Fiscal Policy Preferences, Trade-Offs, and Support for Social Investment

A common finding in the literature is that social investment policies are broadly popularamong citizens but still politically difficult to implement. This article provides a partialanswer to this puzzle by exploring the fiscal trade-offs associated with such a recalibration.Based on survey data from eight Western European countries, it first explores citizens’fiscal policy preferences with regard to the preferred size of the public sector and the distributionof spending across different subsectors. These preferences are then shown to besignificantly associated with attitudes towards fiscal trade-offs regarding the expansion ofsocial investment policies. The results reveal a political dilemma for policy-makers keen onexpanding social investment: People who traditionally support a large public sector andmore welfare state spending tend to oppose redistributing spending towards social investment,whereas support for such a recalibration is higher among those who have a scepticalview on public spending.Introduction Theoretical framework Empirical analysis Conclusion Supplementary material Data Availability Statement Footnotes Reference

Is the Euro up for Grabs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

The COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a resurgence of the euro crisis. In this context, Italy seems particularly vulnerable: support for the euro is lower than in most other eurozone countries, and a possible exit could have serious consequences for the common currency. Based on a novel survey experiment, this paper shows that the pro-euro coalition is fragile in Italy and preferences are malleable. They are heavily dependent on the perceived costs of continued membership, as a majority of Italians would opt for Italexit rather than accepting a bailout plan requiring the implementation of austerity policies. Individuals who feel they have not benefited from the euro are most likely to support exit when faced with the prospect of austerity. This suggests that, differently from Greece, where voters were determined to remain in the euro at all costs, the pro-euro coalition may crumble if Italy is exposed to harsh conditionality.Die COVID-19-Pandemie hat das Potenzial, zu einem Wiederaufleben der Eurokrise beizutragen. Italien erscheint unter diesen Umständen besonders verwundbar: Die Unterstützung für den Euro ist geringer als in den meisten anderen Ländern der Eurozone und ein möglicher Ausstieg Italiens aus dem Euro könnte schwerwiegende Folgen für die gesamte Währungsunion haben. Anhand eines neuen Umfrageexperiments zeigt dieses Papier, dass das den Euro unterstützende gesellschaftliche Bündnis in Italien brüchig ist und die Präferenzen in der italienischen Wählerschaft in hohem Maße veränderlich sind. Individuelle Präferenzen zum Euro hängen stark von den wahrgenommenen Kosten einer fortwährenden Mitgliedschaft im Euro ab. Eine Mehrheit der Italienerinnen und Italiener würde eher für einen Italexit stimmen, als ein Rettungspaket zu akzeptieren, welches die Umsetzung von Austeritätspolitik erfordern würde. Sind die Befragten mit der Aussicht auf Austeritätspolitik konfrontiert, stimmen insbesondere diejenigen für einen Ausstieg Italiens aus dem Euro, die glauben, dass der Euro ihnen nicht genutzt habe. Im Gegensatz zu Griechenland, wo Wählerinnen und Wähler entschlossen waren, zu jedem Preis im Euro zu verbleiben, zeigt dieser Befund, dass das Pro-Euro-Bündnis in Italien auseinanderfallen könnte, sollte Italien mit einer harten Austeritätspolitik konfrontiert sein.Contents 1 Introduction 2 Individual-level preferences for eurozone membership and exit 3 Framing effects on support for the euro 4 Data and methods Experiment design and dependent variable Independent variables Empirical strategy 5 Results The social support base of eurozone membership and exit Multivariate analysis of support for the euro Results from the survey experiment Heterogeneous framing effects 6 Conclusion Reference

Opposition to Austerity Outweighs Support for the Euro in Italy

Could a new financial crisis, brought on by the Covid-19 pandemic, lead to Italy’s exit from the eurozone? Lucio Baccaro, Björn Bremer and Erik Neimanns present evidence from a new survey experiment on Italian attitudes toward a European bailout and exit from the euro. They find that a majority of voters would opt to stay in the euro if a bailout did not involve conditionality, but that there would be a majority for leaving if a bailout were contingent on austerity policies

Agency Innovation in Vermont Yankee\u27s White Space

The literature on “agency discretion” has, with a few notable exceptions, largely focused on substantive policy discretion, not procedural discretion. In this essay, we seek to refocus debate on the latter, which we argue is no less worthy of attention. We do so by defining the parameters of what we call Vermont Yankee’s “white space” — the scope of agency discretion to experiment with procedures within the boundaries established by law (and thus beyond the reach of the courts). Our goal is to begin a conversation about the dimensions of this procedural negative space, in which agencies are free to experiment with new approaches without judicial oversight. We also explore some of the ways in which energy and environmental agencies are innovating within these boundaries

Till Austerity Do Us Part? A Survey Experiment on Support for the Euro in Italy

The COVID-19 pandemic worsened Italy’s fiscal outlook by increasing public debt. If interest rates were to rise, it would become more likely that Italy experiences a financial crisis and requires a European bailout. How does making EU funds conditional on austerity and structural reforms affect Italians’ support for the euro? Based on a novel survey experiment, this article shows that a majority of voters chooses to remain in the euro if a bailout does not involve conditionality, but the pro-euro majority turns into a relative majority for ‘Italexit’ if the bailout is contingent on austerity policies. Blaming different actors for the fiscal crisis has little effect on support. These results suggest that conditionality may turn Italian voters against the euro.Introduction Preferences for eurozone membership and exit during the euro crisis Framing effects on support for the euro Data and methods Results Conclusion Acknowledgements Notes Reference

Conception and preliminary evaluation of an optical fibre sensor for simultaneous measurement of pressure and temperature

peer-reviewedThis paper presents a novel concept of simultaneously measuring pressure and temperature using a silica optical fibre extrinsic Fabry-Perot interferometric (EFPI) pressure sensor incorporating a fibre Bragg grating (FBG), which is constructed entirely from fusedsilica. The novel device is used to simultaneously provide accurate pressure and temperature readings at the point of measurement. Furthermore, the FBG temperature measurement is used to eliminate the temperature cross-sensitivity of the EFPI pressure sensorPUBLISHEDpeer reviewe

The Constrained Politics of Local Public Investment Under Cooperative Federalism

Public investment spending declined steadily in advanced economies during the last three decades. Germany is a case in point where the aggregate decline coincided with growing inequality in investments across districts. What explains the variation in local investment spending? We assembled a novel data set to investigate the effects of structural constraints and partisanship on German districts’ investment spending from 1995 to 2018. We find that the lack of fiscal and administrative capacity significantly influences local investment patterns. Yet, within these constraints, partisanship matters. Conservative politicians tend to prioritize public investment more than the left. This is especially the case when revenues from local taxes are low. As the fiscal conditions improve, left-wing politicians increase investment more strongly and hence the difference between the left and the right disappears. Our findings are indicative of how regional economic divergence can emerge even within cooperative federal systems and show that, even when decision-makers operate under various institutional and structural constraints, partisanship matters for how these actors allocate discretionary spending.1. Introduction 2. Germany’s divergent patterns of local public investment and the political economy of subnational fiscal policymaking 3. Structural constraints and partisan choices: public investment in a multilevel polity 4. Data and methodology 5. Empirical results 6. Concluding discussion Footnotes Acknowledgments Supplementary material Reference