Streptomyces morphogenetics: dissecting differentiation in a filamentous bacterium.

During the life cycle of the filamentous bacteria Streptomyces, morphological differentiation is closely integrated with fundamental growth and cell-cycle processes, as well as with truly complex multicellular behaviour that involves hormone-like extracellular signalling and coordination with an extraordinarily diverse secondary metabolism. Not only are the bacterial cytoskeleton and the machineries for cell-wall assembly, cell division and chromosome segregation reorganized during sporulation, but the developmental programme of these fascinating organisms also has many unusual elements, including the formation of a sporulating aerial mycelium and the production of a surfactant peptide and a hydrophobic sheath that allow cells to escape from the surface tension of the growth medium

Rationality, Perception and the All-Seeing Eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments: e.g., size, contrast, color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward