The internal limits to firms' nonmarket activities

It is well documented that firms develop nonmarket strategies to try to shape public policy changes to their advantage. But are there no limits to this? This paper argues that there is in fact an important limitation, internal to the firm, which comes from the necessity for firms to integrate market and nonmarket activities. Because the two types of activities are not always complements but sometimes substitutes, firms end up giving up part of their nonmarket activities to avoid restricting the development of their market strategies. This argument is tested in the context of the European telecommunications industry. Results suggest that there is reasonable ground for optimism regarding the potentially negative influence that firms' nonmarket activities might play in a democracy

Asset freezing, corporate political resources and the Tullock paradox

In 1967, Gordon Tullock asked why firms do not spend more on campaign contributions, despite the large rents that could be generated from political activities. We suggest in this paper that part of the puzzle could come from the fact that one important type of political activity has been neglected by the literature which focuses on campaign contributions or political connections. We call this neglected activity "asset freezing": situations in which firms delay lay-offs or invest in specific technologies to support local politicians' re-election objectives. In doing so, firms bear a potentially significant cost as they do not use a portion of their economic assets in the most efficient or productive way. The purpose of this paper is to provide a first theoretical exploration of this phenomenon. Building on the literature on corporate political resources, we argue that a firm's economic assets can be evaluated based on their degree of "political freezability," which depends on the flexibility of their use and on their value for policy-makers. We then develop a simple model in which financial contributions and freezing assets are alternative options for a firm willing to lawfully influence public policy-making, and derive some of our initial hypotheses more formally

Private politics daily: What makes firms the target of internet/media criticism? An empirical investigation of firm, industry, and institutional factors

Private politics refers to situations in which activists or NGOs try to push firms to conform to social standards (regarding, for instance, human rights and environmental protection) without public policy intervention. The existing literature on private politics has focused on large campaigns such as consumer boycotts, and looked at the impact of those boycotts on firms' financial performance and on the likelihood that firms comply with activist demands. Even though these large campaigns are important, focusing on them leads to neglecting the fact that a large portion of the time and resources that activists consecrate to private politics is used to monitor firms and criticize them through Internet posting and media statements, rather than to launch high profile campaigns. Little is known, however, about what drives these activists when they criticize companies, why they target certain companies and not others, and whether this criticism should be considered as a primary step in the production of full-fledged campaigns. In this paper, we fill this gap by exploring a unique international database of CSR-based criticisms against Fortune 500 companies for the 2006-2009 period. This database allows us to look at the impact of a broad range of factors including industry differences, country/institutional differences and firm-specific dimensions, on the likelihood that a certain firm will be targeted by activist critique. Results indicate that criticism is driven by strategic intents. Similar to previous literature, large and visible firms in certain industries are more targeted than others. In addition, these firms also tend to come from countries with strong institutions and high standards of living

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation

International Expansion, Diversification and Regulated Firm Nonmarket Strategy

Previous studies have shown that regulated firms diversify for reasons that are different than for unregulated firms. We explore some of these differences by providing a theoretical model that starts by considering the firm-regulator relationship as an incomplete information issue, in which a regulated incumbent has knowledge that the regulator does not have, but the firm cannot convey hard information about this knowledge. The incumbent faces both market and nonmarket competition from a new entrant. In that context, we show that when the firm faces tough nonmarket competition domestically, going abroad can create a mechanism that makes information transmission to the regulator more credible. International expansion can thus be a way to solve domestic nonmarket issues in addition to being a catalyst for growth

Corporate political activity and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis

Using meta-analytic methods on a sample of 74 studies, we explore the links between CPA and public policy outcomes, and between CPA and firm outcomes. We find that CPA has at best a weak effect and that it appears to be better at maintaining public policy than changing them

Learning about the CS during latent inhibition: preexposure enhances temporal control

In three experiments rats were given nonreinforced preexposure to an auditory stimulus, after which this stimulus and a second, novel cue were paired with food. Lower rates of conditioned responding were observed to the preexposed stimulus across the three experiments, indicative of latent inhibition. The degree to which animals used these cues to time the occurrence of food delivery was also examined. Paradoxically, the response slopes - indicating the rate of increase in responding over the course of the CS - were greater for the preexposed than for the novel cues, consistent with the suggestion that the preexposed stimulus exerted greater temporal control. Moreover, this was the case irrespective of whether the duration of the cue during preexposure differed from that during conditioning. These results suggest that although CS preexposure retards conditioning, it may enhance timing. The findings are discussed in terms of current models of conditioning and timing

Educating Dental Health Professionals about People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities

Dental schools and dental hygiene programs are required to incorporate specialized training in their programs to serve people with special needs, however people with intellectual and developmental disability (I/DD) continue to experience poor oral health outcomes. Access to clinicians with the desire and skill to care for people with I/DD remains a challenge. There is a need to understand the best approaches to improve access, and to reduce disparity in oral health, for this vulnerable population representing approximately 1-3% of the general population. Researchers are systematically investigating the literature to uncover evidence of effective approaches to improve access and to support good oral health behaviors. These approaches should be integrated into educational curricula