importbereinigter Nachfragekomponenten vor. Dabei berechnen wir anhand der aktuellen Input-Output-Tabellen der OECD den jeweiligen Wachstumsbeitrag von Konsum, Investitionen, Staatsausgaben und Exporten für 66 Länder in den Zeiträumen 1995–2007 und 2009–2018 und ermitteln die entsprechenden Wachstumsmodelle. Es zeigt sich, dass die meisten Länder ein vom Export oder von der Inlandsnachfrage getragenes Wachstum aufweisen und andere Wachstumsformen selten sind. Unsere Ergebnisse bestätigen bisherige Klassifikationen der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie und unterscheiden sich gleichzeitig in wesentlichen Punkten von ihnen. Vor allem hat unsere Klassifikation im Vergleich zu bisherigen den Vorteil, dass sie sich nicht nur auf die fortgeschrittenen kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsordnungen, sondern auch auf Länder in Mittel- und Osteuropa und in Südostasien und Lateinamerika bezieht. Darüber hinaus erläutern wir, wie die neuen Indikatoren genutzt werden können, um die „Treiber“ verschiedener Wachstumsformen zu ermitteln. Unsere Auswertung der Daten legt offen, dass es in fortgeschrittenen westlichen Volkswirtschaften im Zeitraum 1995–2007 klare Zielkonflikte zwischen konsum- und exportorientiertem Wachstum und eine Abhängigkeit des exportorientierten Wachstums von realen Wechselkursabwertungen gegeben hat, während die Komplexität der Exporte keinen wesentlichen Einfluss auf das exportorientierte Wachstum hatte.Contents 1 Introduction 2 The literature on growth model classification and operationalization 3 Problems with traditional growth decomposition 4 Methodology for deriving import-adjusted demand components 5 The OECD Input-Output Tables 6 Demand contributions to growth 7 Analysis of growth drivers Trade-offs between demand components Drivers of export-led growth 8 Concluding discussion Appendix A Derivation of indirect imports through input-output tables Appendix B Auxiliary variables and structural determinants of growth Appendix C Additional figures and tables Reference

The Irish Social Partnership and the "Celtic Tiger" Phenomenon

Ireland is the miracle economy of the 1990s. In 15 years, it transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in Europe into one of the richest. Ireland’s record compares favorably not just with other, much touted examples of economic success in the last few years, like the Netherlands and the US, but also with Asian “tigers,” even before the latter’s economic setbacks of the late 1990s. Understanding the sources of Ireland’s economic success is therefore relevant for a much wider audience than just the people of the Emerald Isle.Introduction 1. The development of the Irish social partnership 2. Does social partnership matter? 3. Multinationals, social partnership, and the “Irish disease” a) The role of multinationals b) The moral economy of wages and the “Irish disease” c) The effects of social partnership 4. The politics of wage restraint in Ireland a) Pro-partnership coalitions b) The problem of compliance 5. Concluding remarks Reference