High quality political institutions are a precondition for a strong civil society

Strengthening civil society is often assumed to be a mechanism for promoting improved governance. Thilo Bodenstein assesses this perspective using comparative data on the strength of civil society across different regions. He finds that the single biggest factor leading to a strong civil society is the presence of high quality political institutions within a given country. Crucially, however, this effect only appears to operate in one direction: high quality political institutions help create a strong civil society, but a strong civil society alone is unlikely to lead to significant improvements in the quality of a country’s institutions

Partisan Politics in Regional Redistribution: Do Parties Affect the Distribution of EU Structural Funds across Regions?

The current debate on the role of regional politics in the Euro pean Union (EU) is dominated by approaches that focus upon either intergovernmental bargaining or multi-level govern ance. Because Structural Funds are the main EU-wide redis tributive policy, we propose to apply the traditional literature on partisan politics and national redistribution to the case of the EU. We use a new data set on both the distribution of Structural Funds across regions and the distribution of vote shares for different factions of the European Parliament. These data provide empirical details for some of the partisan competition that takes place at the regional level. Specifically, we show that the traditional left vs. right cleavage can have an impact on the size of regional transfers

Developing policy evaluation in an academic setting : assets and challenges

Published: 19 April 2023Based on a seminar organized by LIEPP and CIVICA which took place at Sciences Po in June 2022, this publication brings together ten academic researchers from seven different CIVICA universities (Bocconi, CEU, EUI, Hertie School, LSE, Sciences Po, SNSPA), who are involved in various forms of policy evaluation. These contributions from Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and the United Kingdom, reflect on the assets and challenges of developing policy evaluation in an academic setting. The seminar was organized as part of CIVICA’s research focus on “Democracy in the 21st century”, but through the crosscutting nature of program evaluation, it is also of interest to CIVICA’s three others research streams (on societies in transition, data, and Europe revisited). The aim of this debate is thus to better understand the specificities, assets and challenges of developing evaluation from within an academic setting, in view of eventually reflecting on possible ways to collectively reinforce this practice within CIVICA, and use CIVICA as a leverage to reinforce this practice. This debate is organized around two topics, developing academic evaluative research, and the role of academic institutions in outreach and training in evaluation. Contributions are based on presentations of the experiences of each CIVICA partner

Ripples in a Rising Tide: Why Some EU Regions Receive More Structural Funds Than Others Do. CES Working Paper, no. 157, 2008

We investigate the distribution of European Union (EU) Structural Funds across EU regions. We draw from literature concerning the political economy of national intergovernmental grants, and regarding the EU’s two-tiered bargaining process. Bargaining over the distribution of Structural Funds takes place between regions and their respective national governments, but is also influenced by bargaining that occurs on an intergovernmental level. We test our claims with a data set containing the distribution of Objective-1 and Objective-2 funds across EU regions, as well as other economic, institutional and electoral variables. Adjusting for selection bias, we find that the official allocation criteria are not sufficient determinants for explaining the distribution of regional transfers. For Objective-2 they may even be said to bear the opposite sign. Moreover, federalist regions and those with stronger electoral competition receive significantly more transfers than other regions

Capitalist junctures : Explaining economic openness in the transition countries

Current transition theories attribute the varying economic openness of postcommunist countries to the lack of democracy or the inhibiting veto power of vested interests. In this article, the authors offer micro-foundations for such claims and link the key changes in the foreign economic policy of these states to internal coalition building during the first stages of the political transformation.A simple game-theoretic model demonstrates that the way in which ruling elites responses to the competing demands of domestic stakeholders crucially shaped the chance of foreign economic liberalization years later.This early starter hypothesis is contrasted with contending accounts of economic opening in multivariate tests using the ELITE data set (Economic Liberalization in Transition Economies). The regression models confirm that the scope of the political transformation process has fostered foreign economic openness, while the existence of veto players helps rather than inhibits the process of foreign economic liberalization