LIDA: A Working Model of Cognition

In this paper we present the LIDA architecture as a working model of cognition. We argue that such working models are broad in scope and address real world problems in comparison to experimentally based models which focus on specific pieces of cognition. While experimentally based models are useful, we need a working model of cognition that integrates what we know from neuroscience, cognitive science and AI. The LIDA architecture provides such a working model. A LIDA based cognitive robot or software agent will be capable of multiple learning mechanisms. With artificial feelings and emotions as primary motivators and learning facilitators, such systems will ‘live’ through a developmental period during which they will learn in multiple ways to act in an effective, human-like manner in complex, dynamic, and unpredictable environments. We discuss the integration of the learning mechanisms into the existing IDA architecture as a working model of cognition

Dutch Dike Breach, Wilnis 2003

In August 2003, after a very dry and warm summer, one of the dikes along a canal in The Netherlands failed at night. Because of this dike breach, the water in the canal started to run into a housing quarter of the village Wilnis, which is about 30 km Southeast of Amsterdam. A local contractor immediately started to close off the canal. By the time this was finished, 600 houses were already half a meter under water. The 2000 residents were evacuated in the early morning. Almost all residents could return to their homes the same evening after the water was pumped out of this area. Like many other small dikes in The Netherlands, the complete dike consists of peat. Since peat has a relatively low specific weight, a peat dike has a higher risk of being pushed aside by water pressure than sand or clay dikes. This horizontal sliding is a rare type of failure mechanism. Though, when the stability of this dike is checked with a simple one page computation, it becomes clear that the failure of the dike after a dry period was a realistic threat. For many years it was known that this part of dike was at risk. This was reported to the minister of Public Works in 1993, but the two involved provincial authorities, the provincial government and the water board, did not take steps until after the dike failure

Radio Emission from the Intermediate-mass Black Hole in the Globular Cluster G1

We have used the Very Large Array (VLA) to search for radio emission from the globular cluster G1 (Mayall-II) in M31. G1 has been reported by Gebhardt et al. to contain an intermediate-mass black hole (IMBH) with a mass of ~2 x 10^4 solar masses. Radio emission was detected within an arcsecond of the cluster center with an 8.4 GHz power of 2 x 10^{15} W/Hz. The radio/X-ray ratio of G1 is a few hundred times higher than that expected for a high-mass X-ray binary in the cluster center, but is consistent with the expected value for accretion onto an IMBH with the reported mass. A pulsar wind nebula is also a possible candidate for the radio and X-ray emission from G1; future high-sensitivity VLBI observations might distinguish between this possibility and an IMBH. If the radio source is an IMBH, and similar accretion and outflow processes occur for hypothesized ~ 1000-solar-mass black holes in Milky Way globular clusters, they are within reach of the current VLA and should be detectable easily by the Expanded VLA when it comes on line in 2010.Comment: ApJ Letters, accepted, 11 pages, 1 figur

How deliberate, spontaneous and unwanted memories emerge in a computational model of consciousness

“And as soon as I had recognized the taste of the piece of madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-blossom which my aunt used to give me ... immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like a stage set to attach itself to the little pavilion opening on to the garden which had been built out behind it for my parents ...; and with the house the town, from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I used to be sent before lunch, the streets along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it was fine ...”\ud \ud ---Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Times Past ()\ud \ud In these words the novelist Marcel Proust described a flood of unbidden memories evoked by the taste of what must be the most famous cookie in the world, Proust’s madeleine soaked in lime-blossom tea. It is of course an experience of spontaneous recall. Judging by numerous thought-monitoring studies, spontaneous recall is the norm in everyday thought. But because it is more difficult to study experimentally than deliberate recall, we know much less about it.\ud \ud \ud In this chapter we describe how a current theory of conscious cognition, global workspace theory, leads naturally to a model of both deliberate and spontaneous recall. Deliberate recall is intended; spontaneous memories are not. They can be divided into two categories:\ud \ud 1. acceptable spontaneous recall (ASR), like Proust’s famous rush of memories evoked by the taste of the madeleine. Such memories are interesting or pleasant or at least tolerable;\ud 2. unwanted spontaneous recall (USR), such as painful traumatic events, an annoying recurrent melody, or a the memory of an unresolved argument with a loved one.\ud \ud We therefore have three categories altogether, deliberate recall (DR), spontaneous recall that is acceptable (ASR) and unwanted spontaneous recall (USR).\ud \ud A large-scale computational model of global workspace theory called IDA has been developed by Franklin and co-authors (Franklin et al, 2005). IDA allows the detailed modeling of GW theory, together with other well-studied cognitive mechanisms, in challenging real-world tasks (Franklin et al, 1998; Franklin and Grasser 2001; Franklin 2001a; Ramamurthy et al, 2003, 2004; Franklin et al, 2005). This chapter will only focus on the question of consciousness and voluntary control as they apply to recall. Because IDA is able to simulate human functioning in at least one type of highly trained expertise, our approach here is to furnish a working proof of principle, showing that the basic computational mechanisms are adequate to generate human-like cognitive functioning in a real-world task. No added theoretical constructs are needed to show three kinds of recall we discuss here: deliberate, spontaneous and unwanted. They emerge directly from the original model.\ud \ud Unwanted memories are important in post-traumatic “flashbacks,” as reported in the clinical literature. While there is controversy about the accuracy of claimed memories, for example, there is little debate that repetitive thoughts and fragments of memories can occur. Wegner has been able to evoke unwanted words in an “ironic recall” paradigm, that is, an experimental method in which subjects are asked not to think of some category of ideas, such as white bears or pink elephants (1994). Unwanted memories can be annoying, or in the case of obsessional thinking, they may become disabling. In everyday life, one can simply ask people to bring to mind an intensely embarrassing personal memory, which can be quite uncomfortable. A number of clinical categories (the Axis I disorders) involve unwanted thoughts, feelings, actions, or memories. These conditions are at the more dysfunctional pole of unwanted mental events, and the study of unwanted memories may help provide some insight into them

Conceptual Commitments of the LIDA Model of Cognition

Abstract Significant debate on fundamental issues remains in the subfields of cognitive science, including perception, memory, attention, action selection, learning, and others. Psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence each contribute alternative and sometimes conflicting perspectives on the supervening problem of artificial general intelligence (AGI). Current efforts toward a broad-based, systems-level model of minds cannot await theoretical convergence in each of the relevant subfields. Such work therefore requires the formulation of tentative hypotheses, based on current knowledge, that serve to connect cognitive functions into a theoretical framework for the study of the mind. We term such hypotheses “conceptual commitments” and describe the hypotheses underlying one such model, the Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent (LIDA) Model. Our intention is to initiate a discussion among AGI researchers about which conceptual commitments are essential, or particularly useful, toward creating AGI agents.</jats:p